Occurrence Summaries 01/01/2014 to 31/12/2014 Region(s): All Club:



Christopher Thorpe Executive Manager, Operations The Gliding Federation of Australia Inc.

31-Dec-2014



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	ng Federation of Australia Inc nt and Incident Occurrences									
G	General Statistics									
Date From:	01/01/2014									
Date to:	31/12/2014									

VSA SA	GA	NSWG. N	WAG G	Q .	Total
28	13	21	6	16	84
3	6	3	3	6	21
12	6	13	4	9	44
				1	1
43	25	37	13	32	150
VSA SA	GA	NSWG. N	NAG G	Q '	Total
41	25	35	12	29	142
2		2	1	3	8
43	25	37	13	32	150
	28 3 12 43 VSA SA(41 2	28 13 3 6 12 6 43 25 VSA SAGA 41 25 2	28 13 21 3 6 3 12 6 13 43 25 37 VSA SAGA NSWG V 41 25 35 2 2 2	28 13 21 6 3 6 3 3 12 6 13 4 43 25 37 13 VSA SAGA NSWG. WAG G 41 25 35 12 2 2 1	28 13 21 6 16 3 6 3 3 6 12 6 13 4 9 1 43 25 37 13 32 VSA SAGA NSWG. WAG GQ 41 25 35 12 29 2 2 1 3


Phases

	VSA SA	GA	NSWG.	WAG GQ		Total
Ground Ops	3	1	2			6
Outlanding	3	4	6	1	6	20
Landing	17	13	12	6	16	64
In-Flight	7	6	8	6	5	32
Launch	12	1	9		5	27
Thermalling	1					1
Type of Flight						
Type of Fight						
Type of Fight	VSA SA	GA	NSWG.	WAG GQ	•	Total
Ground Ops	VSA SA 2	GA 1	NSWG. 2	WAG GQ	•	Fotal 5
		-		WAG GQ 3	3	
Ground Ops	2	1	2			5
Ground Ops Competition	2 4	1 3	2 6	3	3	5 19
Ground Ops Competition Local	2 4 21	1 3 11	2 6 14	3 3	3 19	5 19 68
Ground Ops Competition Local Cross-Country	2 4 21 10	1 3 11 6	2 6 14 9	3 3 4	3 19 8	5 19 68 37



The Gliding Federation of Australia IncSOAR Accident and Incident OccurrencesClassification Level 1Date From:01/01/2014Date to:31/12/2014


Level 1						
	VAG	VSA	SAGA	ISWG.	GQ	Total
Airspace	2	7	3	3		15
Consequential Events		2	1	2	1	6
Environment		2			1	3
Operational	11	31	19	30	30	121
Technical		1	2	2		5
Total	13	43	25	37	32	150





The Gliding Federation of Australia Inc SOAR Accident and Incident Occurrences Classification Level 2 Date From: 01/01/2014 Date to: 31/12/2014


Level 2						
	GQ	NSWGA	SAGA	VSA	WAGA	Total
Aircraft Control	13	11	3	8	1	36
Aircraft Separation		3	1	5	1	10
Airframe	6	4	2	3	3	18
Airspace Infringement			2	2	1	5
Communications		1		1		2
Crew and Cabin Safety		1			2	3
Fire Fumes and Smoke	1		1			2
Flight Preparation/Navigation	1	3	1	1		6
Forced / Precautionary landing	1	1	1			3
Fuel Related				1		1
Ground Operations		1	2	4		7
Low Circuit		1		2		3
Miscellaneous	1			3	1	5
Powerplant/Propulsion		1		1		2
Runway Events	5	5	3	8	1	22
Systems		1	2			3
Terrain Collisions	3	4	7	2	3	19
Weather	1			1		2
Wildlife				1		1
Total	32	37	25	43	13	150






The Gliding Federation of Australia Inc SOAR Accident and Incident Occurrences Classification Level 3 Date From: 01/01/2014 Date to: 31/12/2014

Level 3						
	GQ	NSWGA	SAGA	VSA	WAGA	Tota
Abnormal Engine Indications		1				
Aircraft preparation	1	2				
Aircraft Separation Issues		1				
Airframe overspeed			1			
Airspace Infringement			2	2	1	
Avionics/Flight instruments			1			
Birdstrike			-	1		
Collision with terrain	2	3	5	2	3	
Control issues	2	3				
Controlled flight into terrain			1			
Depart/App/Land wrong runway		1		1		
Doors/Canopies	2			2	1	
Engine failure or malfunction				1		
Exhaustion				1		
Fire	1					
Flight crew incapacitation					2	
Forced/Precautionary Landing	1	1	1			
Foreign Object Damage/Debris				1		
Fumes			1			
Fuselage/Wings/Empennage	1			1		
Ground handling				1		
Ground strike			1			
Hard landing	3	1	1	3		
Incorrect configuration	1	1		1		



Inter-crew communications		1				1
Landing gear/Indication	2	3	2			7
Low Circuit		1		2		3
Near collision		2	1	5	1	9
Objects falling from aircraft	1	1			1	3
Other Airframe Issues					1	1
Other Communications Issues		1		1		2
Other Flight Prep/Nav Issues		1	1	1		3
Other Ground Ops Issues			1	1		2
Other Miscellaneous				1		1
Other Systems Issues		1	1			2
Pilot Induced Oscillations		1				1
Rope break/Weak link failure				1		1
Rope/Rings Airframe Strike				1	1	2
Runway excursion	4	3	1	3	1	12
Runway incursion	1	1	2	4		8
Taxiing collision/near collision		1	1	1		3
Turbulence/Windshear/Microburst	1			1		2





Date	4-Jan-2014	Region	VSA		SOAR Rep	ort Nbr		S-0315
Level 1	Environment	Lev	/el 2	Weath	er	Level 3	3	Turbulence/Windshear
								/Microburst
A/C Mod			gfalke II-55		A/C Mode		SZD	-50-3 Puchacz
Injury	Nil	Damage	Substantial	Pha		nd Ops		PIC Age
								The right wing fell
	e left wing of a Pu							
								accident serves as a
	to not leave glide		led on the flight	t line. I	n this case,	the acci	dent	may have been
prophetic	c due to the glue f	allure.		1000	-		-	
	4	-		1	OW			
-	all'	115-				-		
1000	and the second second		-	20	and the second	-		
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the second								-
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ALC: NOT THE OWNER.	and the second second	1	149	-	State of Lot of Lot of Lot	-	200	Contraction of the local division of the
-	30-	6	10	-				And the state of the state of the
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alleria in	1	1	9 700 TEL		The second	A COLOR	1	THE CALLER AND
2			1000 - 200	10.2		-	No.	AND THE OWNER OF THE
	-		State of the second second		A CONTRACT	and the set	5	The second second
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and the second			and the state	12700		-	-	A CONTRACTOR OF
and the second	A DESCRIPTION OF THE OWNER	and the last	the spect of			1000		AND DESCRIPTION OF
and the second	and the second second		A States	WARD -	2 - 50 4 10	the same	TRA	- Alternation
9	Contraction of the	Sector Sector	and the state	15	a farmer a	All CAR	1. 40	a water and the

Date	5-Jan-2014	Regior	n	SAGA			SOAR Report Nbr				S-0311		
Level 1	Operational		Leve	el 2 Terrain Co			llisions Level 3			3	Collision with terrain		
A/C Mod	el 1		P	Pik 20B			A/C Model 2						
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Su	bstantial	Pha	ise	Outlanding			PIC Age	55	
During fir	nal glide in stron	g and gus	sty wi	nd co	onditions (30 to	40 kr	nots) th	e pilot	realis	ed he was n	not going to	
land on t	he aerodrome ar	nd electe	d to la	and i	in a paddo	ck out	side	the aer	odrom	e bou	ndary. Appr	roach control	



Accident and Incident Summaries

was difficult due to wind speed and lack of airbrakes (just landing flaps) and the pilot struggled to get the aircraft out of ground effect. The aircraft struck the ground main wheel and port wing first, then impacted the nose before coming to rest facing the direction of travel. Aircraft suffered broken canopy and fractured tail boom.



Date	5-Jan-2014	Regior	า	VSA SOAR Report Nbr				S-	0312		
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Runway Events Level 3			3	Runway ex	cursion		
A/C Mod	el 1		AS-K	13		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Minor	Dama	age	Minor	Pha	ase	Landi	ng		PIC Age	70
A/C Model 1AS-K 13A/C Model 2InjuryMinorDamageMinorPhaseLandingPIC Age70Returning from local ridge on a training flight, the glider lost height rapidly and was successfully out-landed in local paddock. The glider was retrieved by aerotow and ferried back to the home airfield. The pilot released from tow at a low height for the strong crosswind conditions and conducted a low circuit. During the landing roll the port wingtip contacted grass and, in combination with the crosswind from the right, a ground loop ensued. During the ground loop the aircraft became airborne and dropped heavily to the ground while travelling backwards. The pilot suffered a back injury and was hospitalised for a short period.											
	ting factors inclu th runway.	ide a high	i workioa	a, iong dut	y time	tor c	commai	יסווס חמר	t, and	iong grass (butside the





Conditions pre launch looking north.

Date	7-Jan-2014	Regior	n	NSWGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0313
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	I 2 Runway Events			5	Level	3	Depart/Ap	p/Land
										wrong run	way
A/C Mod	C Model 1			31-350		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dam	age	Nil	Pha	se	Landi	ng		PIC Age	
Several g	liders were retur	ning to t	he airfiel	d following	cross-	coun	try flig	hts and	landi	ing on the n	nost into
wind Rur	way. The PA31 "	Bank Rui	n" aircraf	t also appro	bachin	g the	airfield	d electe	ed to l	land on and	intersecting
runway a	nd hold short of	the oper	ational r	unway to a	void la	ndin	g glider	s, one	of wh	ich passed i	n front of
the static	onary PA31. The	runway c	n which	the 'Bank' p	blane h	nad la	anded h	nad a to	otal le	ngth of 815	meters and
had the p	ilot of the PA31	not been	able to s	stop his airo	craft p	rior t	o the r	unway	inters	ection an a	ccident was
highly pr	obable. This near	⁻ miss wa	s resolve	d construct	ively v	vith (Chief Pi	lot and	the G	GFA Regiona	al Safety
Manager	lanager. Glider pilots were subsequently briefed on potential risks and the need for vigilance and correct										
commun	ications to aid al	erted see	and avo	id. A site vi	sit by (Chief	Pilot w	as mos	t usef	ful in reachi	ng mutual
understa	nding of issues, o	onstrain	ts and th	e effectiver	ness of	ope	rationa	l safety	pract	tices.	





Date	9-Jan-2014	Region SAGA SOAR Report Nbr					S-	0316			
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	2 Terra	in Col	lisior	ıs	Level	3	Collision w	ith terrain
A/C Mod	el 1		LS	-10		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dama	age S	Substantial	Pha	se	Landi	ng		PIC Age	56
	own in nil wind c		•	•		-		•		• .	•
applied b	cted and airspeed out later retracte	d as the a	ircraft's	s speed was o	droppi	ng. T	he pilo	t did n	ot lov	ver the nose	e to regain
speed and the aircraft stalled on short final. The undercarriage collapsed and the left wing was damaged. This incident highlights the importance of maintaining 'safe speed near the ground' and monitoring the ASI											
	ally during the cir			-	sales	peer	i near t	ine gro			ing the ASI





Date	9-Jan-2014	Region		WAGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0324
Level 1	Airspace		Level 2	Airspac	e Infri	ngen	nent	Level	3	Airspace Ir	nfringement
A/C Mod	el 1		Standard	Cirrus		A/C	A/C Model 2				
Injury	Nil	Dama	ge	Nil	Pha	ise	In-Flig	ght		PIC Age	54
	On 9 January 2014 a visiting pilot				-	-			-	-	-
at around	d 2000 ft AGL du	ring the W	/A State (Champions	ships.	The p	oilot ad	vised th	nat at	the time of	this
infringement he was at low level and trying to stay airborne, and he failed to pay sufficient attention to						ntion to					
navigatio	n.										

Date	10-Jan-2014	Regior	I	WAGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0320
Level 1	Airspace		Level 2	Aircra	aft Sep	arati	on	Level	3	Near collis	ion
A/C Mod	el 1		LS8-2	L8		A/C	Model	2	Nim	bus 3/24.5	
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Nil	Pha	ase	In-Flig	ght		PIC Age	66
On 10 Jar	On 10 January 2014 at 1245, a Nimbus and LS8 competing in the West Australian State Championships were										
thermalling to the right in the same general area, with the Nimbus slightly below the LS8. The Nimbus											
straighte	straightened briefly to centre in the core of the thermal and the LS8 turned inside the Nimbus. The pilot of										
Nimbus c	only had a brief t	ime to ob	serve the	LS8 once	his tur	rn wa	s more	establi	shed.	The LS8 wa	as unable to
turn left	out of the turn v	vithout co	olliding wi	th Nimbus	. The p	pilot (of LS8 i	nitiated	l a sh	arp right ha	nd pull up,
stalling th	ne aircraft and c	reating a	brief spin	from whic	h he c	luickl	y recov	ered. T	he sp	in took the	LS8 to a 180
degree o	pposite heading	, clearing	Nimbus. I	Both pilots	agree	e this	was as	close a	s it co	ould get wit	hout being a
collision.	collision. The thermals at the time were generally bubbly and disorganised, with some stronger, intermittent										
cores tha	t could be centr	ed and cli	imbed to	above 400	0ft. M	ost g	liders v	vere mo	oving	in and out o	of the lift
bubbles with search patterns involving constant recentering. The Nimbus pilot did not know the LS8 was											



Accident and Incident Summaries

behind him would not reasonably have been expected to see an LS8 following close behind. The Nimbus pilot would also not have expected another glider to pass inside his turn.

Date	11-Jan-2014 Region WAGA SOAR Report Nbr S-0326 1 Operational Level 2 Crew and Cabin Safety Level 3 Flight crew										
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	2 Crew ar	nd Cab	in Sa	fety	Level	3	Flight crev	v
										incapacita	tion
A/C Mod	Model 1 Astir CS 77 A/C Model 2										
Injury	ijury Nil Damage Substantial Phase Landing PIC Age 48										
On this v	ery hot day the 4	8 year ol	d West	Australian p	ilot fly	ing a	n Astir	CS lost	conse	ciousness at	t 2,000ft AGL
and reco	vered a short wh	ile later a	at 400ft	AGL close to	the a	erodi	rome. (Clearly of	disori	entated, th	e pilot flew a
modified	circuit and lande	ed heavily	, result	ing in substa	intial d	lama	ge to tl	ne aircr	aft bı	ut no injury	to himself.
The pilot	was taken to ho	spital wh	ere he v	vas found to	be su	fferir	ng the e	effects of	of deł	nydration ar	nd was
rehydrate	ed intravenously	. The pilo	t advise	d he had ea	rlier dr	unka	an isoto	onic dri	nk an	d 2 litres of	water, and
he drank	a further half a l	itre of wa	ater dur	ing the accid	lent fli	ght. I	Dehydr	ation re	esults	from the lo	oss of water
and impo	ortant electrolyte	s from th	ie body,	including po	otassiu	ım, so	odium,	chlorid	le, an	d many oth	er minerals
that are o	often overlooked	. Plain w	ater is n	ot quickly ab	osorbe	d by	the bo	dy and	if you	ı drink too r	nuch water,
it ends u	o diluting the cor	ncentratio	on of the	e blood and	the ele	ectro	lytes in	the sys	stem.	For this rea	ason,
drinking	water alone duri	ng a sust	ained ef	fort can para	adoxic	ally b	e a hea	alth risk	. Con	nmercially a	vailable
sports dr	sports drinks like Gatorade, Powerade or Staminade can maintain your electrolyte balance. Be aware that										
many nat	tural fruit drinks	have rela	tively hi	igh concentr	ations	of ca	arbohy	drates t	hat r	equire wate	er for
=	digestion.									•	

NOTE: Following another inflight loss of consciousness episode on 6 December 2014 while flying with an instructor, the pilot underwent comprehensive medical tests that diagnosed vasovagal syncope (refer Report S-0453).

Date	11-Jan-2014	Regior	۱	GQ		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0359	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2		Airfrar	ne		Level	3	Fuselage/\	Nings/Empe	
										nnage		
A/C Mod	el 1	ASW 15 A/C Model 2										
Injury	Nil	Damage Nil Phase In-Flight PIC Age 32										
		easing from aerotow, the pilot heard a noise that was attributed to loose tape on the										
fuselage	hatch and was n	ot particı	ularly con	cerned. Af	ter a v	vhile	the aile	ron co	ntrols	began to fe	eel heavy but	
the pilot	remained uncon	cerned u	ntil after	a couple of	fhour	s loca	al flying	, when	the c	ontrols beca	ame heavier	
and requ	ired two hands o	on the sti	ck. The pi	lot returne	d to tl	he air	field ar	nd land	ed sa	fely, althouរូ	gh with some	
-	. Subsequent ins	-				-	-					
wing for	wing for almost all of its length and was deflected upwards 90 degrees to the airflow, thereby reducing the											
flow of a	ir over the ailero	n and ma	aking it le	ss effective	e. This	incid	ent hig	hlights	the ir	nportance c	of using good	
quality ga	quality gap seals and properly preparing the surface to ensure maximum adhesion.											





Date 11-Jan-2014 Region GQ SOAR Report Nbr S-0318	
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Accident and Incident Summaries

Level 1	Operational	L	evel 2	Airc	raft Co	ontro		Level	3	Control iss	ues		
A/C Mod	el 1	SZD)-50-3 F	Puchacz		A/C	Model	2					
Injury	Injury Nil Damage Nil Phase In-Flight PIC Age 59									59			
While co	While conducting a training flight at 5000ft above the airfield the student said they could not move the												
control c	olumn to the lef	t, the instru	ctor too	ok over and	d foun	d tha	it he als	so coul	d not	move the co	ontrol		
column t	o the left. The gl	ider turned	right to	o line up w	ith the	e airst	trip and	l airbra	kes w	vere deploye	ed for a		
-	n approach. A su		•	•			•			-			
became f	became free to move in all directions. Further inspection did not identify a problem with either the aileron												
circuit or	gap tapes.						circuit or gap tapes.						

Date	11-Jan-2014	Region	legion SAGA			SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0325
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	evel 2 Terrain C		lisior	ıs	Level	3	Collision w	vith terrain
A/C Mod	el 1		Astir	CS		A/C Mode		2			
Injury	Nil	Damag	ge Su	Ibstantial	Pha	se	Outla	nding		PIC Age	30

During a cross country flight the pilot got low and elected to land on the Stuart highway. The glider's right wing impacted a temporary road works sign and did substantial damage. This was the pilot's first outlanding and the road was the safest option. Contributing factors include stress brought on by inexperience and lack of currency, and possible cognitive tunnelling.



Date	16-Jan-2014	Regior	Region WAGA			SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-0375		
Level 1	Operational	Level 2 Terra			ain Co	llisior	IS	Level	3	Collision v	vith terrain	
A/C Mod	el 1	ASW 17/19 m				A/C	Model	2				
Injury	Nil	Damage Minor			Pha	Phase Outlanding				PIC Age	64	
-	lider ground looped in heavy stubble during an out hampionships.				nding	while	e comp	eting in	the \	WA State		




Date	16-Jan-2014	Regior				SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0339
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Airc	raft Co	ontro		Level	3	Hard landi	ng
A/C Mod	C Model 1			LS 3a			Model	2			
Injury	ıry Nil Dan		Damage Minor			Phase Landing				PIC Age	61
Pilot left	decision to 'brea	ık off' the	e flight to	o late after	releas	se an	d flew a	a modif	ied ci	ircuit while	still full of
water. Late decision to dump water and lower the undercarriage led to glider stalling onto the ground											
during the flare resulting in a heavy landing and damage to the fuselage.						he fu					

Date	18-Jan-2014	Region	1	GQ		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	S-0327	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Rur	nway E	vent	S	Level	3	Runway ex	cursion	
A/C Model 1 Nimbus 2C A/C Model 2												
Injury Nil Damage Nil Phase Landing PIC Age 52									52			
Following	g a 4 hour cross o	country fl	ight, the	pilot enter	ed ciro	cuit o	n cross	wind le	eg and	l flew a norr	nal circuit.	
The final	approach was fl	own by ci	abbing	nto a left cr	osswi	nd. T	he aircı	aft flar	ed no	ormally and	landed left	
wing low	and with right r	udder to	counter	the crosswi	nd. O	n roll	ing win	gs leve	l the	left wing tip	was caught	
by 2ft-long grass on the landing strip and swung the aircraft approx. 120 degrees. This incident highlights												
the impo	rtance of mainta	ining gra	ss runwa	iys by regul	ar mo	wing.						

Date	21-Jan-2014	Region		VSA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0355
Level 1	Airspace		Level 2	Airspac	e Infri	ngen	nent	Level	3	Airspace In	nfringement
A/C Mod	Model 1 Ventus 2ct A/C Model 2										
Injury	Nil	Nil Damage Nil Phase In-Flight PIC Age 60								60	
statemer made wa outside t	r was reported b nt that he did not is to misreport hi he CTA. The erro e his map. The pi	actually s positior r occurre	violate a n to ATC, d becaus	irspace and advising he e he misrea	l only e was i ad his	enter n a p navig	red the osition gation i	CTA w inside nstrum	ith cle the C ent a	earance. The TA when he nd did not c	e error he was in fact ross-





Date	27-Jan-2014									
Level 1	Operational		Level	2	Flight		Level 3	3	Other Flig	ht Prep/Nav
				Prepara	tion/Navi	gation			Issues	
A/C Mod	el 1	Kestrel A/C Model 2								
Injury	Nil	Damage Nil Phase In-Flight PIC Age 44								44
	ear old pilot was			-						-
country f	light in hot cond	itions. An	other p	pilot who was	s a Registe	red Nur	se ident	tified	he was suf	fering with
Hyponati	remia from over-	hydratio	n, resul	ting in hypot	ension an	d minor	hypovo	lemia	a brought o	n by a loss of
electroly	tes that had beer	n flushed	from h	is system thr	ough drin	king too	much p	lain	water prior	to and
during th	e flight. The pilo	t recover	ed afte	r drinking a s	ports drin	k that ir	cluded	mod	erate sugar	s and
electroly	tes, and a medica	al check-u	up the f	following day	showed h	ie was s	uffering	no il	l-effects. D	ehydration
results fr	om the loss of w	ater and	import	ant electrolyt	es from t	ne body	, includi	ng po	otassium, so	odium,
chloride,	and many other	minerals	that a	re often over	looked. Pl	ain wate	er is not	quic	kly absorbe	d by the
body and	l if you drink too	much wa	iter, it e	ends up diluti	ing the co	ncentra	ion of tl	he bl	ood and the	e electrolytes
	stem. For this rea									
-	mercially availat		-		-			-	-	
electroly	te balance. Be av	vare that	many	natural fruit d	drinks hav	e relativ	ely high	cone	centrations	of
carbohyc	Irates that requir	e water f	for dige	estion.						

Date	1-Feb-2014	Region	VSA	SOAR Report Nbr	S-0341
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Level 1	Operational	Leve	2 Airc	raft Co	ontro		Level	3	Incorrect of	configuration
A/C Mod	el 1	Ast	Astir CS 77			Model	2	AM	ERICAN CHA	MPION
								AIRCRAFT CORP 8GCBC		
Injury	Nil	Damage	Nil	Pha	Phase Launc				PIC Age	65
A delay d	uring a competit	ion launch led	the pilot to di	semba	ark th	e aircra	aft. Upc	on re-	entering the	e glider he
forgot to	complete his pre	e-take-off checl	ks due to outs	ide pr	essur	e to lau	unch an	id too	ok off with t	he airbrakes
unlocked	. A slow climb a	gle from the tu	ug aler	ted t	he pilo	t to the	prob	lem and the	e airbrakes	
were clos	ed without furth	ner incident.								

Date	1-Feb-2014	Regior	1 I	SAGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0331	
Level 1	Operational		Level	2 Air	craft C	ontro		Level	3	Wheels up	landing
A/C Mod	el 1	Pilatus B4-PC11				A/C Model 2					
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Nil	Pha	ase	Landi	ng		PIC Age	71
This aircr	aft has the airbra	ake and ι	Inderca	arriage lever	s in clo	se pr	oximity	. Witho	out lo	oking and ic	lentifying the
airbrake	control, the und	ercarriag	e lever	was misuse	d for ai	rbrak	e contr	ol and	the a	ircraft was l	anded wheel
up. A dire	ection change an	d later gr	ound le	oop was init	iated t	o avo	id over	shootir	ng inte	o the bound	ary fence
due to a long float. The pilot had flown for almost two hours on a hot day at low altitude and was								is			
dehydrat	him to not i	dentify	/ that	brakin	g was ii	neffe	ctual.				

Date	1-Feb-2014	Regior	า	SAGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0334	
Level 1	vel 1 Airspace		Level	evel 2 Airspace Inf			nent	Level	3	Airspace Infringement	
A/C Model 1			Discus b				A/C Model 2				
Injury	Dam	age	Nil P		ase In-Flight			PIC Age	77		
Terminal	ruary 2014, a p Airspace. The i despite the pilo ntion.	nfringeme	ent was	identified by	/ the p	ilot's	Officia	l Obser	ver. T	he infringer	ment

Date	2-Feb-2014	Regior	1	VSA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0333
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	el 2 Ground Operations Level 3 Other Gro				und Ops			
		Issues									
A/C Mod	el 1	Pi	per PA-25	5-235/A1		A/C	Model	2	LS 3		
Injury	Minor	Dama	age	Nil	Pha	ise	Launc	h		PIC Age	60
The tug h	ad stopped for a	n extend	ed period	l in front o	f a glio	ler al	ongside	e the op	perati	onal runwa	y. A ground
crew per	son walked 30m	to the tu	g and ret	rieved rope	e, and	then	walked	l back t	owar	d the glider	past the
tug's win	g. When the grou	und crew	man was	almost in t	front c	of the	glider,	the tug	g acce	elerated acr	oss the
runway i	n a manoeuvre to	o "lay the	rope". Tl	ne rope ca	ught tl	he gro	ound ci	ewmar	n arou	und one leg	, melted his
trouser le	eg and blistered l	nis hand.	The glide	r pilot awa	iting l	auch	"appea	ired un	awar	e or disconr	nected from
the incide	ent although it o	curred ri	ght in fro	nt of (then	<i>1)."</i> At	temp	ts by o	ther ob	serve	ers to stop t	he tug were
unsucces	sful and the incid	lent end	ed when t	he tug rea	ched t	he e	ktremit	y of the	e man	oeuvre and	l turned
back. Pot	ential casual fact	ors inclu	de a brea	kdown in s	situati	onal a	awaren	ess by t	the tu	ıg pilot, gro	und
crewman	and the glider p	ilot. Rop	e runners	should en	sure tl	ney h	old the	rope ir	n a m	anner that a	allows it to
be pulled	l away from then	n safely r	ather tha	n wrap aro	und th	neir b	ody (oi	catch	their	fingers in th	ne rings). Tug
pilots sho	ould exercise care	e while m	nanoeuvri	ng when tl	he rop	e is ir	n the ha	ands of	a rop	e runner.	

Date 5-Feb-2014 Region VSA SOAR Report Nbr S-0332



Level 1	Operational	Leve	I 2 Groui	nd Opera	ations	Level	3	Taxiing collision/near collision	
								conision	
A/C Mod	el 1	Bella	nca Scout		A/C Moc	el 2			
Injury	Nil	Damage	Nil	Phase	e Lan	ding		PIC Age	65
Manoeu	ring to park bes	ide to another	tug near the c	ompetit	tion laun	ch grid, a	ind av	oid a car to	wing a glider
to the gr	id, pilot was unsi	ghted with a ga	ıble marker aı	nd taxie	d over it	lengthw	ise, fo	rtunately w	ithout
making c	ontact. The tug p	oilot only becan	ne aware of th	ne positi	ion of th	e marker	after	stopping, h	aving turned
over it th	rough 120 degre	es to park next	to another tu	ıg. Nobc	ody atter	npted to	stop	the pilot ap	oroaching
the obsta	acle which passe	d beneath prop	eller and fuse	lage, an	nd fortun	ately pilo	ot turr	ned before r	ear fuselage
contacte	d it. One bystand	ler later congra	tulated pilot	on his ta	axiing ski	l, not rea	alising	event was	not
intended	. Flush markers u	used previously	had been rep	laced by	y gables	at CASA	insiste	ence to the a	aerodrome
operator	(local council), a	move n	markers	out to fei	nce to	widen area	for greater		
room to	manoeuvre.								

Date	6-Feb-2014	Region	1	VSA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0345
Level 1	Operational		Level 2 Grou			d Operations Level 3			3	Foreign Ob	oject
								Damage/Debris			
A/C Mod	el 1	Bellanca	Scout		A/C	Model	2				
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Minor	Pha	ase	Landi	ng		PIC Age	65
-	led with a wing v		-	-			-	-		-	
	ot had no dedica	-					-				-
	just prior to lau					-		-			-
	looked. Eventua	• •	•		-					-	
due to a breakdown in the orderly sequence of pre flight preparations by the glider pilot by not having such											
fittings taken to his car by a crew person. The competition Safety Officer made all pilots aware of the serious											
consequences of leaving equipment on or next to runways.											

Date	7-Feb-2014	Regior	า	SAGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0337
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Run	iway E	vent	S	Level	3	Runway ex	cursion
A/C Mod	el 1		LS 3 TOP			A/C Model 2					
Injury	Nil	Dama	nage Nil		Pha	ase Landir		ng		PIC Age	56
	hour cross coun wing down towa					-					
impacted an above-ground runway light. No damage to aircraft but runway light was broken.							-				

Date	7-Feb-2014	Regior	۱	VSA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0338
Level 1	Operational		Level	2 Run	iway E	vent	5	Level	3	Runway in	cursion
A/C Mod	el 1	Discus 2B				A/C Model 2					
Injury	Nil	Dam	age	Nil	Pha	ase Grour		nd Ops		PIC Age	71
another a	g a competition f glider was on fin ed situational aw	al approa	ch. Pilo				•				


Date	8-Feb-2014	8-Feb-2014 Region		NSWGA		ort Nbr		S-0335
Level 1	Airspace		Level 2 Aircraft Sep		aration Level		3	Near collision
A/C Mod	el 1	F	Piper PA-2	25-235	A/C Model	2	DG-	303 Elan Acro



Injury	Nil	Damage	Nil	Phase	Launch	PIC Age	56
ATSB Invest	igation – Wha	t Happened				•	-
On 8 Februa	ry 2014, at ab	out 1500 Easte	ern Daylight-sa	avings Time	e, the pilot of an AN	1S-flight DG	-303 glider,
registered V	H- DGA (DGA)	, broadcast on	the local glidi	ng club rad	lio frequency that h	e would ret	urn to land
at Bunyan a	eroplane landi	ng area (ALA),	New South W	ales, follov	ving a local flight of	about 90 m	ninutes
duration. Th	e glider was al	bout 5 NM eas	t of the aerod	rome and o	on descent from 10	,000 ft abov	ve mean sea
level (AMSL)	. About 10 mii	nutes later, the	e pilot of a Pip	er PA-25, r	egistered VH-MLS (MLS), broad	dcast a lining
up and rollir	ng call and too	k off from run،	way 33 at Buny	yan to laun	ch a glider from over	erhead the	aerodrome.
					e glider pilot releas	-	
pilot of MSL	turned to lool	< behind the ai	ircraft. He con	firmed that	t the glider had rele	eased succes	ssfully and, in
			-		nced a descending		
-		-			he two aircraft wer		
			-	-	ned the aircraft wo		-
		•			en them, and to tra		
	-				sumed the pilot of	-	-
			-		wind. As the pilot o		
	-	-			bassing about 30 ft	-	-
		-			conds later, the pilo that he had the glio		
		e pilot of DGA			•	iel visual. A	itter lanung,
the phot of i	VILS alerteu tri	e phot of DGA	to the incluen	it that hau	occurreu.		
and the second second							
			Concession in which the				
						-	
			and the owner which the		and the second se	No. of Lot of Lo	
and the second					1	1	The second se
-			-	-	- Trans		4 Land
and the second			That Bernard				
-	a la contra da contra		-		0 0		



Accident and Incident Summaries



- Due to proximity to terrain and associated turbulence, Bunyan (ALA) did not have fixed, prescribed circuit directions.
- Circuits may be flown in either direction, however the gliding club recommended that pilots of the glider tow aircraft descend away from the circuit direction currently in use. **Safety action**

As a result of this occurrence, the gliding club has advised the ATSB that they are taking the following safety actions:



Accident and Incident Summaries

- *Fitment of FLARMs* The gliding club is proposing the fitment of FLARMs to all club aircraft. This is an electronic device which selectively alerts pilots of potential collisions between aircraft. It is tailored for the specific needs of small aircraft such as gliders.
- *Pilot communications briefing* All gliding club pilots will be reminded of the standard procedures with regard to radio communications at a pilots' briefing night.

Safety message

This incident highlights the importance of communication and the limitations of unalerted see-and- avoid principles. Issues associated with unalerted see-and-avoid have been detailed in the ATSB's research report Limitations of the See-and-Avoid Principle. The report highlights that unalerted see-and-avoid relies entirely on the pilot's ability to sight other aircraft. Broadcasting on the CTAF is known as radio-alerted see-and-avoid, and assists by supporting a pilot's visual lookout for traffic. An alerted traffic search is more likely to be successful as knowing where to look greatly increases the chances of sighting traffic. The report is available at www.atsb.gov.au/publications/2009/see-and-avoid.aspx.

Date	8-Feb-2014	Regior	1 I	SAGA	SOAR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	-0336	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Terrain Co	llisions	Level	3	Controlled	d flight into	
		terrain								
A/C Model 1 Astir CS 77 A/C Model 2										
Injury	njury Nil Damage Substantial Phase Landing PIC Age 33									
obtain hi downdra change ru airbrake fence and and the a	s 5 hour duration fts in the area. T unways, whereu was employed to he attempted a ircraft impacted	n. Local w he pilot e pon he cr o lose hei a turn ont I nose do	veather co elected to rowded h ght but tl to anothe wn and si	ar, 300km cross c onditions deterio land ahead of a is circuit and set ne pilot perceived r runway at too deways. The Clul tigue to be causa	rated, with squall but v himself up f d he would d low a height b's Training	light sh arying v or an o collide v . The ri	ower wind o versh with t ght w	s, squalls ar conditions s oot. A side- he runway ringtip struc	nd saw him slip with full perimeter sk the ground	

Date	8-Feb-2014	Region GQ				SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0350		
Level 1	Environment		Leve	vel 2 Weather L			Level	3	Turbulenc /Microbur	e/Windshear		
A/C Mod	A/C Model 1 Piper PA-25-235 A/C Model 2							50				
Injury	Nil	Dama	nage Nil Phase Landing				ng		PIC Age	59		
aircraft b	nding roll the to ecame airborne ull power and th	and rolle	d rap	idly to the righ						-		

Date	16-Feb-2014	Region		NSWGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0342
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Airc	raft Co	ontro		Level	3	Incorrect of	configuration
A/C Mod	el 1		Piper PA	-25-235		A/C	Model	2	SZD	-50-3 Pucha	ICZ
Injury											
The tow pilot had completed three launches and noted the runway was damp from overnight rain. Because											
	of damp ground, runway upslope and conditions the towing combination was clearing far fence by about										
	normal launches										
-	r leave ground. D		•	•				-			• ·
	prompting the pilot to check that power settings, carburettor heat and switches were correct. With no										
obvious p	obvious problem with the tow plane and the aircraft not getting airborne by midway down the runway, the										



Accident and Incident Summaries

tow pilot elected to abort launch while a safe length of runway remained available. The tow pilot released the glider and the towplane rolled to a stop. The glider landed safely ahead in the middle of the runway. The glider instructor noted the student handled the aborted launch well. The launch crew advised that the glider's airbrakes extended fully just after the glider became airborne, and remained open during the landing. Neither the Instructor or student were aware of the airbrakes coming open. While the student completed his pre take-off checks, it appears the airbrakes were closed but not locked. The tow pilot's discipline of having a go/no-go point on the runway was vindicated.

Date	16-Feb-2014	Region		VSA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-0346	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Grour	nd Ope	eratio	ons	Level	3	Ground ha	Indling
A/C Model 1 Twin Astir A/C Model 2											
Injury Nil Damage Nil Phase Launch PIC Age 58											
being abo further b powered	ommenced while orted. Leading up ack along the run tug. As the pilot en by them and	o to this ir nway whil s had alre	ncident w e the pilo ady com	as the dec ots were of pleted the	ision t n boar ir pre-	o fit f d to i board	the tail mprov ding ch	dolly s e the ta	o as t ake-o	o move the ff distance f	glider or the low

Date	23-Feb-2014	Regior	۱	VSA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0347
Level 1	Operational	al Level 2 Runwa			nway E	vents	5	Level	3	Depart/Ap	p/Land
wro							wrong run	way			
A/C Mod	el 1		Piper PA-	25-235		A/C	Model	2	Janu	us B	
Injury	njury Nil Damage Nil					ise	Laund	:h		PIC Age	70
Aerotow	launch was stop	ped whe	n a glider	was obser	ved la	nding	g across	the op	erati	onal runway	y on a hangar
Aerotow launch was stopped when a glider was observed landing across the operational runway on a hangar flight. The crosswind landing was contrary to documented aerodrome procedures designed to mitigate against this type of risk. Contributing factors include missed radio calls from landing gliders and inexperienced launch crew.									nitigate		

Date	25-Feb-2014	Regior	۱	NSWGA		SOAR Report Nbr				S-	0349
Level 1	Operational		Level 2 Aircraft Control Level 3 Wheels						Wheels up	anding	
A/C Mod	Adel 1 JS1 B A/C Model 2										
Injury	njury Nil Damage Minor Phase Landing PIC Age 60										
another workload landing a	anded with the u pilot that distrac I environments a It an early stage. undercarriage sh	ted him a and pilots GFA train	and he fail are enco ning is to	ed to lowe uraged to i lower the u	er the reduce under	unde e thei carria	rcarriag r workl ge once	ge. Circi oad by	uit an confi	d landing ar	re high aircraft for

Date	28-Feb-2014	Region	gion NSWGA SOAR Report Nbr				S-0354				
Level 1	Operational Level 2 Aircraft Control Level 3 I								Hard landi	ng	
A/C Model 1 ASW 20B A/C Model 2											
Injury Nil Damage Minor Phase Landing PIC Age 60										60	
including landing u	conducting a se stalls, steep tur sing full landing ne conditions an	ns and ind flap. The	cipient sp pilot com	in recovery	y. The ormal	pilot circu	then el iit but h	lected t ne flew	o uno the a	dertake a 'sh pproach at a	nort field' a speed too



Accident and Incident Summaries

he flew an approach speed recommended in the aircraft handbook for that flap configuration and did not allow for wind. The pilot also advised he believed using airbrake in conjunction with full landing flap was undesirable. GFA requires pilots to adhere to the 'safe speed near the ground' rule, which is a minimum of 1.5Vs plus half wind speed. This speed may be slightly higher than quoted in the flight manual but not significantly so. Also, use of airbrakes in conjunction with flaps is quite safe. Causal factors include inexperience on type, inadequate speed control during final approach and possible low level turbulence.

Date	2-Mar-2014	Region	n VSA			SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0352
Level 1	Environment		Level 2		Wildlif	fe		Level 3	}	Birdstrike	
A/C Mod	el 1		LS8-	t		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dama	ge	Nil	Pha	se	Thern	nalling		PIC Age	65

While thermalling on a cross-country flight about 38kms from home, the pilot heard a loud bang accompanied by the airframe shuddering and immediately knew something had collided with his aircraft. There were no Flarm indications and the pilot had not sighted another glider. After determining his aircraft was controllable, the pilot elected to return to his home airfield. The aircraft landed without further incident. Subsequent inspection of the airframe revealed signs of a bird strike 5 metres outboard of the left wing. The aircraft was undamaged.



Date	8-Mar-2014	Region	n GQ			SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0362
Level 1	Operational		Level 2 Aircraft		raft Co	ontro	ī	Level	3	Wheels up	landing
A/C Mod	A/C Model 1		LS 7			A/C Model 2					
Injury	Nil	Damag	ge	Minor	Pha	ise	Outla	nding		PIC Age	44




Accident and Incident Summaries

Pilot outlanded with the undercarriage retracted. Causal factors include: misjudged altitude as the pilot was more familiar with metric instruments whereas the glider was fitted with an altimeter calibrated in feet; the pilot completed pre-landing checks at which time he lowered the undercarriage and then attempted to thermal away; conditions of weak lift and the aircraft being at a higher altitude than initially thought led to the pilot to change landing paddock; and another pre-landing check was undertaken and the undercarriage was retracted.

Date	8-Mar-2014	Regior	n	NSWGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0353		
Level 1	Operational		Level	2 Airc	raft C	ontro		Level	3	Pilot Induc	ced	
										Oscillation	IS	
A/C Mod	el 1		ASV	V 20B		A/C	Model	2				
Injury	Minor	Dama	age	Substantial	Pha	ase	Landi	ng		PIC Age	66	
	ooned landing a			-			-	-	-		-	
	nitted to hospita								•	-	•	
	s observed the g						-	•				
include inexperience on type, high workload, stress, incorrect landing technique, and over controlling glider												
in pitch d	in pitch during flare and hold off prior to ground impact.											





Date 9-Mar-2014 Region VSA SOAR Report Nbr S-0356



Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Run	way Eve	ents	Level	3	Runway in	cursion		
A/C Mod	el 1					A/C Mod	lel 2					
Injury												
A two-se	at sailplane over	shot the l	anding a	rea and rol	led to a	stop ha	f-way do	wn tł	ne right-han	d runway		
near the	cross-strip. A ve	hicle was	dispatche	ed along th	e left-h	and run	way perir	neter	track to ret	rieve the		
glider. Just as a winch launch commenced on the left-hand runway, the vehicle driver was abeam the glider												
being ret	rieved and drov	e across tl	he movin	g wires to I	retrieve	the glid	er. The L	aunch	n was aband	oned and no		
damage	or injury occurre	d. The ve	hicle driv	er was not	monito	ring the	CTAF and	d did	not follow e	stablished		
procedur	res, which requir	ed retriev	ve vehicle	s not to cro	oss the \circ	operatic	nal runw	ay bu	it use the pe	rimeter		
track clos	sest to the aircra	ift. This in	cident hi	ghlights the	e impor	tance of	adhering	g to es	stablished p	rotocols, and		
serves as	serves as a reminder that retrieve drivers must maintain proper situational awareness and use radio for											
alerted s	ee-and-avoid.											

Date	11-Mar-2014	Regior	I	SAGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-0361	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Grour	Ground Operations Level 3				3	Other Gro	und Ops
										Issues	
A/C Mod	el 1	Discus b				A/C Model 2					
Injury	njury Nil		nage Minor		Pha	ise	Ground Ops			PIC Age	65
While att	empting to enga	age the w	ater dum	p valve to a	assist	riggin	g the v	vings, t	he co	mmand pilo	ot
inadverte	ently activated th	ne canopy	/ release i	nstead of t	the wa	ater d	ump. T	he rea	r cano	py hinge w	as damaged.
Contributing factors include similar shaped knobs and the pilot using feel for the knob as he was looking at											
the wing	connection.										

Date	16-Mar-2014	Regior	1	NSWGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0357	
Level 1	Operational		Level	2 Corr	Communications Level 3		Level 3		Other Com	nmunications	
										Issues	
A/C Mod	el 1	IMC A-9A Callair				A/C Model 2					
Injury	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		age	Nil	Pha	nase Laun		h		PIC Age	
Tug and (Glider combinati	on were	ined up	o for take-of	^F await	ing A	TC airv	/ays cle	aran	ce. ATC inst	ructed the
tug to ho	ld position as a f	lying club	aircra	ft was cleare	d for a	touc	h and g	go on n	nain r	unway. The	tug pilot
misunder	misunderstood the ATC call and commenced roll. The glider pilots realised no take-off clearance had been										
issued an	ssued and released immediately. The tug aborted the take off before becoming airborne.										

Date	19-Mar-2014	Regior	า		NSWGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0358
Level 1	Operational		Lev	el 2	Airc	raft Co	ontro	Ē	Level 3		Wheels up	landing
A/C Mod	el 1	LS 6-b				A/C Model 2						
Injury	Nil	Dam	Damage Minor Phase					Landi	ng		PIC Age	78
Pilot forg	Pilot forgot to lower the undercarriage for landing and did not complete his pre-landing checks.											

Date	21-Mar-2014	Regior	Region GQ			SOA	SOAR Report Nbr				0383
Level 1	el 1 Operational		Level 2 Aircra		raft C	ontro		Level 3		Wheels up	landing
A/C Mod	el 1	IS-28B2				A/C Model 2					
Injury			amage Nil		Pha	se Landing			PIC Age	67	
After retu	urning to the air	field into	a strong	headwind,	the pi	lot di	d not c	omplet	e his	pre-landing	checks and
landed with the wheel retracted. Causal factors include low experience and high workload in strong wind											
condition	conditions.										



Date	21-Mar-2014	Regior	า	GQ		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0385
Level 1	Operational		Leve	l 2 Ai	rcraft C	ontro		Level	3	Incorrect of	onfiguration
A/C Mod	el 1		IS	-28B2		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Nil	Pha	ase	Launc	h		PIC Age	81
Aircraft la	aunched with the	e wheel r	etracte	ed after beii	ng lande	ed wh	eel-up	the pre	evious	s flight. NOT	E: The IS28
has semi-	retractable land	ing gear.									

Date	22-Mar-2014	Region	Region WAGA		SOAR Report Nbr				S-0360	
Level 1	Operational	Lev	rel 2	Airfrai	ne		Level	3	Doors/Car	opies
A/C Mod	el 1	SZD-5	50-3 Puchacz		A/C	Mode	2			
Injury Nil Damage Nil Phase Landing								PIC Age	62	
while the was inco the cano	ed-up on final ap Instructor flew t nclusive, as the lo py may not have ly rigged latch sy ns.	the approach ocking mecha been properl	. The aircraft la nism was foun y locked at tak	nded s d to be e-off. (afely in go GFA A	. Invest ood wo N170 r	igation rking o notes th	i into rder. nat a j	why the car The instruct partially loc	nopy opened for believes ked, worn or

Date	5-Apr-2014	Regior	1	GQ		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0364
Level 1	Operational					3	Runway in	cursion			
A/C Model 1 SZD-51-1 Junior A/C Model 2 FK9											
Injury	InjuryNilDamageNilPhaseLaunchPIC AgeA glider was launched by winch while a powered aircraft was on final approach. The person who was										
as wing r and did r confirm t did not p	unner was new t tot undertake an he airspace was roperly monitor ew being proper	to the clu 'airspace clear and the base	b and, a clear fo l author station	lthough had or launch' ch ised the lau radio prior t	l previ ieck. T nch to he lau	ous g he pi proc inch.	liding e lot in co eed. Th This inc	experier ommar le duty cident h	nce, v nd of t pilot nighlig	vas not bein the glider di in the opera ghts the imp	ng supervised d not ations van portance of

Date	6-Apr-2014	Regior	۱	VSA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0363
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	el 2 Airframe Level 3 F				Fuselage/\	Nings/Empe		
										nnage	
A/C Mod	el 1	ASW 20B A/C Model 2					2				
Injury	Nil	Damage Nil Phase In-Flight				ght		PIC Age	46		
RH Flap b	ecame disconne	ected fror	n contro	s approx 45	5 minu	ites ii	nto the	flight.	Aircra	aft was flow	n back to
airfield a	nd landed witho	ut incidei	nt. Inspe	ction show	ed L'H	otelli	er safe	ty pin r	ot en	igaged. Inve	stigation
revealed	revealed the L'Hotellier was functioning correctly, leading to the conclusion that it was not properly										
connecte	connected at time of rigging. A dual inspection of control attachments was not completed.										

Date	14-Apr-2014	Region		SAGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-0366	
Level 1	Airspace	Le	evel 2	Aircra	ift Sep	arati	on	Level	3	Near collis	ion
A/C Mod	el 1	SF 25C Falke				A/C Model 2 Ces			Cess	sna	
Injury	Nil	Damage	nage Nil Phase Landing			PIC Age	71				



Accident and Incident Summaries

While on the crosswind leg of the circuit during a training flight in a motor glider, the pilots heard a Cessna call downwind and another powered aircraft called inbound from the East. The motor glider called entering downwind and identified as a glider, although the motor was still idling while engine cooldown procedures were being followed. The Cessna on downwind was sighted ahead of the motor glider and the inbound aircraft was sighted by the motor glider pilots when on late downwind. At this time the student pilot in the motor glider realised that separation from the Cessna was reducing, and extended downwind. The Instructor in the motor glider broadcast that the glider was landing grass left and informed the Cessna pilot that the Cessna would was number one for landing. The Cessna pilot, who was on a commercial check flight, became nervous of the relative position of his aircraft and the glider and decided to go around. The motor glider landed engine-off without further incident.

Date	16-Apr-2014	Regior	า	NSWGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0369	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Airframe Level 3		3	Landing					
										gear/Indic	ation	
A/C Mod	el 1		Discu	us 2c	A/C Mod			2				
Injury	Nil	Dam	age	Minor	Pha	ase	se Landing			PIC Age	60	
	On downwind the pilot conducted FUST checks and extended and locked the landing gear. A normal circuit and approach were conducted. Airbrakes were used on final approach and no landing gear warning was											
	triggered. A smooth touchdown occurred, but soon after the main landing gear collapsed and the aircraft											
slid for a	slid for a short distance on its belly. Investigation by an Airworthiness Inspector indicated a likely cause of											
this incid	this incident was the u/c indentation becoming worn allowing the handle to slip out.											

Date	16-Apr-2014	Region		SAGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0370
Level 1	Operational	Le	Level 2 Fire Fumes and Smoke Level 3				3	Fumes			
A/C Mod	el 1	SF	25C F	alke		A/C	Mode	2			
Injury Nil Damage Nil Phase In-Flight PIC Age 20									20		
The carbon monoxide monitor 'activated'. Initial investigation suggested water contamination may have											
been a fa	actor but, after cl	eaning, the r	nonito	or again ac	tivate	d. Fui	rther in	vestiga	tion I	revealed the	e port
exhaust	clamp had becon	ne unseated,	allow	ing exhaus	st to e	nter t	hrough	n a num	iber o	of points in t	he firewall.
The exhaust clamp was re-seated, all exhaust nuts tightened, and sealant replaced where controls pass											
through	the firewall into t	the cockpit. T	he CC) monitor (renew	al da	te has l	been er	ntered	d in the Mai	ntenance
Release. The inspector noted that water contamination would not cause the monitor to activate.											

Date	19-Apr-2014	Regior	า	WAGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr	or S-		0367
Level 1	Operational		Level	2 Run	Runway Events Level 3 Runway excurs				xcursion		
A/C Model 1 PW-6U A/C Model 2 DG-800A											
InjuryNilDamageSubstantialPhaseLandingPIC Age63During landing the pilot of PW6 glider lost directional control and collided with a glider being towed to the									63		
launch po Contribut and airbr	nding the pilot opint outside the bint outside the ting factors inclu akes. It is import ders usually canr	aerodron de tail wi tant for p	ne gabl ind con ilots to	e markers. Bo nponent, high maintain dire	oth gli n spee ection	ders s d app al co	suffereo proach, ntrol w	d subst and ina hen lar	antial adequ iding	l damage in uate use of v	the collision. wheel brake

Date	19-Apr-2014	Region		NSWGA	SOAR Repo	ort Nbr	S-0368
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Aircraft Co	ontrol	Level 3	Control issues
A/C Mod	lodel 1		Discus	2c	A/C Model 2		



Accident and Incident Summaries

InjuryNilDamageMinorPhaseOutlandingPIC Age60Pilot outlanded on a dirt road running between 2 paddocks within a property. A few star pickets from an old
fence line located off the road passed 3-4m from the glider's wingtip. An aerotow retrieve was undertaken.
During the launch the pilot aborted the take-off due to heavy dust. Minor scratches occurred to the
underside of one wing caused from the dirt road surface during the rejected take-off (fortunately the glider
did not collide with a star picket). A subsequent launch resulted in the towing combination returning home
close to last light. The glider pilot acknowledged this was a risky pursuit and that a road retrieve was
preferable.PIC Age60

Date	23-Apr-2014	Regior	1 I	NSWGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-0376	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2 Airfr		Airfrar	ne		Level	3	Landing	
										gear/Indic	ation
A/C Mod	el 1		Discu	Discus 2c A/C				2			
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Minor	Pha	ase Outlanding				PIC Age	60
During ar	n outlanding into	o a large g	rass pade	dock, and f	ollowi	ng a r	normal	toucho	lown	and landing	roll, the
undercar	riage partially re	etracted a	nd the ai	rcraft quick	dy can	ne to	rest. Si	ubsequ	ent ir	nspection re	vealed a
likely cau	likely cause of this incident was that the undercarriage DOWNLOCK mechanism and the landing gear over-										
centring	centring mechanism needed attention.										

Date	26-Apr-2014	Regior	1	GQ		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0373		
Level 1	Operational	Level 2 Miscel		scellar	eous		Level	3	Winch Performance			
										Issue		
A/C Mod	el 1	Astir CS				A/C Model 2						
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Nil	Pha	hase Launch		PIC Age	52			
safely, th	InjuryNilDamageNilPhaseLaunchPIC Age52Winch launch progressively slowed, resulting in the pilot releasing at low height. Unable to land ahead safely, the pilot successfully landed in a paddock parallel to the runway. It is suspected the winch drum brake was engaged during the launch.PIC Age52											

Date	27-Apr-2014	Regior	า		GQ		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0371
Level 1	Operational		Leve	12	Terra	in Col	llisior	าร	Level	3	Collision w	vith terrain
A/C Mod	el 1	Blanik L13				A/C	Model	2				
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Sul	bstantial	Pha	ise	Landi	ng		PIC Age	16
A low-ho	urs pilot winch la	aunched	into a	light	t headwin	d but a	at a h	ieight o	fabou	t 450f	t the cable	broke. The
pilot cho	pilot chose to modify the circuit instead of landing ahead but flew too far downwind and had to modify his											
base turn to fly directly towards the airstrip. The aircraft cleared tall pine trees on approach but the pilot												
	he airspeed to c	•	-	-		•		•			-	
-	pproach path wa			-			-	-				
-	eft wing struck th	-					-	-		-		-
	The aircraft was substantially damaged but the pilot was uninjured. It is unclear whether the glider's											
airbrakes	were deployed	during th	e circu	uit. C	Causal fact	ors in	clude	e inexpe	erience	, high	workload,	and impaired
judgeme	nt.											

Date	27-Apr-2014	Region Level 2		VSA		SOAR Report Nbr				S-0372	
Level 1	Operational	Level 2 Misc		scellan	neous Level 3			3	Other Miscellaneous		
A/C Mod	el 1	PW-6U				A/C Model 2					
Injury	Nil	Damage		Nil	Pha	hase Launch			PIC Age	73	



Accident and Incident Summaries

This airfield has chains embedded flush with the ground at each end which has a 'fixed' hook on which the wires from a two-drum winch can be anchored when not in use. During a winch launch the 'live' wire snagged under the hook positioned in front of the winch. The winch driver realised what had happened and kept the power on just long enough to allow the glider to achieve sufficient height for a circuit, at which time the launch was terminated. The 'fixed' hook was removed and replaced with a removable one to prevent a recurrence. The crew of the glider were unaware of what caused the low launch until after landing.

Date	17-May-2014	Region		VSA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0377
Level 1	Airspace		Level 2	Aircra	ft Sep	arati	on	Level	3	Near collis	ion
A/C Model 1 SZD-48-1 Jantar Standard 2 A/C Model 2								2			
Injury	Nil	Damage Nil Phase In-Flight PIC Age				PIC Age	46				
A Jantar Std 2 glider was cruising at 2,500 ft near Bacchus Marsh, when a single engine aircraft passed in											
close proximity. No communication could be established with the powered aircraft.											

Date	17-May-2014	Region	1	VSA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0378
Level 1			Level 2	vel 2 Aircraft Se			paration Level 3			Near collision	
A/C Mod	el 1		Twin Astir			A/C Model 2		2	BEE	CH A23-24 M	Лusketeer
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Nil	Pha	ise	In-Flig	ght		PIC Age	70

The glider pilots had been flying in the downwind area of the circuit chasing lift. The pilots elected to fly upwind in the downwind leg and, during a turn towards the runway mid downwind the glider pilots sighted the Beech Musketeer 200 metres to the left on an intercepting course. The glider pilot banked left to avoid a collision, at which time the Musketeer pilot saw the glider. Normal radio calls were made but the glider radio's low volume setting may have led to the glider pilots not hearing the Musketeer pilot. Low lighting due to overcast conditions may have contributed to a degraded 'see and avoid'. This near miss highlights the dangers of gliders operating in the vicinity of the live side of the circuit and the need to keep radio volumes at a level that can be readily heard to facilitate alerted see and avoid.





Accident and Incident Summaries

Date	17-May-2014	Region	1		VSA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0380	
Level 1			Level	vel 2 Aircraft Se			eparation Level 3			3	Near collision		
A/C Mod	el 1		Twi	in Asti	ir		A/C	Model	2	Pipe	er PA-39 Twi	in Comanche	
Injury	Nil	Dama	age		Nil	Pha	se	Landi	ng		PIC Age	71	

A Twin Astir glider on final approach about 400 metres short of the runway and at between 200 and 250ft AGL was overtaken from below by a Twin Comanche aircraft. The glider pilot had not sighted the Twin Comanche during his base leg as the Twin Comanche was flying a long straight-in approach at low level and was not visible due to ground features. The Twin Comanche passed about 50ft below the glider, which was descending on a half airbrake approach. Both aircraft proceeded to execute normal landings. The pilot of the Twin Comanche sighted the glider but elected to continue to overtake. He conceded the situation was a near-miss but felt the separation was marginally adequate. The Rules for Prevention of Collision detailed in CARs 162 (6) & (7), viz.:

(6) When two or more heavier-than-air aircraft are approaching an aerodrome for the purpose of landing, aircraft at the greater height shall give way to aircraft at the lesser height, but the latter shall not take advantage of this rule to cut-in in front of another that is on final approach to land, or overtake that aircraft.(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in subregulation (6), power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft shall give way to gliders.



Date	18-May-2014	Regior	۱ I	VSA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0384		
Level 1				Airspac	e Infri	ngen	nent	Level	3	Airspace Ir	nfringement	
A/C Mod	el 1		LS 4		A/C Model 2							
Injury				Pha	Phase In-Flight				PIC Age	75		
During fli	ght in weak wav	e conditi	ons, the p	ilot inadve	ertentl	y ent	ered Cl	ass C ai	irspac	e due to mi	sinterpreting	
the locat	During flight in weak wave conditions, the pilot inadvertently entered Class C airspace due to misinterpreting the location of the airspace boundary. Pilot did not consult appropriate charts despite these being available											
in the glio	in the glider.											



Date	18-May-2014	Regior	า		VSA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0381	
Level 1	Operational		Level	2	Fu	el Rela	ated		Level	3	Exhaustion	n	
A/C Mod	el 1	Pi	per PA	25	Pawnee		A/C	Model	2				
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Su	bstantial	Pha	se	Landi	ng		PIC Age	76	
GFA FIEL	D INVESTIGATIO	N - FACT	UAL IN	FO	RMATION								
At about	1526 Eastern Sta	andard Ti	me on	18	May 2014	, while	e con	ducting	glider	towi	ng operatio	ns, the pilot	
of a Piper	PA25 Pawnee a	ircraft to	ok off	fror	n Bacchus	Marsl	n, Vic	toria w	ith a gl	ider i	n tow. At 1	529 and at a	
height of	about 2,081ft A	MSL (Aer	odrom	e el	levation is	520ft	AMS	L) <i>,</i> the	Pawne	e eng	ine momen	tarily lost	
power ca	power causing the pilot to lower the nose and increase the throttle. During this manoeuvre the tow rope												
went slack and the glider pilot, perceiving a drop in the towing airspeed, released the tow. The Pawnee pilot													
noted the engine responded to throttle command and, being well positioned, he entered the downwind leg													
for a circuit onto runway 27. According to the GPS log taken from the aircraft, the pilot turned onto base leg													
at around	1530:28. Sixtee	en second	ls later	, at	1530:44 a	nd at	a hei	ght of a	about 7	00ft /	AGL and abo	out 1600m	
from the	runway, the eng	gine surge	ed and	sto	pped. The	pilot i	mme	diately	turned	tow	ard the airfi	eld and	
commen	ced a glide appro	oach. The	pilot,	who	o was also	an exp	perie	nced gl	ider pil	ot, in	itially perce	ived he had	
sufficient	height to land c	on the air	field. V	Vhil	e passing t	throug	h 80	Oft AM	SL the a	aircra	ft was subje	ect to	
turbulend	e and a higher '	sink' rate	, and a	n o	ff-field lan	ding v	vas n	ow ine	vitable.	The	most suitab	le landing	
area was	bounded by tree	es, which	the pil	lot a	assessed h	e was	likely	/ to fly	into, so	he lo	owered the	nose to	
increase	airspeed. The pil	ot pulled	-up ov	er t	he trees, v	vhereu	upon	the air	craft st	alled	and landed	heavily into	
a paddoc	k adjacent to the	e airfield	bound	ary.	The aircra	aft tou	ched	down	on a no	orthe	rly heading	on the right-	
hand und	ercarriage whic	h collapse	ed, cau	sing	g the aircra	aft to s	lew 1	to the r	ight an	d cor	ning to rest	on an east	
south-eas	st heading, almo	st in the	directio	on c	of travel. T	he pilo	ot tur	ned of	f the sv	vitche	es and exite	d the aircraft	
uninjured	l												



Accident and Incident Summaries



Pilot Information

At the time of the accident the command pilot held a current medical and BFR. On the day of the accident, the pilot conducted six glider tows without incident.

Aircraft information

The aircraft was maintained by a CASA authorised workshop. The Maintenance Release (MR) was issued on 2 April 2014 and the aircraft was due for its next inspection on 2 April 2015 or at 4,432.9 hours (1,346.0 off the Air Switch). The MR records the aircraft had 64.3 hours to run prior to the first flight on the day of the accident. After the accident, the Air Switch recorded 1,284.9 hours leaving 62 hours' time to run.

Meteorology

The weather at the time of the accident was good visual meteorological conditions (VMC). The wind was from 3300 (NNW) at 15 knots. Glider pilots reported turbulent conditions close to the ground and in the lee of trees on the approach to runway 27.

Flight data recorder

The aircraft carried a GPS based traffic and collision-warning system (FLARM) which was capable of logging the flight path and altitude. Club members downloaded a trace recording the last three flights of the aircraft. The GPS track data has been determined to be reliable and is consistent with witness observations. ANALYSIS


Flight

The aircraft commenced its final flight at 1526 towing a Schempp-Hirth Janus B glider on a solo recreational flight. The glider pilot stated that the "Tow was proceeding normally until about 1500' above ground when the speed appeared to drop off and the tow rope went slack. I released immediately turning to the right and completed a normal circuit." The Pawnee pilot stated that "at 1800ft AGL (The flight logger trace indicates actual height to be about 1,500ft AGL.) I noticed a minor surge in power. Because I normally fly with my hand on the throttle I thought I may have retarded it when I flew through some turbulence. I recall lowering



Accident and Incident Summaries

the nose of the tug and opening the throttle. During this manoeuvre the glider released." The Pawnee pilot stated that the aircraft responded to throttle inputs and, as he was well positioned, he entered the downwind leg of his circuit. The pilot stated that after turning onto base leg at about 800ft AGL the engine surged and he immediately headed toward the airfield. He estimated the aircraft was about 1,000 metres from the airfield perimeter fence and within reach. "After about three seconds the engine stopped, at which time I gave a mayday call. I initially thought that I had sufficient height to glide onto the airfield but as I passed through about 250ft AGL I experienced turbulence and an increased rate of sink and realised that I would not make it to the airfield and I manoeuvred to land in the paddock just short of the airfield perimeter. I gave another mayday call." As the pilot approached the paddock he perceived a collision with trees was likely. The pilot stated that he "lowered the nose to gain some speed and manoeuvred so as to pick a gap in the tree line. As I approached the tree line I pulled up over them, the aircraft came to a halt within short distance." After the aircraft came to rest the pilot noticed the 'low fuel' warning light was illuminated. He then turned off the electrics and exited the aircraft.



Pilot

Fatigue and stress were evaluated as potential factors in degrading the pilot's performance. During an interview with the pilot he revealed that he had been awake most of the previous night watching football on the television and had only two hours sleep in the preceding 30 hours. It was also determined that he was still experiencing some stress from a recent legal matter that went against him. He stated that "I recall seeing the low fuel light illuminated after the aircraft came to rest but I do not recall seeing it illuminated in flight. Because the accuracy of the fuel gauges are unreliable, I did not pay attention to them. I remember checking the time card maintained for fuelling purposes prior to my first tow and recall I had about 0.4 hours remaining to a refuel. I was therefore expecting to see the low fuel light flash, which would have been my trigger to refuel the aircraft in sufficient time before fuel starvation." There may also have been the added pressure of the gliding clubs having to cease flying operations for the day if he did not fly the tow plane. The pilot advised that he was not rostered to fly the Pawnee on the day of the accident flight and had attended the airfield merely to meet up with fellow gliding club members. However, during the afternoon the rostered tow pilots ceased flying as the conditions were challenging their skill levels. As the pilot of the



Accident and Incident Summaries

accident flight had over 50 years flying experience and the conditions were not beyond his skill level, he agreed to fly the Pawnee so that gliding operations could be continued. **Aircraft**

Examination of the aircraft post-accident revealed no anomalies with the flight controls. The aircraft had impacted the ground heavily on its right undercarriage, which collapsed and caused damage to the RH wing leading edge. The two-blade propeller struck the ground but it was evident it was not turning at the moment of impact, as only one blade was damaged. When the master switch was turned on the 'low fuel' light illuminated, and when the fuel tanks were dipped it was determined they were empty.

Fuelling Requirements

The fuel gauges on the Pawnee are difficult to read with any accuracy. As the aircraft flies many short duration flights (glider tows are typically seven (7) minutes), the Club uses a method of recording refuelling times on a card, taking times off an engine hour meter connected to an air pressure sensor and switch (Air Switch). According to the card in the aircraft, the aircraft was due to refuel at 1284.1 'air switch' time. The 'air switch' was reading 1284.9 immediately after the aircraft came to rest. The Club Tug Master advised that under normal circumstances a Pawnee should provide over two hours towing from a start with both tanks full. He further stated "When the fuel tanks are filled, a note is made on a card clipped to the left door of the aircraft, where 1.5 Hrs. is added to the then current air switch time to signify when fuel should next be added. The decision to use 1.5 Hrs. rather than 2 Hrs. was to allow some flexibility whilst maintaining a reasonable safety margin. All pilots were made aware of this procedure when it was introduced." There is also a "low fuel" red warning light that initially flashes when fuel is low and stays on shortly after to alert the pilot to the fuel state.





Accident and Incident Summaries

- 2. The aircraft had a valid Maintenance Release and had been maintained in accordance with relevant requirements.
- 3. The aircraft was capable of normal operation up to the moment of impact.
- 4. The engine stopped due to fuel exhaustion.
- 5. The pilot did not adequately monitor the aircraft's fuel state nor notice the 'low fuel' warning light was illuminated.
- 6. It is probable that stress and fatigue degraded the pilot's attention and decision making.
- 7. Weather conditions were challenging, with low level turbulence possibly contributing to a destabilised approach.

SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The GFA to remind tow pilots of the importance of fuel management in accident prevention, citing the following references:

- GFA Aerotow Manual (paragraph 9.1.7 Minimum fuel for tow) (<u>https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B775i9ACh45kY2ItQUJMY0E2RG8/edit?usp=sharing</u>);
- ATSB Aviation Research and Analysis AR-2011-112 Starved and exhausted: Fuel management aviation accidents (<u>http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/2012/avoidable-5-ar-2011-112.aspx</u>); and
- The Civil Aviation Safety Authority's (CASA) Civil Aviation Advisory Publication, CAAP 234-1
 Guidelines for aircraft fuel requirements

(http://www.casa.gov.au/wcmswr/ assets/main/download/caaps/ops/234 1.pdf).

2. The GFA to remind members of the importance of fatigue and stress management in accident prevention, citing the following references:

- GFA Human Factors Manual
- (https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B775i9ACh45kZnV4aENxQWxoSnc/edit?usp=sharing);
- The Civil Aviation Safety Authority's (CASA) 'Fatigue Management Toolkit' (<u>http://casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:STANDARD::pc=PC_90315</u>); and
- 'Proof that fatigue kills' a presentation by David Learmount, of Flight International, to an FRMS forum in Farnborough, U.K.
 (<u>https://www.eurocockpit.be/sites/default/files/Fatigue_Kills_Proof_D_Learmount_SP_09_0528.pd</u> f).

Date	7-Jun-2014	Regior	า	Ν	ISWGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0386
Level 1	Operational		Leve	12	Airc	raft Co	ontro		Level	3	Wheels up	landing
A/C Mod	/C Model 1 ijury Nil D			Standard Libelle 201 B A/C Model 2								
Injury	njury Nil E			Mi	Pha	hase Landing				PIC Age	56	
glider cal	not complete his led entering dov ency in recent me lertness.	vnwind. 1	⁻ his wa	is the p	oilot's se	econd	fligh	t of the	day. P	otent	ial causal fa	ctors include

Date	9-Jun-2014	Regior	1	VSA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0388
Level 1	Operational		Leve	l 2 Air					Wheels up	landing	
A/C Mod	el 1		Capr	oni A21S		A/C	Mode	2			
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Minor	Pha	ise	Landi	ng			74
	nded with the wh complete the pr				oilot w	as dis	tracted	l by pa	sseng	er during th	e circuit and

Date 28-Jun-2014 Region GQ SOAR	Report Nbr S-0387
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before the winch.

The Gliding Federation of Australia Inc

Accident and Incident Summaries

Level 1	Consequential	Events	Level 2	Forced / Precautionary			Level	3	Forced/Pr	ecautionary		
					landir	g				Landing		
A/C Mod	el 1		Grob Std Cirrus			A/C	Model	2				
Injury	Nil	il Damage Nil Phase		se	Landing			PIC Age	51			
Pilot tern	ninated flight du	ie to dete	riorating	weather co	onditic	ns ar	nd appi	roachin	g sho	wers. Durin	g downwind	
the glider	r flew through h	eavy sink	sufficient	for the pil	ot to r	nodif	fy his ci	rcuit. A	radio	o call was m	ade to other	
traffic ad	traffic advising of the modified circuit and the glider landed safely 300m from the runway end.											

Date	28-Jun-2014	Region	า		NSWGA		SOA	OAR Report Nbr			S-	0392
Level 1	Consequential Events		Level 2 Forced /			/ Prec	autio	nary	Level	3	Forced/Pro	ecautionary
						landir	ıg				Landing	
A/C Mod	A/C Model 1		KA7				A/C	Model	2			
Injury			Damage		Nil	Pha	se	Landi	ng		PIC Age	64
A rapid c	hange to a tailw	ind durin	g a site	e fan	niliarisatio	n win	ch lau	unch re	sulted	in a lo	oss of speed	during the
climb. Th	e non-flying PIC	made a d	lecisio	on to	release th	ie cab	le at i	300ft A	GL for	a stra	ight-ahead	landing. The
second p	second pilot lowered the nose and applied full airbrake. The PIC, perceiving a threat of running out of room,											
assumed	assumed control and initiated a sideslip to wash off height more quickly. The aircraft came safely to rest 30m											

Date	12-Jul-2014	Regior	n	SAGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0390
Level 1	Technical		Level 2		Syster	ns		Level	3	Other Systems Issues	
A/C Mod	el 1		ASk	-21							
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Nil	Pha	ise	Launc	h		PIC Age 51	
After the	glider released a	at the top	of the l	aunch, the	winch	throt	tle jam	med o	pen. T	he rope wa	s fully
wound in	wound in and the 'trace' shackle broke when it was pulled through the guide pulleys.										

Date	12-Jul-2014	Region	1	NSWGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0389
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Run	iway E	vent	5	Level	3	Runway ex	cursion
A/C Mod											
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Minor	Pha	ise	Laund	h		PIC Age	69
right that left as the	becoming airbo lifted the starbo port wing tip to whereupon the p	oard wing ouched gr	and tail. ound. Th	The pilot ne pilot imi	was u media	nable tely a	to stat	oilise th	ne glid	ler, which sl	ewed to the

Date	20-Jul-2014	Regior	า	GQ		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0391
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Rur	nway E	vents	5	Level	3	Runway ex	cursion
A/C Mod	el 1	Sheib	pe Moto	falke SF 25	С	A/C	Model	2			
Injury Nil Damage Write-off Phase Landing PIC Age 41								41			
veer to the gable The left v	chdown in gusty ne left. The pilot e markers. The le vingtip was seve of impact.	attempte ft wing h	ed to cor it trees l	rect by usin ning the air	g full field p	rudde perim	er and a eter, sv	aileron vinging	but tl the a	ne aircraft ro aircraft into	olled beyond the trees.



Accident and Incident Summaries



Date	27-Jul-2014	Regior	۱	VSA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0393
Level 1	Operational		Level 2 Commu		munic	ation	IS	Level	3	Other Con	nmunications
										Issues	
A/C Mod	el 1	ASK13				A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil Damage Nil Phase Laur		Launc	:h		PIC Age	61				
noticed a not hear turned o	aunch proceede a glider had turn d by the launch a nto final. The lau the landing glid	ed onto fi crew, who inch poin	nal appro o were foo t was suff	each to the cused on g iciently dis	opera etting	tiona the la	al runw aunch a	ay. It aj away be	ppear efore	s that the 'S the glider o	top' call was n base leg

Date	27-Jul-2014	Regior	۱	NSWGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0394
Level 1	Operational		Level	2 Crew a	nd Cal	oin Sa	fety	Level	3	Inter-crew	,
										communic	ations
A/C Mod	el 1		A	SK21		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dam	age Nil			ase	In-Flig	ght		PIC Age	59
led to ne manoeuv pilot with	n Instructor Train ither pilot being vre while the airc nout receiving ar trol being hande	in contro raft was acknow	l of the in a no ledgem	e aircraft for a ose-high attitu nent that the	a short Ide, th other	: perio e pilo pilot	od. Dur ot flying had co	ing the g hande ntrol. T	reco ed cor he no	very from a ntrol to the i on-flying pilo	n aerobatic non-flying ot did not



Accident and Incident Summaries

into a steep dive, and then started to slowly recover to its trimmed attitude giving the impression that it was under control. Control was finally resumed when both pilots became concerned that the aircraft was low and not pulling out of the dive quickly enough. This incident highlights the importance of being clear about who is flying the glider at any time and that one should not let go of the controls until confirmation has been received that the other pilot has taken control.

Date	27-Jul-2014	Regior	ion VSA			SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0395	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2 Aircr		craft C	ontro	ol	Level	3	Wheels up	landing	
A/C Mod	el 1	LS3A				A/C	Model	2				
Injury	Nil Damage Minor Phase Landin		ng		PIC Age	48						
The pilot	The pilot did not complete a post-launch check and left the undercarriage down during the flight. A pre-											
landing c	heck was comple	eted that	led to	the pilot ret	racting	the ι	underca	arriage	and la	anding with	the wheel	
up. While	up. While an undercarriage warning buzzer was fitted, it did not activate. This accident highlights the											
importar	importance of checking the undercarriage lever to the placards.											

Date	1-Aug-2014	Region		GQ			R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0397	
Level 1	Operational		Level	2 Air	craft C	ontro		Level	3	Wheels up	landing	
A/C Mod	el 1	Blanik L13A1				A/C	Model	2				
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Nil	Pha	ise	Landi			PIC Age	71	
Glider lar	nded with the wh	ieel retra	cted. N	NOTE: The Bl	anik ha	is sen	ni-retra	ctable	landiı	ng gear. Pilo	ot did not	
configure	configure the aircraft for landing nor complete a pre-landing check.											

Date	2-Aug-2014	Region	Region GQ			SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0401
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	el 2 Fligh				Level	3	Aircraft pr	eparation
				Preparation/Navigation							
A/C Mod	lel 1		13 A1		A/C	Model	2				
Injury	Nil	Dama	ige	Nil	Pha	ase Landing			PIC Age	40	
Blanik w	ne Daily Inspection heel only partly r nay have been la	retracts). T	The reasc	on for the v							

Date	3-Aug-2014	Regior	1		SAGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0398
Level 1	Operational		Leve	el 2	A	Airfrar	ne		Level	3	Landing gear/Indic	ation
A/C Mod	A/C Model 1			LS4			A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Damage Nil			Nil	Pha	ise	Landi	ng		PIC Age	48
	InjuryNilDamageNilPhaseLandingPIC Age48Undercarriage collapsed during landing on rough ground. Casual factor was out of specification gas strut that failed to maintain overcentre lock.											

Date	3-Aug-2014	Region		VSA			R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0396	
Level 1	Airspace		Level 2	Aircra	aft Sep	arati	on	Level	3	Near collis	ion	
A/C Mod	el 1		Duo [Discus		A/C	Model	2	Puc	uchacz		
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Nil	Pha	ise	In-Flig	ght		PIC Age	66	
Approach	ning the top of a	winch lau	inch the	Puchacz In	structo	or no	ticed a	Duo Di	scus t	o his right a	ind heading	
into his p	Approaching the top of a winch launch the Puchacz Instructor noticed a Duo Discus to his right and heading into his path. The instructor immediately released from the cable and took avoiding action as the Duo Discus											



Accident and Incident Summaries

passed within 50 metres laterally and 20ft vertically of the Puchacz. The Duo Discus pilot stated that he was unaware his glider had drifted over the active runway and, although he heard a radio call he did not identify that a winch launch was about to commence. He attributed the incident to a lack of situational awareness; possibly due to relaxed vigilance (the last flight of the day), and he may not have paid sufficient attention to the radio as he was conversing with his copilot.

Date	3-Aug-2014	Regior	۱	VSA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0400	
Level 1	Consequential	Events	Level	2 L	ow Cir	cuit		Level	3	Low Circui	t	
A/C Mod	el 1		Asti	r CS 77		A/C	Model	2				
Injury	Nil	Dam	age	Nil	Pha	ise	Landi	ng		PIC Age	70	
The pilot	The pilot of the incident flight was low on downwind, originally intending to turn onto an early base leg and											
land long	land long as the operational runway was occupied by three gliders that had just landed. Just prior to him											
turning o	nto base leg, the	e pilot ob	served	the grass rig	nt runv	way b	eing cl	eared s	o he	extended hi	s downwind	
leg in ord	ler to land short	on the cl	eared r	runway. This	decisio	on res	sulted i	n him f	lying	a very low f	inal turn.	
Potential	causal factors in	nclude blo	ocked r	unways, and	desire	to la	nd bac	k at the	e laun	ch point. Th	is incident	
highlights	highlights the dangers of pilots modifying their normal operating procedures, or abandoning accepted best											
practice,	practice, for no reason other than convenience.											

Date	3-Aug-2014	Regior	1	VSA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0399
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	ŀ	Airfrar	ne		Level	3	Doors/Can	opies
A/C Mod	el 1		DG-1	000S		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Nil	Pha	ise	Launc	h		PIC Age	17
rear cand instructo the laund unservice canopy v	at aircraft being opy to use the air r did not adequa ch and landed ah eable radio in the vas closed; and th pint hygiene and	craft rad tely close ead safel control ne instrue	io in ord e the can y with ne van; a po ctor's ina	er to alert o opy, and it o damage o otential run ittention to	thers opene r injur way co the ta	of a p ed dui y. Pot onflic isk. Tl	ootentia ring the tential t; the in his incio	al runw e launcl casual f nability dent hij	vay co h. Th factor of th ghligh	nflict. The E e solo pilot s include ar e PIC to ver nts the impo	Duty abandoned i ify the rear irtance of

Date	16-Aug-2014	Regior	า	VSA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0402
Level 1	Consequential	ntial Events Level 2			ow Cir	cuit		Level	3	Low Circui	t
A/C Mod	el 1		AS	K-21		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Nil	Pha	ise	Landiı			PIC Age	20
Pilot con	Pilot conducted a low-level finish without holding a 'low-level finish' endorsement. Pilot was counselled by										
his CFI.											

Date	25-Aug-2014	Regior	1	NSWGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0403
Level 1	Operational	Level 2 Terrain			ain Co	llisior	IS	Level	3	Collision w	ith terrain
A/C Mod	el 1		Discu	s 2B		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Minor	Pha	ase	Landi	ng		PIC Age	60
observed During th	g a 3-hour local s kangaroos midf le landing flare t ne boundary, res	ield and e he aircraf	elected to t main w	b land shor heel and lo	t. The ower fi	final usela	approa ge impa	ch was acted a	flowi n eleo	n into the se ctric fence o	etting sun. In the



Accident and Incident Summaries

a setting sun, ground shadows leading to the pilot misidentifying the airfield boundary, and wildlife present on the runway.

Date	30-Aug-2014	Regior	egion VSA			SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0405
Level 1	Operational	Level 2 Miscella		scellar	neous		Level	3	Rope/Ring	s Airframe	
									Strike		
A/C Mod	el 1		PW	-6U		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dam	age	Minor	Pha	ase Launch			PIC Age	53	
while box it fell ove winching	n aerotow launcl king the slipstrea er the wing and t to aerotow and Training Panel is	im. Incori he tow ri , while th	rect reco ngs caus e club's	overy techni ed minor da pilots were	que le amage aeroto	d the . The	checki club h	ng Inst ad rece	ructo ntly t	r to release ransitioned	the rope but from

Date	30-Aug-2014			SAGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0406
Level 1	Operational		Level	2 Run	iway E	vent	S	Level	3	Runway in	cursion
A/C Mod	el 1		DG-	1000S		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	,		age	Nil	Pha	ase	Landi	ng		PIC Age	48
During la	nding off a norm	al circuit	on the	crosswind ru	inway	, the	pilot al	lowed t	the ai	rcraft to cro	oss the active
runway a	runway at the end of roll. There was no conflict with other aircraft. The Club training panel identified that										
that poor energy management led to a high-speed float in ground effect.											

Date	6-Sep-2014	Regior	1 I	VSA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0418	
Level 1	Airspace		Level 2	Aircra	aft Sep	arati	on	Level	3	Near collis	ion	
A/C Mod	el 1	D	G-500 Ela	n Orion		A/C	Model	2	Pipe	er PA-25-235	5	
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Nil	Pha	ase	In-Flig	ht		PIC Age	58	
	igaged in aeroto	• •			-					• • • •		
	proximity to the towing combination with no opportunity for either pilots to take evasive action. The DG505											
had mor	had moments earlier completed a "rolling on a point" exercise and was in cruise when the pilots heard the											
towplane	and saw it in clo	ose proxii	mity passi	ng under t	he no	se. Tł	ne pilot	in the	Ventu	us glider und	der tow	
estimate	d the tow plane	and glide	r came wi	thin 50ft.	All airc	craft v	were eo	quipped	d with	n Flarm. The	primary	
method f	or implementing	g 'see-and	d-avoid' is	lookout, v	vhich i	involv	ves see	ing pot	ential	l hazards an	d assessing	
informat	on prior to react	ing. The	primary s	ource of in	forma	ation	is visior	n. Pilots	s mus	t maintain a	good	
lookout a	ind adequately o	ompensa	te for any	/ aircraft b	lind sp	oots. ⁻	This me	ans av	oiding	g long perio	ds at a	
constant	constant heading and checking that the airspace is clear before turning. For further information, refer to OSB											
02/14 'Se)2/14 'See-and-Avoid for Glider Pilots'.											

Date	9-Sep-2014	Region		NSWGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0444
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Run	way E	vents	5	Level	3	Runway ex	cursion
A/C Mod	el 1		H-36 D	mona		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Minor	Dama	ige S	ubstantial	Pha	ise	Grour	nd Ops		PIC Age	78
What Happened											
During m	aintenance of th	e motor g	glider an	d after repla	acing	the fu	uel pun	np, the	engir	eer/pilot m	oved the
glider's fu	uselage outside t	he hanga	r to test	run the eng	gine. 1	he th	nrottle	was set	to id	le and the s	tarter
button was pressed with the engineer/pilot standing outside the cockpit. The engine immediately started											
and went to full power. The fuselage accelerated away with the engineer/pilot attempting to climb aboard.											



Accident and Incident Summaries

Eventually the engineer/pilot abandoned his attempt to board the aircraft and the aircraft careered uncontrolled across the (inactive) runway and impacted the airfield boundary fence causing substantial damage. The engineer/pilot suffered minor abrasions and sought medical attention. It was most fortunate that there were no people or other aircraft in the motor glider's path.

Safety Advice

The engine of a motor glider must only be operated when the glider is rigged, and the pilot is occupying the control seat. Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) 230 provides that a person must not start or permit an aircraft engine to be run unless the engine is started or run when the control seat is occupied by an approved person or by a person who may fly the aircraft. This may include a pilot qualified to fly, or maintenance personnel qualified to work on, that type of aircraft. In any case, the person starting the aircraft must have sufficient knowledge of the aircraft's controls and systems to ensure the starting or running does not endanger any person or damage the aircraft. Civil Aviation Order (CAO) 20.9(5) states: "An aircraft engine shall not be started or operated: within 5 m (17 ft) of any sealed building; or within 8 m (25 ft) of other aircraft; or within 15 m (50 ft) of any exposed public area; or within 8 m (25 ft) of any unsealed building in the case of an aircraft with a maximum take-off weight not exceeding 5700 kg (12,566 lb)."

Date	12-Sep-2014	Regior	1 I	WAGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0412
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Mis	scellar	neous	;	Level	3	Rope/Ring	s Airframe
									Strike		
A/C Mod	el 1		DG-1	000S		A/C	Mode	2	Pipe	er PA-25-235	5
Injury	Minor Damage			Nil	Pha	ase	In-Flig	ght		PIC Age	72
slight tur positione breaking ground. training,	n to left. This acc ed behind the tug and the rope dra This incident high and for instructo e tow pilot prior	celerated g. Subseq aping ove alights the ors to ens	the glid uent use r wing. e import ure the	er resulting of airbrake The glider pi ance of tow tow pilot is l	in the to co ilot re pilots briefe	rope ntrol lease s flyin d pric	develo over-ri d the ro g straig or to lau	oping so unning ope, wh ght duri unch. Pi	ome s the ro lich th ing er ilots s	lack as the g ope led to th nen descenc nergency pr should use t	glider was ne weak link ded to rocedures he radio to

Date	13-Sep-2014	Regior	1		NSWGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0426
Level 1	Airspace		Leve	el 2	Aircra	ft Sep	arati	on	Level	3	Aircraft Se	paration
											Issues	
A/C Mod	el 1		SF 2	5C F	alke		A/C	Model	2	Skyf	fox CA25N G	iazelle
Injury	Nil	Dama	age		Nil	Pha	ise	In-Flig	ght		PIC Age	64
On 13 Se	On 13 September 2014 at 0940 an RA-Aus registered Gazelle on a solo training flight reported an airprox											
with a m	vith a motor glider at around 700 ft AGL during departure from Temora aerodrome and just after											
completi	completing a turn to crosswind. The motor glider was on the downwind leg and the pilot stated he had the											
Gazelle s	Gazelle sighted at all times. The Gazelle pilot reported that he had heard broadcasts from an aircraft in the											
vicinity b	ut the transmiss	ons were	e unre	adal	ole. The m	otor g	lider	radio v	vas fou	nd to	be faulty in	both
transmit	and receive, alth	ough the	glide	r pilo	ot heard th	ne Gaz	zelle j	oilot's t	ransmi	ssion	s. The moto	r glider radio
issues are	e being addresse	d. Temor	a aero	odro	me is regis	stered	and	carriag	e of a v	vorkir	ng radio is m	nandatory
when flyi	ng within its vici	nity. This	incide	ent h	nighlights t	he im	porta	ance of	commu	unicat	tion and the	limitations
	ted see-and-avo								•		•	
	craft. Broadcasti	-										
	pilot's visual lookout for traffic. An alerted traffic search is more likely to be successful as knowing where to											
look grea	tly increases the	chances	of sig	htin	g traffic.							



Accident and Incident Summaries

Date	14	-Sep-2014	Regio	n		GQ		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0404
Level 1	Op	perational		Lev	el 2	ļ	Airfran	ne		Level	3	Landing	
											-	gear/Indic	ation
A/C Mod	el 1			SZD-3	6A C	obra 15		A/C	Model	2			•
Injury		Nil	Dan	nage		Minor	Pha	se	Landi	ng		PIC Age	58
		Indercarriag							ealed t	hat the	cable	e connected	l to the
undercar	riag	e actuating l	ever bro	ke du	e to i	unidentifie	d wea	r.					
			STRAN	05 6	ROX	E AT							
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Date	14-Sep-2014	Regior	1 I	VSA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0415
Level 1	Technical		Level 2	Powerp	lant/P	ropu	lsion	Level	3	Engine fail	ure or
										malfunctio	on
A/C Mod	el 1	9	ZD-50-3	Puchacz		A/C	Model	2	IMC	A-9A Callai	r
Injury	Nil Damage			Nil	Pha	ase	Launo	h		PIC Age	50
During ta	ke off the tug su	iffered pa	irtial eng	gine failure r	esulti	ng in	very lo	w climł	o out.	The tow pi	ot turned
back over	r the airstrip and	l, at abou	t 400ft A	GL, initiate	d a wa	ave-o	ff. The	comma	nd pi	lot in the gl	ider
immediately released form tow. Both aircraft landed back on the airfield safely. Subsequent investigation											
revealed	revealed the loss in power was due to fouled spark plugs.										

Date	14-Sep-2014	Regior	۱		NSWGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0427
Level 1	Operational		Leve	12	Run	way E	vents	8	Level	З	Runway in	cursion
A/C Mod	el 1		SF 2	5C Fa	alke		A/C	Model	2	Jabi	ru J170	
Injury Nil Damage Nil Phase Launch PIC Age 75								75				
At approximately 1025 EST on Sunday 14 September 2014 a Falke SF-25c entered runway 36 at Temora at												
the mid-point and broadcast a rolling call for runway 36 Temora and then departed to the north. At the time												
	s a Jabiru on fina		•									•
threshold	l taxiway for the	Jabiru to	land.	Both	these we	ere in	radio	contac	t and r	neithe	er heard any	radio calls
from the Falke, although the Glider pilot's radio calls were heard by the Gliding Club CFI who was in a												
position	forward of the m	otor glid	er. The	e Jabi	iru pilot a	ssesse	ed tha	at there	e was a	great	ter risk of co	ollision by



Accident and Incident Summaries

going-around than by making a full-stop landing behind the Falke, which had become airborne before the Jabiru touched down some 400m behind it. The Falke pilot later advised that he had heard nothing on the radio and failed to see the Jabiru on final approach. The radio in the motor glider was found to be faulty. Contributing factors include the glider pilot's lack of currency, poor lookout and faulty radio installation.

Date	20-Sep-2014	Region		NSWGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0411
Level 1	Operational	Le	evel 2	Terra	lisior	ns Level 3			Wirestrike		
A/C Mod	el 1	Piper PA-25-235			A/C Model 2						
Injury	Nil	Damage		Nil	Pha	ise	In-Flig	ght		PIC Age	57

GFA FIELD INVESTIGATION - FACTUAL INFORMATION

At about 1640 Eastern Standard Time on 20 September 2014, while conducting a positioning flight between Camden NSW and Bunyan NSW, the pilot of a Piper PA25 Pawnee aircraft decided to conduct a precautionary inspection of a private airstrip at Michelago, NSW. While flying above runway 18/36 on a southerly heading, the aircraft struck power lines suspended some 20 to 30 metres above ground and about 300 metres south of the threshold of runway 18. The aircraft was substantially damaged but controllable, and the pilot was able to complete a low circuit and land back on the airstrip. The pilot contacted the Canberra Gliding Club to notify them of the accident and the property caretaker called emergency services. The ATSB was advised of the accident but declined to attend.



Pilot Information

At the time of the accident the command pilot held a CASA PPL(A) and PPL(H), held an Instrument rating and was endorsed for Glider Towing and to retrieve gliders from paddocks. **Aircraft information**



Accident and Incident Summaries

The aircraft was maintained by a CASA authorised workshop, Dent Aviation (NSW) Pty Ltd. The Maintenance Release (MR) was issued on 15 April 2014 and the aircraft was due for its next inspection on 15 April 2015 or at 9,388.42 hours. The MR records the aircraft had flown about 26 hours since 15 April 2014 and prior to the accident flight (Aircraft TTIS 9342.30 hours). There were no outstanding maintenance items on the MR prior to the accident. The aircraft was not fitted with wire cutters or deflectors.

Meteorology

The weather at the time of the accident was good visual meteorological conditions (VMC). The wind was from 1800 at 5 knots at ground level.

Flight data recorder

The pilot was using a portable GPS unit for navigation that was lost during the accident. The aircraft was fitted with a GPS based traffic and collision-warning system (FLARM) that was capable of logging the flight path and altitude but the unit was not switched on for the flight.

Airfield information

The airfield at Michelago is a well-defined private airstrip with a windsock. The runway is 1,200 meters long and 20 meters wide, and aligned approximately 180/360 degrees. The surface is mown grass surrounded by white painted markers. There is a power pole situated immediately east of the runway near some water tanks and, from this pole, two power lines cross the runway to a power pole on a hill situated some 800 meters west of the airfield. The two power lines are each marked by three small flags immediately above the eastern perimeter road but there are no line markers over the runway itself.



Accident and Incident Summaries



ANALYSIS

Flight

The pilot was ferrying the aircraft from Camden airport to Bunyan ALA with a refuelling stop at Goulburn Airport. The aircraft, which is owned by the Southern Cross Gliding Club, was to be used for glider towing at the Canberra Gliding Club's annual wave camp during the period 20 to 28 September 2014. When approaching the Michelago airstrip, which is situate about 20NM north of Bunyan, the pilot decided to conduct an impromptu straight-in and low-level run down the runway to conduct an inspection of the airfield to ascertain its suitability for him to retrieve gliders that may outland there during the coming weeklong wave camp. During the course of the aircraft's run down runway 18 at a height estimated by the pilot to have been about 100ft, the aircraft struck and severed power lines crossing the runway about 300 metres from the runway threshold. The pilot did not immediately understand what had happened but knew he had hit something. He still had control of the aircraft but realised he did not have sufficient room to land straight-ahead and so flew a low-level right-hand circuit and landed on runway 18. It wasn't until he exited the aircraft that he realised the aircraft had hit wires.

Pilot

The pilot was medically fit and qualified to undertake the flight. Fatigue and stress were evaluated as potential factors but analysis was inconclusive. The pilot reported that he had been 'on duty' for six hours prior to the accident, with his duty period having commenced two hours after waking from a period of 8



Accident and Incident Summaries

hours sleep. In the accident he suffered minor cuts from shattered Perspex but was otherwise in good health; although he was clearly shaken by the experience. The attending Police took a breath alcohol content reading and the pilot was found to have a zero BAC. The pilot held a Glider Towing Permit which included an outlanding retrieve approval. This approval allows the holder to launch gliders from unmarked paddocks and to land in such paddocks solely for the purpose of launching a glider, subject to the approval of the land-owner. As part of this approval, the pilot is trained in conducting precautionary search procedures, particularly in respect of assessment of suitability of paddocks by reference to size, slope, surface, stock and surroundings, with special attention given to SWER lines and their effect on selection of take-off and approach paths. In the case of this accident, the pilot commenced his precautionary search off a straight-in approach and at too low a height to avoid the obstacles encountered.

Aircraft

The aircraft was originally set-up for agricultural work but the hopper and spray gear had been removed many years ago. The aircraft does not have a wire cutter or deflector fitted. Examination of the aircraft post-accident revealed no anomalies with the flight controls. However, the aircraft had been significantly damaged. There was evidence of wire strike to the spinner, propeller, engine cowling (RHS and top), left wingtip leading edge, cockpit, rear fuselage, the leading edge of the vertical and horizontal (port) stabilisers, and rudder. The cable shattered the windscreen and travelled up the cockpit frame to remove the fibreglass roof. The wire then ran down the back of the fuselage, up the vertical stabiliser and then between the top of the vertical stabiliser and the bottom of the rudder horn. The top third of the rudder was torn off. A gaping hole was made in the port wing leading edge near the tip.

Airfield

The airfield is well-defined, with edge markers, a wind sock and a mown grass runway. It is visible as an airfield from some distance away. The airfield is not marked on charts, nor is it in ERSA. The airfield also has a power line hazard that pilots would not expect to encounter that is well inside the airfield boundary; with one pole east of the airstrip and the next pole atop a hill 800 metres away to the west. This power line configuration makes it potentially hazardous to aviators and is particularly unusual. The absence of intermediate power poles makes searching for power lines during an aerial search much more difficult.



The airfield owner had to overcome a number of objections to the airfield development plan and the local Council initially declined to approve it. The owner appealed the Council's decision to the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales (No 10923 of 2010) and the development application was subsequently granted subject to various conditions, among which is the following:

• (Point 12) The electrical power line traversing the site east-west is either to be relocated or placed underground so as to not present a hazard to aircraft movements in accordance with any applicable legislative requirements. A plan showing the proposed relocation or placement of the power line underground is to be provided to Council prior to the commencement of construction. The cost of



Accident and Incident Summaries

this work to be the responsibility of the applicant. Reason: To provide a measure of protection from the possibility of an accident involving aircraft and the electricity supply line. The owner has not complied with this requirement and the local council wrote to the landowners on 13 March 2012 suggesting they install runway unserviceability markers to deter unauthorised use of the airstrip. The landowners acknowledged receipt of the correspondence on 14 March 2012 but did not act on it.

CONCLUSIONS

- 1. The command pilot was appropriately qualified and medically fit for the flight.
- 2. The command pilot holds a GFA "Paddock Retrieve" rating and is trained to search for power poles, insulator orientation and relationship to nearby structures, to detect power lines.
- 3. The aircraft had a valid Maintenance Release and had been maintained in accordance with relevant requirements.
- 4. The airfield had a power line traversing the runway about 300 metres in from the northern threshold.
- 5. The power line was an unusual configuration, with an 800m long span to a power pole atop a nearby hill. The lack of intermediate poles denied the pilot normal visual cues of power line danger.
- 6. The power lines were inadequately marked and were almost invisible to a pilot on approach.
- 7. The airfield operator did not comply with planning approvals that required the power line to be relocated or placed underground to provide protection from the possibility of an accident involving aircraft and the electricity supply line.
- 8. The aircraft struck power lines during a low-level precautionary inspection of a private airstrip.
- 9. The aircraft was capable of normal operation up until the time of impact with the wires.
- 10. The pilot's inspection of the area where low flying was planned was inadequate.

SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1. GFA to remind all pilots operating into an unfamiliar landing area to remain vigilant and ensure that all the necessary precautions are taken to reduce the risks. Precautionary searches should be conducted initially from a safe height, only working to low-level once risks have been identified.
- 2. GFA to remind tow pilots to ensure the owner of an airstrip or paddock has given permission to operate there and has been quizzed about power lines and other potential hazards.
- 3. GFA to recommend to all Gliding Clubs to fit passive wire-strike protection systems to tow planes, especially those used for paddock retrieves.

REFERENCES

- CASA Website Precautionary Search and Landing
- CASA CAAP 92-1 Aircraft landing area guidelines.
- ATSB Document Wire-strike Accidents in General Aviation

Date	21-Sep-2014	Regior	1	GQ			SOAR Report Nbr			S-0408	
Level 1	1 Operational		Level 2	evel 2 Ai		ne		Level	3	Objects fa	lling from
								aircraft			
A/C Mod	el 1		Blanik L13 A1			A/C Model 2					
Injury			age	Nil	Pha	ise	In-Flig	n-Flight		PIC Age	67
InjuryNilDamageNilPhaseIn-FlightPIC Age67The command pilot was undertaking a private passenger flight. During the flight, the passenger attempted to open the clear view panel in the canopy to allow some ventilation. During the course of opening, the perspex track broke and the 'clear view' panel fell out. The panel was retrieved by a person on the ground.											

Date	21-Sep-2014	Region		GQ	SOAR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0407
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Aircraft C	ontrol	Level 3	••	Wheels up landing
A/C Mod	el 1		Nimb	ous 2	A/C Mode	2		



Accident and Incident Summaries

Nil Nil Phase Outlanding PIC Age Injury Damage 51 Due to deteriorating weather conditions and unable to contact lift, the pilot made an early decision to conduct an outlanding. The pilot properly configured the aircraft for landing and flew a standard circuit of the selected paddock checking for hazards. The pilot identified a fence across the paddock and set-up the approach to land past the fence to an uphill landing. During late final the pilot observed power lines across his path but determined they were sufficiently high (about 100ft AGL) not to be a hazard and the glider passed under them during the landing. The aircraft touched down at flying speed and rebounded into the air. During that brief moment the aircraft became airborne the pilot inexplicably retracted the undercarriage and landed with the wheel up. The pilot could offer no explanation for retracting the undercarriage other than he must have become stressed during the late stages of the approach. Causal factors include high workload, stress, low visibility due to overcast conditions and light rain, and the power poles were widespaced making identification of the hazard more difficult.

Date	26-Sep-2014	Region		GQ		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-0416			
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Airc	raft C	ontro	_	Level	3	Wheels up	landing		
A/C Mod	lel 1		IS-28	B2		A/C	Model	2					
Injury Nil Damage Nil Phase Landing PIC Age 67									67				
	On returning to the airfield from a local flight the glider flew through very strong sink and lost height rapidly. The pilot modified his plans and joined circuit on the base leg. The glider landed safely with the												
		-				-	•			•			
	riage retracted.	-				-		-		-	-		
complete his pre-landing checks. Landing mishaps usually occur due to poor workload management, so it is important to get some of the tasks, like lowering the undercarriage, out of the way early. Refer also OSB													
	•			ering the u	inderc	arria	ge, out	of the	way e	early. Refer a	also OSB		
01/14 'Ci	01/14 'Circuit and Landing Advice'.												

Date	26-Sep-2014	Region		WAGA SO			AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0532	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	ŀ	Airfran	ne		Level	3	Other Airf	rame Issues
A/C Mod	el 1	DC	DG-500 Elan Orion A/C Model 2				2				
InjuryNilDamageNilPhaseIn-FlightPIC Age61The pilots fitted a camera externally to the glider's fuselage without having the appropriate engineering											
orders. A airframe 2012 an camera.	s fitted a camera ttaching any obj can have uninter ASK 21 experiend All installations t require a technic	ects to the nded cons ced elevate o an airfra	e externa equence or flutter me, whe	l surfaces o s, such as i at 60 knot ther came	of a sa increa ts caus	ilplai sed s sed b	ne is fra tall spe y turbu	ed or a	Addin airfrar rflow	g cameras t ne flutter. In from a wing	o the n NSW in g mounted

Date	27-Sep-2014	Regior	۱ I	NSWGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0417	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2		Fligh	t		Level	3	Other Fligh	nt Prep/Nav	
				Prepara	tion/N	laviga	ation			Issues		
A/C Mod	el 1		Discu	ıs b		A/C	Model	2	EME	3-110P1		
Injury Nil Damage Nil Phase In-Flight PIC Age 58												
GFA rece	GFA received a complaint from a local parachute operation that a glider on a cross-country flight within the											
Goulburn	Goulburn CTAF came close to the parachute plane. The pilot of the parachute plane could not contact the											
	ot on the CTAF. T	-	•	-						•		
	ate charts for the		• .				•	•				
	resolved. This incident highlights the need for cross-country pilots to properly flight plan, to ensure they											
	have maps and charts for the areas in which they will be flying, and that they monitor the appropriate											
frequenc	y to aid in see-ar	nd-avoid.										



Accident and Incident Summaries

Date	28-Sep-2014	Region		GQ		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0409
Level 1	l 1 Operational		Level 2	Fire Fur	Fire Fumes and Sr			Level 3		Fire	
A/C Mod	el 1	AMT-200			A/C Model 2						
Injury	Minor	Damage Substantial Phase I		In-Flig	ght		PIC Age	67			

GFA FIELD INVESTIGATION - FACTUAL INFORMATION

At 0822 Eastern Standard Time on 28 September 2014, the command pilot took-off from Proserpine (Whitsundays) airport on 315NM flight to Georgetown Airport, Qld. At approximately 0845 and while over Lake Proserpine at 4,000ft, the pilot smelt smoke in the cockpit. This smoke started to increase in intensity, at which point the pilot immediately turned back to Proserpine Airport with the intention of abandoning the flight. When flames appeared out the sides of the engine cowling the pilot switched off the engine. Thick smoke then entered the cockpit and the pilot decided to eject the canopy to clear the smoke. However, when the pilot activated the release, the canopy slid back and locked partially open and did not leave the airframe. With heat building in the cockpit the pilot elected to land in the lake to extinguish the fire. The pilot noticed a ski boat and fishing boat on the water and decided to land in close proximity. He flew a glide approach with the undercarriage retracted with the view to touch-down in front of the boats. When close to the water and with flames coming over the firewall and into the cockpit, the pilot pushed the stick forward and nosed the glider into the lake. The fire was extinguished and the pilot was able to exit the glider, which stayed afloat even though the cockpit was full of water. Fishermen rescued the pilot from the water and towed the glider to the beach.

Pilot Information

The pilot had completed a GFA Annual Flight Review during April 2014 and had accumulated 540 hours/419 flights on the accident type. In the preceding 12 month period he had only flown 7 hours/5 flights, all of which were flown in the preceding 90 days.

Aircraft information

The AMT 200 Super Ximango is a two place side by side powered sailplane of T tail configuration and constructed predominantly of glass fibre sandwich, although some carbon fibre is used in the wing main spars.



Accident and Incident Summaries



Spoilers are fitted to the wing upper surfaces but flaps are not fitted. The two main landing gear legs are located in the underside of the wings, forward of the C of G and are fully retractable, but the steerable tailwheel is not retractable. Power is supplied by a Rotax 912 A2 four cylinder four stroke engine of 69 Kw @5,500 rpm located at the front of the fuselage. Cylinders 1 & 3 are on the right, 2 & 4 are on the left, with No. 1 cylinder closest to the propeller flange. Cylinder firing order is 1,4,2,3. The engine is cooled using a combination of liquid cooling for the cylinder heads and air cooling for the cylinder barrels. The liquid cooling radiator is located behind and below the engine on the right side and there is an oil cooler fitted on the left side, opposite the radiator. Both the radiator and oil cooler are supplied with air from NACA ducts set into the sides of the engine cowlings and the air is exhausted via a common duct located centrally below the engine firewall. Cooling air for the barrels enters via a round duct of approx. 100 mm in the front cowling below and to the right of the propeller, and is ducted to the cylinder barrels by a close fitting fiberglass baffle across the top of the crankcase. There is an adjustable cowl flap for temperature control. The engine is extremely closely cowled and, to help keep temperatures down, the four exhaust pipes are lagged with an insulating material. Coolant hoses that run close to the exhausts are covered with fireproof sleeving to protect them from excessive heat. Engine lubrication is via a "dry sump" system. Engine oil is stored in a tank mounted behind the engine near the No. 4 cylinder and is supplied via an oil cooler to an engine driven pump located at the front of the engine, directly below the gearbox. From the pump it passes through a filter to the engine components via galleries in the crankcase, and to the cylinder head valve gear via hollow pushrods. Unlike most dry sump systems there is no scavenge pump. Oil is collected in the crankcase and the scavenging process is achieved by utilising combustion blow-by gases to pressurise the crankcase and force the oil back to the tank. Crankcase pressure under normal running conditions is nominally 3 to 5 psi. A crankcase breather is not fitted; any excess pressure is passed to the oil tank along with the scavenged oil where the gases are separated and vented via a breather pipe on the oil tank. An adjustable pitch Hoffmann HO-V62R-1/170FA tractor propeller is fitted. Three positions are available: fine pitch for take-off; coarse



Accident and Incident Summaries


pitch for cruise; and full feather for minimum drag when soaring with the engine stopped. The propeller is operated manually by the pilot via a handle in the cockpit that is connected by Bowden cable to an actuating lever and yoke that moves a swash plate at the rear of the propeller hub. The fuel system comprises two 45 litre tanks selectable via a three position valve in the cockpit, a gascolator, an engine driven pump located on the front right corner of the engine, and two naturally aspirated Bing constant depression type carburettors located at each rear upper corner of the engine. There is also an electrically driven boost pump located in the central fuselage area. Fuel supply and return hoses on the engine side of the firewall are all protected by fireproof sleeving. The gascolator is fitted with a metal filter bowl and is located on the engine side of the firewall on the lower right side. Carburettor heat is not fitted on this aircraft, although there is a heat exchanger built into the muffler to supply cabin heat. Air supply for the heat exchanger enters via a horizontal duct below the spinner.

Meteorology

The weather at the time of the accident was good visual meteorological conditions (VMC) with an overcast sky. Cloud base was estimated to be 8,000ft and the wind was from the south-east between 5 and 10 knots. **ANALYSIS**

Flight

The intended flight was from Proserpine (Whitsundays Airport) to Georgetown Airport to the North West and tracking directly over Lake Proserpine, Qld. On departure the aircraft climbed to 500 ft with the propeller in fine pitch, and the pilot then selected cruise pitch and continued a gentle cruise climb at approximately 80 knots.



At around 4,000ft and about 20 minutes into the flight, an unusual smell was noticed that was not initially considered a threat because the engine was operating normally; the smell being attributed to recently installed heat barrier lagging on the exhaust pipes. However the smell intensified and was soon accompanied by visible smoke from the cowling joints. With smoke building in the cockpit, the pilot operated the canopy ejection mechanism but the canopy merely retracted rearwards and jammed open. The pilot then shut down the engine that was still operating normally. Shutting down the engine had no appreciable effect on the fire, which by now had started to breach the cowling on the upper right rear where the oil tank inspection hatch is located. By this time the aircraft was crossing Lake Proserpine at about



Accident and Incident Summaries

4,000ft and because there was visible evidence of an engine fire the pilot elected to land in the lake (the pilot believed landing in one of the available cane fields was not an option due to the fire). The ignition and Master switches were turned off but the main fuel valve was not closed. Spoilers were deployed and the aircraft descended at around 80 knots. An attempt to feather the propeller was made but was unsuccessful as the fire had melted the alloy pitch operating lever at the left front of the engine, thereby rendering the pitch change mechanism inoperable and the propeller fixed in the coarse position. During the latter stages of the descent significant flames were being blown back across the canopy, mainly from the upper right side of the engine cowling and the canopy started to deform from the heat. The pilot was able to keep the flames away from himself by sideslipping the aircraft to port. Because of the failed pitch change mechanism the propeller continued to rotate by windmill effect, resulting in the oil pump and mechanical fuel pump continuing to operate up until the time of ditching in the lake. The pilot was able to exit the still burning aircraft without sustaining serious injury and extinguished the fire, but not before it had caused significant damage to the cockpit and instrument panel, which was totally consumed.




Damage to the engine and its systems was extensive. The four coolant hoses exiting the cylinder heads terminate at a small steel header tank situated centrally above the crankcase and this area sustained the worst of the damage. The return pipe to the radiator is also connected to this header tank. All five of these hoses were badly burned, the worst being the No. 2 cylinder head hose, which was completely destroyed. Hoses from numbers 1, 3 & 4 cylinders were burned to ash at the ends connecting to the header tank but were still intact nearer to the cylinder heads. The header tank, although not melted, had been subject to extreme heat, especially on the rear left adjacent to the left carburettor. There was no evidence of coolant in any of the upper hoses or the tank. The ignition coil packs and wiring to the right of the tank were severely damaged, as was the battery that is located centrally on the upper firewall behind the engine. The four hoses beneath the engine supplying coolant to the heads fared better and still contained coolant. Fire sleeving had been applied to these hoses to shield them from radiant exhaust heat and this protected them;



Accident and Incident Summaries

although their condition suggested that they had not been exposed to severe flame. The front left engine mounting rubber was severely damaged by the fire but the remaining three were still in good condition, suggesting they had received only minimal exposure to flames. All fuel and oil line connections were checked for tightness and, although the fuel line threaded connections at the fuel pump, carburettors and firewall showed signs of some torque loss due to heat/flame exposure, all were deemed to have remained fuel and oil tight.



Despite severe exposure to heat and flame, especially visible on the fuel line fire sleeve where it crosses behind the gearbox, all the oil and fuel lines were intact and undamaged; the fire sleeving obviously performing its designed function. The remaining protective lagging was removed from each of the four exhaust pipes and the pipes examined for cracks or leaks but all were found to be in good condition. Likewise the muffler and all pipe joints were found to be sound. The lagging on numbers 2 & 4 pipes had been subject to flame, some of which had fallen away. The remainder was found to be very brittle and fell away when touched. The numbers 1 & 3 pipes had some lagging missing but was more intact and much less heat damaged. The oil pressure sensor, located at the front of the engine adjacent to the oil pump, was severely burned and was considered to be a potential oil leak source. However, upon removal and testing with compressed air to 80 psi the unit was found to have only the slightest air leak and was determined not to have contributed to the fire. The left carburettor had been involved in a very hot fire, with the fuel bowl melted and the air filter completely burned away. The rubber coupling between carburettor and intake manifold was also burned away. The safety retaining spring was still in place indicating that the carburettor had been properly located on the manifold prior to the fire. The float bowl retaining clip was also in its correct position, indicating that the float bowl was correctly installed. Although some of this fire impinged on the rear side of the coolant header tank and the upper left rear of the cowling the hottest area was below and to the rear of the carburettor. There was no fire at the right carburettor, although the right air filter was partially damaged. An examination of the electrical system, although badly burned with most of the insulation gone, revealed no sign of electrical fusion or overload. The spark plug attachments and ignition



Accident and Incident Summaries

leads to cylinders 2 & 4 were almost completely burnt away but those to cylinders 1 & 3 were significantly less damaged. The entire lower surface of the crankcase, muffler and front end of the crankcase were coated with engine oil. A significant oil leak was identified where the No. 2 cylinder inlet pushrod tube enters the crankcase. The No 2 cylinder head was removed and revealed that about one-third of the pushrod tube sealing O-ring was missing. The oil return line was then removed from the base of the crankcase and the missing segment of the O-ring was found in the banjo bolt. Approximately 750 ml of engine oil and a small quantity of water was drained from the crankcase. Slightly less than one litre of oil was also drained from the oil tank. Given that the oil cooler and filter were still full it is estimated that around one litre of oil had been lost via the pushrod tube leak.

Canopy

The canopy is jettisoned by setting the red handles (on both sides of the canopy) to the "open" position and lifting up the canopy. The flight manual notes that at low speeds, near stalling speed, it is necessary to push canopy away from the aircraft using both hands. The canopy rotates up and back at the front on two struts when it is unlocked by the red handless. The struts are screwed to the fuselage and meant to break away if sufficient force occurs. The back of the canopy has a slide on which it slides back that is designed to allow the canopy to pivot at the rear and depart the aircraft without striking the tail in flight. The pilot advised that he had trouble opening the canopy and it is likely that it suffered sufficient heat deformation as to prevent it from breaking away in the airflow.

Pilot

The pilot was medically fit and qualified to undertake the flight but had only flown five flights for 7 hours in the last 12 months, all of which were undertaken in the accident aircraft in the previous 90 days following the aircraft's return to service. Upon determining the aircraft was on fire, the pilot conducted the emergency checklist from memory. The emergency checklist for an engine fire is as follows:

- Fuel selector valve shut off.
- Throttle full power.
- Magneto switch turn off (after engine stops).
- Master and alternator switches turn off.
- Air vents closed
- Lateral canopy windows openThe pilot recalled turning off the Master and alternator switches but the fuel selector valve was not shut. The pilot attempted to eject the canopy but it locked open. The pilot made a conscious decision to ditch the aircraft into Lake Proserpine in order to extinguish the flames. As recommended in the aircraft flight manual when landing on water, the pilot left the undercarriage retracted and attempted, unsuccessfully, to feather the propeller. The pilot suffered minor injury and smoke inhalation and was hospitalised for a short period.

Aircraft

The aircraft struck the water in a nose down attitude with the wheels retracted and the propeller windmilling. It suffered significant fire and water damage but stayed upright and afloat after coming to rest. The aircraft was maintained under the GFA system of maintenance. The Maintenance Release could not be located following the accident and may have been destroyed in the fire or was lost either when the canopy was opened or during the ditching sequence. Review of the aircraft logbook showed that, prior to the accident flight, it had a Total Time in Service (TTIS) of 992 hours for 812 landings and a total of 785.83 engine hours. The most recent Inspection for the issue of a maintenance release was performed and signed out on 16 August 2013 by a GFA Airworthiness Inspector. Due to low compression issues with the engine, issue of the Maintenance Release was to be deferred until after the cylinder heads had been overhauled. This work was duly completed by another GFA Airworthiness Inspector on 14 April 2014, at which time the Maintenance Release was to be issued.



Accident and Incident Summaries



FINDINGS

Investigation indicates the fire started near the front left of the engine, fuelled from the oil and mist leaking from the No. 2 cylinder inlet pushrod tube. The oil was most likely ignited by the adjacent hot exhaust pipe. Flames and heat were sucked upward and diagonally across the top of the engine, exiting initially via the gaps in the cowling around the oil tank inspection hatch and where the cowling attaches to firewall. Initially this fire was not severe but it intensified once the rubber components ignited. The pitch change relay lever was melted away at its outer end where it would have been in a direct path of the fire as it swept up past the front of the No. 2 cylinder. The failure of this lever prevented the pilot feathering the propeller, which resulted in the continuing rotation of the engine. This led to a continual flow of oil mist and petrol to the fire via crankcase pressurisation and the mechanical fuel pump. The cause of the oil leak was determined to be the incorrect assembly of the No, 2 cylinder head. During the process of aligning the pushrod tubes and the crankcase, the inlet side O-ring slipped out of position on the pushrod tube and was sheared off between the end of the pushrod tube and the crankcase aperture, thereby resulting in about one-third of the pushrod tube diameter remaining unsealed. The aircraft had flown on four occasions since the cylinder head installation but during this time no oil leaks or loss had been detected. The operator advised that he always removed the engine cowls when performing his Daily Inspection and that no evidence of oil leakage had been detected, nor was there any evidence of oil on the floor of the hangar where the aircraft was parked. Oil level in the tank was checked at each Daily Inspection and no oil usage/loss was seen. It is unclear why the oil leak did not become evident until after four flights, as the potential for the leak existed from the moment the O-ring was damaged on assembly.



Accident and Incident Summaries



CONCLUSIONS

- 1. The pilot was certified and qualified for the flight.
- 2. Records indicate that the aircraft was certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with existing regulations and approved procedures.
- 3. O-ring failure the No. 2 cylinder inlet pushrod tube likely occurred as a result of inadequate engine maintenance procedures during re-assembly.
- 4. The fire started as a consequence of escaping oil at the damaged O-ring contacting the hot exhaust.
- 5. The pilot did not fully complete the emergency checklist and did not close the fuel selector valve, thereby allowing petrol to feed the fire when fuel lines were compromised.
- 6. Fire damage rendered the pitch change mechanism inoperable, thereby preventing the propeller from feathering.
- 7. The windmilling propeller resulted in the oil pump and mechanical fuel pump continuing to operate.
- 8. The pilot was unable to extinguish the fire.
- 9. The pilot elected to land in a lake to extinguish the fire rather than risk setting fire to a paddock.

GFA COMMENT

There are both Airworthiness and Operational lessons to learn from this potentially fatal accident. The cause was a clearly identified maintenance error. This incident highlights:

- The importance of maintenance personnel ensuring faults such as this do not result, especially in circumstances where a fault cannot be seen once assembled. This was an avoidable defect but it is understandable how the error could occur. Working in a poorly lighted hangar and assembling a complex component with an inexperienced assistant may have contributed. The maintenance engineer was a very experienced and qualified GFA member. More care was required to avoid the fault and engineers must identify potential problems and compensate.
- The burning coolant hoses contributed significantly to the fire, which reduced the time in which to land and increased the fire risk to the occupant. They were of a standard design and GFA will consider recommending the use of fire resistant hose or fire sleeving on similar gliders (mandatory action is not considered necessary as the occurrence rate is very low).



Accident and Incident Summaries

- Had the engine been shut down on first noticing smoke it is likely the propeller would have feathered and the pumping of oil and fuel reduced. This may also have reduced the flow of coolant that was feeding the fire and reducing its intensity.
- In this case the failure to close the fuel valve is not believed to have added significantly to the fire but in other cases this could have been a fatal error. More training and practice on emergency procedures will be implemented.
- Fire sleeving on fuel and oil hoses was effective and prevented release of fuel and oil from hoses so protected.
- The pilot elected early to conduct a precautionary landing and the decision to land in a lake to extinguish the fire was appropriate. While the pilot omitted to shut off the fuel selector valve, his decision making was otherwise sensible and appropriate. He remained calm and in control even though flames were around him, and was able to use his skills to keep the flames away from him by sideslipping.

The investigation of the failure was conducted by a highly experienced Aeronautical and Mechanical Engineer and retired Senior Technical Officer with GFA. The report has been reviewed by the GFA Airworthiness Department and recommendations for airworthiness made as given above.

Date	30-Sep-2014	Regior	1	GQ		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0413	
Level 1	vel 1 Operational		Level 2	el 2 Airfra		ne		Level	3	Doors/Can	opies
A/C Mod	el 1		AMT-200 S			A/C Model 2					
Injury	njury Nil		age	Minor	Pha	ise	Launch			PIC Age	63
-	ne launch of this ully aborted the	-								•	


Date	3-Oct-2014 Region		n		NSWGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0420
Level 1	Airspace		Leve	vel 2 Aircraft Se			paration Level 3			З	Near collision	
A/C Mod	A/C Model 1		AS	H 25	бМ		A/C	Model	2	Pipe	er PA-30 Twi	in Comanche
Injury	Nil	Dama	age		Nil	Pha	se	In-Flig	ght		PIC Age	76

GFA FIELD INVESTIGATION - WHAT HAPPENED

On 3 October 2014 a Twin Comanche aircraft being flown by a pilot under the supervision of an instructor and accompanied by a passenger was conducting instrument approaches into Gunnedah aerodrome, including a missed approach exercise. The hood was not being used. At about 15:15 and after a missed approach, they climbed to 2,000ft and turned right, which took them to the location of the circling glider at about 4,000ft. The Twin Comanche pilot, who was monitoring the Gunnedah CTAF 127.4 MHz, stated his aircraft came within 20 metres of a sailplane. The Twin Comanche crew had not observed the glider circling until the near miss occurred. The Twin Comanche pilot was unable to contact the sailplane on the Gunnedah CTAF but did so on the Lake Keepit CTAF of 122.7 MHz. The ASH-25 powered sailplane involved in this incident was conducting a 160NM cross-country gliding flight (engine off) from Lake Keepit NSW to Narrabri NSW to Mullaly NSW and then returning to Lake Keepit. The flight log of the sailplane shows that at 15:00 it was at 4,000ft AMSL about 5NM South West of Gunnedah Airfield, NSW. At 15:15 it had descended to 3,600ft approximately 3NM from Gunnedah aerodrome, where it commenced to thermal in order to gain height for the return trip to Lake Keepit, approximately 20NM away. By 15:21 the sailplane had climbed to 6,700ft in the same location. From this altitude the glider tracked direct to Lake Keepit. The glider pilots said that the first time they observed the Twin Comanche was when it was on approach to Gunnedah aerodrome whilst they were at 6,000 feet. The sailplane pilots was on the Lake Keepit CTAF 122.7 MHz and listening out on the area frequency of 127.1 MHz. The sailplane pilot believed that, given his heights, he was not likely to be in conflict with Gunnedah aerodrome operations and therefore was not monitoring the Gunnedah CTAF.



Accident and Incident Summaries



GFA COMMENT

When operating outside controlled airspace, it is the pilot's responsibility to maintain separation with other aircraft. For this, it is important that pilots utilise both alerted and unalerted see-and-avoid principles. Pilots should never assume that an absence of traffic broadcasts means an absence of traffic.

Unalerted see-and-avoid relies entirely on the ability of the pilot to sight other aircraft. A traffic search in the absence of traffic information is less likely to be successful than a search where traffic information has been provided because knowing where to look greatly increases the chance of sighting the traffic.

This incident highlights the importance of broadcasting radio calls to alert pilots and assist in see-and-avoid practices. It also serves as a reminder to keep a good lookout for other aircraft, particularly around non-controlled aerodromes.

SAFETY ACTIONS

- 1. The Chief Flying Instructor of the Gliding Club met with his counterpart at the flight training school in Tamworth and all parties have a better understanding of each other's operations.
- 2. The Gliding Club has reinforced to their members the importance of being on the correct frequencies to facilitate alerted-see-and-avoid.

REFERENCES

• Civil Aviation Advisory Publication 166-1(3) – Operations in the vicinity of non-controlled aerodromes.



Accident and Incident Summaries

- Civil Aviation Advisory Publication 166-2(1) Pilots' responsibility for collision avoidance in the vicinity of non-controlled aerodromes using 'see-and-avoid'.
- Limitations of the see-and-avoid principle (1991).
- A pilot's guide to staying safe in the vicinity of non-towered aerodromes (AR-2008-004(2)).

Date	4-Oct-2014	Regior	1	SAGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0419
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	vel 2 Aircraft C		ontro	1	Level 3		Airframe overspeed	
A/C Mod	el 1		ASW 2	27-18							
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Minor	Pha	Phase In-Flight			PIC Age	47	
subjected The pilot Type Cerr manufact ensure th	1400 ACST, durin d to gust loads du advised that dur tificate notes tha turing defect ma ne aircraft is flow smooth air.	uring a hi ing a run It the ma y also hav	gh-speed near Vn ximum ro ve contri	d run that re e (137 knot ough airspe buted. Pilot	esulte s), the ed (Vr ts und	d in d glide a) is ertak	lelamin er flew 116 kno ing test	ation o throug ots. Inv t flights	of the h turk estiga after	port wing le pulent air. T ation reveal maintenan	eading edge. he Glider's ed a latent ice must

Date	6-Oct-2014	Regior	۱	NSWGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0414
Level 1	Technical		Level	2 Powerp	lant/P	ropu	lsion	Level	3	Abnormal	•
										Indication	S
A/C Mod	el 1		H-36 I	Dimona		A/C	Model	2			
Injury Nil Damage Nil Phase Launch PIC Age 59									59		
During the latter part of the take-off run and then into early climb of this training flight the pilot in command											
noticed t	noticed that normal power was not being developed and that the climb rate, although positive, was										
comprom	compromised. The command pilot took control and, after assessing options, made a left-hand turn to remain										
within th	e airfield bounda	ary and o	ver land	able terrain	. The c	omm	and pi	ot con	tinue	d the turn o	nto an
oblique c	rosswind and lat	e downw	/ind joir	n, and compl	eted a	n une	eventfu	l landiı	ng. Af	ter landing	the
comman	d pilot identified	the prop	eller ha	id been in cri	uise pi	tch ir	nstead	of fine	pitch	required fo	r take-off.
Causal Fa	ctors include ina	dequate	confirn	nation of app	oropria	ate pr	op pito	h setti	ng du	ring pre lan	ding checks;
failure to	carry out static	run up ch	neck du	ring pre take	-off ch	iecks	due ex	pedien	cy; ar	nd acceptan	ce of rough
centre section of runway for take-off run that led to handling issues (PIO) distracted from engine monitoring.											
The com	mand pilot noted	l that rec	ent club	o exercises o	n simu	lated	engin	e failur	e afte	er take-off p	roved
invaluable in this situation.											

Date	17-Oct-2014	Region	1	GQ		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0421		
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Terra	in Co	llisior	าร	Level	3	Wirestrike		
A/C Mod	el 1		ASW	20		A/C Model 2						
Injury	Minor	Dama	age Su	ubstantial	Pha	ise	Outla	nding		PIC Age	39	
GFA FIEL	D INVESTIGATIO	N - FACT	UAL INFO	RMATION								
At about	1604 Eastern Sta	andard Ti	me on 17	October 2	014, v	vhile	on the	final le	g of a	416Km cro	ss-country	
racing ta	sk, the aircraft ex	kperience	d a high i	rate of desc	cent n	ecess	sitating	the pil	ot to	abandon th	e flight and	
conduct	an outlanding. A	s the pilo	t approac	hed the sel	lected	l land	ling pao	dock it	: beca	ame obvious	s that the	
surface w	/as unsuitable fo	r landing	. During l	ow level ma	anoeu	ivres	to land	in ano	ther p	baddock fur	ther ahead,	
the aircra	aft flew into pow	er lines a	nd cartw	heeled to tl	he gro	ound.	The pi	ot suff	ered	minor abras	ions and the	
aircraft w	aircraft was substantially damaged. The broken power line ignited a small grass fire that was extinguished by											
emergen	cy services.											
Elight da	Elight data recorder											

Flight data recorder




Accident and Incident Summaries

The pilot carried an LxNav Nano3 flight recorder with an integrated 56-channel GPS receiver and antenna. A valid log was downloaded from the device for analysis.

Meteorology

The weather at the time of the accident was good visual meteorological conditions (VMC), with blue skies and strong climbs to 8,400ft AMSL. The wind was from 214o at 20 knots at ground level.



Wind profile with height. Taken from GPS flight recorder.


ANALYSIS

Flight

The accident flight was on the final day of the 34th Australian Club and Sports Class National Gliding Championships. Going into this flight, the pilot was leading the Club Class after eight competition days. The final day's task was an Assigned Area Task with a 3.5 hour task time, comprising three cylinders - two of 30km radius and one of 20km radius. Task length varied between 296Km and 545km, subject to where the pilot flew within the assigned areas. Weather conditions were fine and a peak temperature of 29.50 C was recorded at the Goondiwindi Airport during the mid-afternoon. The pilot launched at 11:09 and went through the start line at 12:20. The pilot flew 126km down the first leg at 101kph to a position south of Mungindi, turning northwards at 13:43 at 4,200ft AMSL. The pilot was working a height band of between 4,400ft and 8,000ft, with a low point of 3,600ft. The pilot experienced similar conditions along the second leg and worked the same height bands. At 14:41 the pilot turned the second turnpoint at 4,100ft well inside the assigned area, and headed East towards the final turnpoint. During the second leg he had covered 126km at a speed of nearly 130kph. Conditions on the third leg were not as good as earlier and the pilot found himself working to below 3,000ft on at least three occasions. The climbs were not strong and the speed for this leg was down to 90kph after a further 110km, which prompted the pilot to turn for home as soon as he entered the assigned area, with a further 40kms back to the airport. During the final run home the pilot did not find any significant climbs but believed he had sufficient height to successfully glide home. However, when about 15kms from the finish line (18kms from the airport) the aircraft was down to 2,500ft AGL. The aircraft continued to fly through descending air and approximately 6kms from the finish line the aircraft was at 800ft AGL, at which time the pilot flew through some reduced sink. The pilot slowed the aircraft down and gained about 200ft as a result but after one and a half turns elected to continue the flight towards a paddock about 3-4 kms in the distance.



Accident and Incident Summaries



The paddock in which the pilot intended to land is circled.

The pilot arrived at his intended landing paddock at about 400ft AGL but realised the paddock was unsuitable. The pilot spotted an alternative small paddock some two kilometres further that he thought he would be able to reach but the glider continued to fly through descending air. The pilot flew the aircraft to very low level and initiated a pull-up over trees in order to land off a straight-in approach in the alternative paddock. After clearing the trees and while positioning for a landing, the glider's starboard wing struck a power line that the pilot had not sighted and the glider cartwheeled into the paddock tail first.



Close-up of the Power pole showing broken line. Pilot

The pilot was medically fit and qualified to undertake the flight. Fatigue and stress were evaluated as potential factors but analysis was inconclusive. While the pilot had been airborne that day for just over five hours, he did not believe he was fatigued. Notwithstanding, both cross-country soaring and competition flying are stressors, where high workload and the pressure to win can lead to impaired decision making and



Accident and Incident Summaries

reduced situational awareness. The pilot may have been susceptible to fixation and cognitive tunnelling in these circumstances.

Aircraft

The aircraft struck the power line with the right wing, midway between the fuselage and the airbrakes. This resulted in the aircraft turning through 180 degrees and impacting the ground tail-first, and then the fuselage taking an impact. This accident geometry led to the pilot suffering only minor injury.



CONCLUSIONS

- 1. The command pilot was appropriately qualified and medically fit for the flight.
- 2. The aircraft had a valid Maintenance Release and had been maintained in accordance with relevant requirements.
- 3. The command pilot was operating in a high workload environment, and towards the end of the flight adopted a high risk flight profile that eroded safety margins.
- 4. The aircraft struck power lines during an outlanding into an alternative paddock.
- 5. The profile of the aircraft flight path during the last few minutes made identification of the power lines difficult.
- 6. The aircraft was capable of normal operation up until the time of impact with the wires.

GFA COMMENT

A common reason for outlanding accidents is the pilot not accepting soon enough that an outlanding is likely, and not prioritising the available height to allow them to fly to a good safe area. Pressing on with the flight in the hope that that all will be well is fraught with danger. Unlike landing at the home airfield where the runway layout, ground features and hazards are usually well known, when landing in a strange paddock the pilot is faced with the unknown. Such a situation demands the pilot take additional precautions to ensure a proper survey is undertaken of the landing area so as to identify all hazards and ensure a safe landing can be accomplished. In power flying this is called a 'precautionary search' and is commenced from no lower than 500ft AGL, although in gliding one must obviously start a lot higher. Guidance on conducting precautionary searches for outlanding can be found on page 78 of the GFA Basic Gliding Knowledge book. When flying cross-country it is important that pilots plan and think ahead so that they are always in a position to make a safe landing. At low levels a pilot's priority will change from searching for lift to finding a suitable area in which to land. This requires good flight management and discipline because flying at low level is unsafe:



Accident and Incident Summaries

- there are more obstacles to avoid, many of which are hard to see until it is too late (e.g. power lines and birds);
- pilots have a higher workload because there are more hazards to negotiate in the environment;
- there may be turbulence and wind shear that pilots do not encounter at higher levels; and
- there is very little time to recover control of the aircraft if something goes wrong (e.g. consider a low level spin).

For competition pilots the race to the finish is a high workload and dynamic situation. In such circumstances, being near the ground at a height where it is not possible to assess and check an available landing paddock is a high risk situation that must be avoided. Human factors including decision biases, goal fixation and cognitive tunnelling in competition may lead to pilots eroding safety margins more than in normal non-competition flying. Being aware of the dangers of continuing into marginal circumstances, setting boundaries, having a sound knowledge of rules and procedures, disciplined adherence to minima and performance requirements, prioritisation of options, and planning to deal with potential situations will act as defences against unsafe conditions.

SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

Chief Flying Instructor

- 1. All competition pilots should reconnoitre a 10 km circle around the aerodrome so as to be aware of suitable landing fields and obstacle should a competition finish not result in enough energy to make the airfield.
- 2. All Competition Directors should aim to have the desired final glide offer the safest arrival possible, this include moving the Soak sector in AAT's far enough away to avoid a wide convergence angle over unsuitable terrain.
- 3. GFA should consider removing all zero height competition finishes unless the final glide track is over suitable outlanding fields on the inbound track within a 10km radius of the airfield

Competition Safety Officer

• The sports committee investigate whether mandatory finish heights at competitions would reduce the risk of marginal final glides. International competition rules allow this.

GFA RESPONSE

The Safety recommendations have been referred to the GFA Sports Department for consideration. The Sports Department is already considering the setting of a minimum finish height at competitions and is looking to implement an education program focussing on human factors and risk management for competition pilots.

REFERENCES

- GFA Publication Basic Gliding Knowledge
- GFA Publication Human Factors for Gliding
- GFA Operational Safety Bulletin OSB 01/14 Circuit and Landing advice
- CASA Website Precautionary Search and Landing
- ATSB Document Wire-strike Accidents in General Aviation

Date	17-Oct-2014	Regior	า	GQ		SOAR Report Nbr				S-	0422
Level 1	Operational		Level	2 Terra	ain Co	llisions Level 3 Co			Collision w	ith terrain	
A/C Mod	el 1		Blaı	nik L13		A/C	Model	2			
Injury Minor Damage Substantial Phase Outlanding PIC Age 81								81			
return th decision realised t	ing between clou e 8NM to the air to outland in a p the glider would a levelled gravel	field. The addock a not reach	e aircra bout h n the se	ft continued alf a mile to t elected paddo	to lose he eas ock an	e heig st. Los d an a	ht and sing he alterna	the cou ight rap tive site	mmai pidly, e was	nd pilot mac the comman chosen. The	de a late nd pilot e alternate



Accident and Incident Summaries

decided to land from the east due to trees on the western approach but flew too wide a circuit for the conditions. During final approach the glider began to undershoot and it became apparent that the aircraft would not clear the 15ft embankment. The command pilot stalled the glider into the embankment causing significant damage to the glider and minor injury to the two occupants. The command pilot's CFI noted the alternative landing area was unsuitable but suitable landing areas were within reach. Poor situational awareness and stress resulted in impaired decision making processes. When landing in a strange paddock the pilot must ensure a proper survey is undertaken of the landing area so as to identify all hazards and ensure a safe landing can be accomplished. Guidance on conducting precautionary searches for outlanding can be found on page 78 of the GFA Basic Gliding Knowledge book. When flying cross-country it is important that pilots plan and think ahead so that they are always in a position to make a safe landing. At lower levels a pilot's priority will change from searching for lift to finding a suitable area in which to land. This requires good flight management and discipline.





Accident and Incident Summaries

Date	1-Nov-2014	Regior	1 I	GQ		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0425
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Run	nway E	vents	6	Level	З	Runway ex	cursion
A/C Mod	el 1		Discu	s a		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Minor	Pha	ase	Landi	ng		PIC Age	53
The pilot was experienced but had flown little in the past 12 months. While legally current, the pilot was out								oilot was out			
of practio	e. During a land	ing in tur	bulent co	nditions, a	stron	g win	d gust i	from th	e rigł	nt lifted the	starboard
wing resu	ulting in the port	wing dro	pping int	o grass. Th	e glide	er gro	und-lo	oped to	o the	left, turning	through 135
degrees l	pefore coming to	rest. The	e pilot wa	s unhurt a	nd the	e aircr	aft suff	fered m	ninor	damage. Th	e pilot noted
that whil	e the take-off ar	ea had be	en mowi	n, other are	eas of	airfie	ld had	long gr	ass at	oout knee h	igh. The
Club's CF	I noted that the	airfield o	perator h	ad not mo	wn the	e gras	s due t	o fire r	estric	tions but th	at large
areas of t	the airfield were	mowed a	and the b	itumen rur	nway v	vas in	servic	eable c	ondit	ion. Causal	factors
include lo	ow recency, lack	of situati	onal awa	reness, unf	favour	able	meteor	ologica	l con	ditions and	long grass
adjacent	to the selected I	anding ar	ea. This i	ncident hig	ghlight	s the	differe	nce be	twee	n currency a	ind
proficien	cy. Currency sim	ply refers	s to being	up to date	e or oc	currin	ng with	in a rec	ent p	eriod of tim	ne.
Proficiency, by definition, means performing a given task to a required standard with a high degree of skill.											
	e, being current					-			-		This accident
also high	lights the hazard	s of oper	ating on a	airfields tha	at hav	e not	been a	Idequat	tely m	naintained.	

Date	2-Nov-2014	Region		VSA			AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0423	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Run	way E	vent	S	Level	3	Runway ex	cursion
A/C Mod	el 1		Eurofo	x 2K		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dama	ge Su	Ibstantial	Pha	ase Landing		ng		PIC Age	53

GFA FIELD INVESTIGATION - FACTUAL INFORMATION

On 2 November 2014, the pilot of a RA-Aus registered Eurofox 2K was conducting glider towing operations at the Bendigo Gliding Club's airfield at Raywood, Vic. The pilot commenced his third launch at 1110, towing a LS8 single-seat glider to about 1800ft AGL. Following the glider's release, the pilot joined circuit for a landing on runway 18. The pilot then conducted a normal stabilised approach and both wheels touched down at the pilot's selected point. The aircraft bounced slightly at touchdown coincident with a gust of wind from the right. The starboard wing of the aircraft lifted and the aircraft started to veer to the left towards the airfield boundary fence. The pilot could not correct the swing with control inputs and elected to conduct a go-around. He applied full power and the aircraft became airborne but the wheels impacted the wire fence. The drag of the fence pulled the aircraft to the ground and the aircraft came to rest on its nose facing north. The aircraft was substantially damaged and the pilot was uninjured.

Pilot Information

The command pilot was medically fit, was in current flying practice, and was endorsed for glider towing. He completed his Aircraft Flight Review on 30 August 2014. Most of his flying experience has been in sailplanes (345 hours), and he had 75 hours in ultralight aircraft of which 15 hours and 92 landings were in the Eurofox. **Aircraft information**

The aircraft had a current maintenance release and the pilot confirmed the aircraft was airworthy up until the collision with the fence.



Accident and Incident Summaries



Meteorology

The weather at the time of the accident was good visual meteorological conditions (VMC). Weather observations from nearby Bendigo Airport were:

Time	Wind Direction	Wind Speed kts	Wind Gust kts
Sun 11:00 EDT	SSW	11	15
Sun 11:30 EDT	SW	12	21

The GPS based flight recorder log from the glider that was launched records the average wind to be from 2130 at 16 knots at ground level during the launch phase. Witnesses noted the wind to be about 10 knots with strong gusts to 20 knots at the time of the accident. **ANALYSIS**

Flight

During the final approach onto runway 18 the pilot established himself on an aiming point displaced about 500 metres from the runway threshold in order to overfly at a safe height gliders lined-up and awaiting launch. There were a number of gliders taxying along the western edge of the runway during the landing, so the aircraft was aligned to the left of the runway centreline. The runway's length of 1,400 metres and width of 120 metres provided sufficient margin for a safe landing.



Accident and Incident Summaries



Witnesses observed the aircraft on a stabilised approach, crabbing slightly into wind to maintain runway heading. The aircraft was observed to touch down normally on both main wheels and bounce, at which time it was subjected to a wind gust from the right of around 20 knots. The wind lifted the starboard wing and the starboard wheel left the ground. The pilot applied right-hand aileron and rudder control but was unable to maintain the runway heading and the aircraft started to veer to the left towards the airfield boundary fence some 25 to 30 metres away. The pilot made a decision to conduct a go-around and opened the throttle fully. The aircraft continued to veer to the left and just as the aircraft became airborne the wheels struck the wire and picket fence. As the aircraft broke through the fence it was slowed and pulled towards the ground while rotating to the left. The left wheel broke off at impact, the right wingtip was damaged by contact with the ground, the composite propeller struck the ground and shattered, and the aircraft came to rest on its nose facing north. The pilot switched off the fuel and electrics and disembarked the aircraft without injury. The maximum crosswind component of the Eurofox aircraft is 15 knots. Calculations indicate that the gust loading may have been near the designed maximum, thereby making control difficult.

Runway Heading (Magnetic)	180°	180°	180°	180°
Wind Direction (True)	200°	210°	220°	230°
Wind Speed (knots)	20	20	20	20
Crosswind Component	7	10	13	15
Head wind component	19	17	15	13

Table 1. Wind Component Calculations

Another possible causal factor is torque effect. The propeller spins clockwise from the cockpit, so the effect of opening the throttle and commanding more power would be for the forces to act towards the left, thereby exacerbating the aircraft's turning to the left. Gyroscopic and asymmetric blade effects may have also contributed.



Accident and Incident Summaries



Gliding Operation

The Glider pilots held a briefing during the morning and the first launches were scheduled for 1130. The pilots were asked to marshall their gliders at the launch point prior to launching commencing. A number of glider pilots sought to take advantage of an earlier start and were positioned at the launch point well ahead of schedule. These pilots convinced the tow pilot to commence towing operations before all the gliders had reached the launch point. The tow pilot agreed but when he came into land on the last tow the right-hand (western) side of the runway was occupied by a number of gliders taxying to the launch point. As a consequence, the width of the operational runway was reduced by nearly one-third.

Pilot

The pilot was medically fit and qualified to undertake the flight. The pilot's aeronautical experience was predominantly flying aircraft with the right-hand on the control column and using the left-hand for auxiliary controls or throttle. The investigation considered the ergonomics of the pilot flying left-handed in the Eurofox, using his right-hand for throttle. The pilot did not recall this being a factor and advised that his employment as an earthmoving contractor requires him to regularly move between machines with conflicting control configurations. The different control configuration is not considered to have contributed to this incident. The pilot also advised that he felt under pressure before the launch as a number of pilots were looking for launches before the scheduled launch time and that he had limited support on the flight line.



Accident and Incident Summaries



Instrument panel showing control stick and centre throttle. CONCLUSIONS

- 1. The command pilot was appropriately qualified and medically fit for the flight.
- 2. The aircraft had a valid Maintenance Release and had been maintained in accordance with relevant requirements.
- 3. The aircraft encountered a strong crosswind gust on touchdown.
- 4. The crosswind gust, coupled with torque and asymmetric blade effects resulted in an uncontrollable runway excursion to the left and collision with terrain.
- 5. The aircraft was capable of normal operation up until the time of impact with the wires.

Date	2-Nov-2014	Regior	1	VSA			R Repo	ort Nbr		S-0424		
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Run	iway E	vents	5	Level	3	Runway in	cursion	
A/C Mod	el 1		DG-4	00		A/C	Model	Model 2				
Injury Nil Damage Nil Phase Landing PIC Age 55								55				
by severa alert the While on Reportin landing. I paraglidi	urning to the air al paragliders und paragliders of hi the downwind la g Officer (ARO). T Investigation rev ng operation to h ng the CTAF as th	dertaking s presence eg the pil The ARO ealed the nave ther	ground h e and the ot noticed organised ARO had n clear the	andling tra n made a d a white c for the ru heard the e runway.	aining radio ar ent nway glide It tran	The call a er the to be pilot spire	pilot fle dvising e airfiel vacate t's circu d the p	ew two joining ld that d and t nit calls araglid	circle down belon he gli and c ing op	es directly o nwind for R nged to the ider comple drove down peration wa	verhead to WY 18. Airfield ted a normal to the s not	



Accident and Incident Summaries

Date	4-Nov-2014	Regior	1	GQ		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0431
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Run	way Ev	/ents	5	Level	3	Runway ex	cursion
A/C Mod	el 1		Discus	2B		A/C	Model	2			
Injury Nil Damage Minor Phase Landing PIC Age 55								55			
aerotowa immedia thermals ballast ar circuit, a nose pito final app the pilot	intended to fly a ed to a height of tely fly through t were found and ad experienced of nd during the tur hed down indica roach at 80 knot deliberately grou minor damage. (2,800ft A the start I the decis lifficulty I m from d tting a sta s with the und-loop	GL, with t ine with t sion was r owering t ownwind illed cond e intention ed the air	the pilot re he intention nade to re he underco onto final ition. The n of landin craft to ave	eleasing on of ge turn to arriage (there pilot re g long. oid par	g in a etting the . The was cove The ked g	a therm g a clim airfield pilot f no base ered to aircraf gliders	al. The b on tr . The p lew a h e leg) t straigh t touch and the	pilot rack. ilot d iigh s igh s he wi t and e dou e bou	made the d However, no id not dump peed and cr ng dropped level flight own at high ndary fence	ecision to o further o the water amped and the and flew the speed and . The aircraft

Date	4-Nov-2014	Region	Region NSWGA			SOAR Report Nbr				S-0481	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Terra	ain Col	lisior	ıs	Level	3	Collision w	vith terrain
A/C Mod	el 1		LS 7-V	VL		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	njury Nil		ge	Nil	Pha	se	Outla	nding		PIC Age	51

The low hours pilot was flying in a coaching event that was inadequately organised and supervised. The pilot succumbed to peer pressure to fly cross-country when lacking currency and outlanding practice. During the flight an outlanding became inevitable. The pilot set up a circuit but experienced difficulty lowering the undercarriage. An approach was made into a stubble paddock and the glider touched down in the first third of the available length. The pilot then applied the wheel brake but was unable to stop the aircraft in the length of the paddock and initiated a ground loop to avoid the boundary fence. One wingtip impacted the ground resulting is severe damage but the pilot was unhurt. This incident highlights the importance of proper supervision and planning of events organised for low hours pilots. In this case the two instructors/coaches were supporting several pilots of varying ability from ab-initio to cross-country rated. Their workload was too high and they were unable to devote sufficient attention to the needs of the many pilots under their charge. Organisers must ensure there is a proper ratio of instructors/coaches to participants and that the tasks assigned match the skill levels of the participants.

Date	7-Nov-2014	Region		GQ		SOAR Report Nbr				S-0432	
Level 1	Operational		Level	2 Airc	raft Co	ntro	_	Level	3	Hard landi	ng
A/C Mod	el 1		Disc	us 2B		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Substantial	Pha	se	Landi	ng		PIC Age	55
knot cros flew thro impacted	Irned from a four swind componer ugh some moder I the ground hear ctors include fati	nt. Follov ate turb vily with	ving a st ulence a the airb	abilised app and balloone rakes still de	roach d. The ployed	and o glide d. The	during t er then e aircra	the rou experi oft was	nd ou enced subst	ut and flare, d a high rate antially dan	the aircraft of sink and naged.

Date	8-Nov-2014	Region		SAGA	SOAR Repo	ort Nbr	S-0429
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Terrain Co	lisions	Level 3	Ground strike
A/C Mod	el 1		Grob G	109	A/C Mode	2	



Accident and Incident Summaries

InjuryNilDamageSubstantialPhaseLandingPIC Age45The motor glider was flying the final approach with the engine idling as it was intended to do a 'touch and
go'. The instructor took over during a mishandled approach and flare but was too late to prevent the aircraft
landing heavily. The propeller struck the ground causing substantial damage.PIC Age45

Date	9-Nov-2014	Regior	۱	NSWGA		SOA	R Repo	Report Nbr		S-	0428
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Airc	raft C	ontro	rol Level 3		vel 3 Wheels u		landing
A/C Mod	el 1	LS 1-f				A/C Model 2					
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Minor	Pha	ase	Landi	ng		PIC Age	73
This expe	erienced pilot ad	vised tha	t he faileo	l to retract	the u	ndero	carriage	e durin	g his p	oost-release	check, and
then retr	acted it during t	ne pre-lai	nding che	ck. A visua	l inspe	ection	n to cor	firm th	e uno	dercarriage	was in the
down po	sition was not m	ade. OSB	01/14 'Ci	rcuit & Lar	nding /	Advic	e' confi	rms th	at the	pre-landing	g checklist is
a 'check' and not an 'action' list. The undercarriage check should verify the undercarriage lever is matched to											
the lowe	red position on t	he placar	d.								

Date	10-Nov-2014	Region		NSWGA		SOAR Report Nbr				S-0489	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	el 2 Terrain Co			llisions Level		3	Collision with terrain	
A/C Model 1		LAK 19				A/C Model 2					
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Minor	Pha	ise	Outla	Outlanding		PIC Age	67
The pilot had been airborne for 5.5 hours and had completed 202kms of a 220km task. Conditions											
deteriorated towards the end of the flight and the pilot elected to conduct an outlanding. The pilot landed in											
a paddack containing a mature area, and during the flare a using caught in the area causing the glider to											

a paddock containing a mature crop, and during the flare a wing caught in the crop causing the glider to ground loop and turn through 180 degrees. The aircraft suffered minor damage and the pilot was uninjured. The pilot advised that despite flying a precautionary search of the paddock before landing, he mistook an unharvested crop for stubble.

Date	13-Nov-2014	Regior	n	NSWGA		SOAR Report I		ort Nbr		S-0436	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Fligh		t		Level 3		Aircraft preparation	
				Prepara	aration/Navigation						
A/C Mod	el 1	Piper PA-25-235/A2				A/C Model 2					
Injury	Injury Nil		Damage		Pha	ise	In-Flight			PIC Age	65
During la	During launch and at about 200'AGL the tow pilot noticed the right hand engine cowl was unlatched and										
raised about 10 cm. The tow pilot reduced power slightly and used the radio to advise traffic of the problem											
and that he would be returning to land on the cross runway. The tow pilot continued to climb to allow the											
glider pilot sufficient height to return to the aerodrome and the glider pilot released at 400ft AGL. A safe											
landing was completed by both the tow plane and glider. The tow pilot reported that at the start of the day's											
operations he had difficulty starting the engine due to a sticking throttle and a jammed mixture control. The											
tow pilot exited the aircraft and with assistance managed to remedy the problems. Another pre-flight											
inspection was undertaken, including a visual check of the cowling, but the pilot did not notice the right-											
hand cowl was unlocked. The tow pilot advised that while he was under pressure to get to the launch point,											
he was aware of the risks of rushing his checks, which is why he did a further 'walk around' inspection.											

Date	13-Nov-2014	Region	1	NSWGA	SOAR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0438	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	2 Fligh	Flight		3	Aircraft preparation	
				Preparation/	Preparation/Navigation				
A/C Model 1		JS1 B			A/C Mode	2			



Accident and Incident Summaries

InjuryNilDamageNilPhaseLaunchPIC Age74Experienced pilot launched with the tail dolly still attached to the glider. The pilot was distracted by a news
camera crew photographing launching gliders and omitted to complete the pre-boarding checks. It appears
the launch crew were similarly distracted. During the launch the Duty pilot noticed the problem and advised
the pilot by radio. The glider pilot instructed the tow pilot to complete a circuit and position the glider on
final approach. A safe landing was completed. This incident highlights the importance of pilots performing
their checks without interruption or distraction. Launch point discipline and hygiene is vital; distractions
must be avoided and onlookers kept out of the way.Pilot aunch
PhasePilot Age74

Date	15-Nov-2014	Regior	1 I	GQ		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0433
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Airc	raft Co	ontro	-	Level	3	Control iss	ues
A/C Mod	el 1		ASK	·21		A/C	Model	2			
InjuryNilDamageNilPhaseIn-FlightPIC Age50During an Air Experience Flight the student stored a camera in a well that formed in the boot of the of the										50	
control co incident a passenge avoid inte	olumn, thereby r and the pilot did rs and students erfering with the rre control colum	estricting not repo are fully l controls	g forward rt any co oriefed o or becor	l elevator ti ntrol difficu n where ob ning loose o	ravel. ulty. Tl ojects s object	Fortu nis in such a s in t	inately, cident s as phor urbuler	the flig serves nes and nce. Air	ght wa as a ro I came worth	as complete eminder to e eras should niness Inspe	d without ensure be placed to ctors should

Date	15-Nov-2014	Region		WAGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0434	
Level 1	Operational	Le	vel 2	Terra	in Co	lisior	าร	Level	3	Collision w	ith terrain
A/C Mod	el 1		Nimbu	us 2		A/C	Model	2			
InjuryNilDamageMinorPhaseLandingPlDuring a marginal final glide the aircraft flew through sink and undershot the runway, la								PIC Age	54		
resulting the glide zero finis and optir	marginal final gli in minor damago r's performance h height set. Pot nism bias. Cross- ith marginal fina	e. The pilot h capability. In ential causal country pilo	ad red addit facto ts mus	cently acqui ion, the fin rs include u st remain a	iired t al glic unfam lert to	he ai le cor iliarit	rcraft a nputer ty with	nd was that th aircraft	s som ne pilo t and	ewhat over ot was moni systems, hig	confident in toring had a gh workload,

Date	18-Nov-2014	Regior	1	SAGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0435
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Terra	ain Co	llisior	าร	Level	3	Collision w	vith terrain
A/C Mod	el 1		LS	4		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dam	age	Minor	Pha	ise	Outla	nding		PIC Age	77
aircraft c late decis despite in damage t situation	was distracted b ontinued to desc sion to outland a nitiating a groun to the leading ed al awareness. In tely post launch	cend tow It too low d loop to lge. This i this case	ards the a height avoid th ncident l a safer c	ground. The to conduct boundary highlights th ourse of ac	e pilot a circ fence ne dan tion w	even uit. T , the gers rould	itually r he pilo port w of not l	ecogni t lande ing coll ooking	sed h d wel ided v out a	e was low a l into the pa with the fen ind maintair	nd made a addock and, ce causing ning

Date	19-Nov-2014	Region		NSWGA	SOAR Repo	ort Nbr	S-0446
Level 1	Operational		/el 2	Aircraft Co	ontrol	Level 3	Control issues



Accident and Incident Summaries

A/C Model 1		Р	ik 20B		A/C	Model 2	IMC	A A-9A Calla	air			
Injury	Nil	Damage	Nil	Pha	se	In-Flight		PIC Age	63			
During a cros	ss-country fli	ght the glider p	ilot experience	ed det	erior	ating conditio	ns an	d landed at	a regional			
airport sever	ral miles fron	n the gliding clu	b site. The pilo	ot arra	nged	l for an aeroto	w ret	rieve and th	ne tow plane			
was duly dis	patched. The	tow plane arriv	ed with a sho	rt rop	e use	d for paddock	retrie	eves and the	e glider pilot			
elected to ta	ected to take-off unassisted (i.e. wing down). The glider pilot found the initial acceleration to be slow and											
it took a whi	took a while for the wings to come level. The glider then conducted a series of oscillations in pitch down											
the runway l	e runway before becoming airborne. During the return flight the glider pilot continued to have difficulty											
staying in sta	ation and ma	intaining tensic	on in the tow r	ope. T	he to	w pilot had ar	n unco	omfortable	time due to			
the glider's c	onstant excu	irsions during t	ne tow. The gl	ider pi	lot e	lected to relea	se fro	om tow at a	higher			
height than	required for	the glide home	to recover fro	m the	stres	ses of the tow	/ and	a normal lai	nding			
	-	ermined that th				•	-					
		outs. The glider						0	, 0			
	•	xperienced on	••				-					
familiarity, a	nd lack of re	cency allowed t	he combinatio	on to g	et in	to a oscillation	ı in pi	tch and spe	ed which			
was very diff	vas very difficult to stop.											

Date	20-Nov-2014	Regior	า	NSWGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0437		
Level 1	Operational		Level	2 Airc	raft C	ontro	ol	Level	3	Wheels up	o landing	
A/C Mod	el 1	V 20B		A/C Model 2								
InjuryNilDamageSubstantialPhaseOutlandingPIC Age60During an outlanding and while on final approach, the pilot mistook the undercarriage lever for the airbrake												
handle. 1 aircraft 9	n outlanding and The aircraft lande O degrees to avo cial pilot has limi	ed well in bid trees a	to the p and the	addock with boundary fe	the w nce, c	/heel ausin	retract g signif	ed. The icant d	e pilot amag	ground-loo but no inj	oped the jury. The	

Date	22-Nov-2014	Region		VSA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0452
Level 1	Operational		Level 2 Aircraft			Control Level 3			3	Hard landi	ng
A/C Mod	Model 1 DG-500 Elan Orion		in Orion		A/C Model 2						
Injury	Nil	Dama	ge	Minor Ph		ise Outla		nding		PIC Age	39

A low experience solo pilot flying in a 20 knot and gusting wind realised he would not make the airfield after turning onto the base leg of his circuit. The pilot immediately angled towards the airfield but forward progress was retarded by the strong headwind. When at around 400ft AGL the pilot realised he would not make the airfield and he elected to land in a paddock. The pilot lowered the nose to maintain airspeed to his intended paddock then pulled up over the boundary fence, passed under unidentified power lines that were about 10 metres high and stalled heavily into the paddock with some drift on. The aircraft rebounded a couple of times before coming to rest. The aircraft suffered damage to the undercarriage/fuselage mounting points and the pilot was unhurt. Investigation revealed the pilot flew too far downwind for the conditions and did not maintain appropriate speeds for the conditions. When he pulled up over the boundary fence of the outlanding paddock the glider had very little energy and landed heavily. This accident highlights the importance of increasing speed during the downwind leg to allow for wind (1.5Vs plus ½ wind speed) and to re-trim as the glider approaches a position adjacent to the intended landing point. This has the benefit of simplifying the assessment of height (via the angle down to the landing area) by eliminating the complication of angular change due to the exchange of height for speed. This is particularly important from the position opposite the Aiming Point onwards, after which the options for adjusting the circuit are limited. The loss of height and time occasioned by this earlier increase in speed is small and is well worth the extra safety margin achieved (refer also to Operational Safety Bulletin OSB 01/14).









Date											
Level 1											
A/C Mod	el 1		Pik 2	20		A/C	Model	2	IMC	A A-9A Call	air
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Nil	Pha	se	Launc	h		PIC Age	75
During la	unch the glider f	lew throu	ıgh turbu	lent air and	d the g	lider	pilot h	ad diffi	culty	maintaining	g station and
speed. Th	ne glider is not fi	tted with	airbrakes	and uses	flaps to	o inci	rease d	rag. It a	also h	as a CG tow	release
	in front of the u		-			-		• •		•	
	ot extended 15 c	-	-		-	-		-		-	-
	ing and pitching						•	-			
-	tug, which he believed was now below him, and saw the rope extend past the canopy to his left. The rope										
-	again became tight with a jolt and the glider pilot felt his aircraft kiting as if on a winch launch. At this stage the tail of the tug had been pulled up and the tow pilot found himself pointing at the ground in a 45 degree										
	-	-	-				-	-		-	-
	vn attitude. The	•									
	broke just as th									-	-
-	tion by the Club				•		-			•	-
	in pitch. The tov	-		-		-		-	-		-
	pilot had not flo										
	t conditions; a co		-				-			-	
	emain line aster		-	-		-					
	lider. This incide iliar with the po			-						-	
	of the tug.			is and leve	is, dilu	1 3.10	i giluei	phots		mediately	elease if they
IOSE SIGIL	. of the tug.										



Date	25-Nov-2014	Regior	۱	NSWGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0487
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Run	iway E	vents	5	Level	3	Runway ex	cursion
A/C Mod	el 1		LAK 1	7A		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Nil	Pha	ise	Landii	ng		PIC Age	60
The pilot, on his first flight in this sailplane type, successfully completed a cross-country task and had returned to the airfield. While overflying at 2,000 ft the pilot commenced dumping water ballast and then proceeded to fly a circuit. The aircraft touched down normally while still trailing water and as it slowed the starboard wing dropped. The aircraft veered off the runway towards two parked gliders but the pilot was											
able to b starboard The pilot it was his	ring the aircraft d wing had not fu advised that the first flight in thi time for the bal	to a stop ully empt aircraft s type of	short of thied and th was corre glider he	he gliders l le aircraft l ctly loadec was unfam	by hea had la d at tal niliar w	avy br nded ke-of vith th	aking. in an a f and th ne rate	Inspect symme nere we of emp	ion la etric v ere no otying	ter revealed vater ballast handling p and had no	d the condition. roblems. As it allowed

Date	27-Nov-2014	Regior	1	SAGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-0439	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	ŀ	Airfrar	ne		Level	3	Landing	
										gear/Indic	ation
A/C Mod	A/C Model 1 LS 4-a							A/C Model 2			
Injury	Injury Nil Damage Minor					Phase Landing				PIC Age	66
Undercar	riage collapsed	on landin	g. This is a	a known iss	sue wi	th LS	type gl	iders. 1	To he	lp prevent la	anding gear
collapses	, always follow t	he maint	enance m	anual instr	uctior	ns at e	each ar	nual ir	spect	tion. Ensure	there is
adequate over-centre and that the gas strut is in good condition. A weak gas strut will allow the landing gear											
to collaps	se.										

Date	28-Nov-2014	Regior	ı	SAGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0440	
Level 1	Airspace		Level 2	Airspac	e Infri	ingen	nent	Level	3	Airspace In	nfringement
A/C Mod	el 1		Discus	2cT		A/C	Mode	2			
InjuryNilDamageNilPhaseIn-FlightPIC Age70During a cross-country flight the pilot's navigational instrument ceased working due to a flat battery. The											
pilot inco incident	cross-country fli prrectly judged h highlights the im nal Regulations,	is positio portance	n and ina of carryi	dvertently	flew ii	nto co	ontrolle	ed airsp	ace v	vithout a cle	arance. This

Date	29-Nov-2014	Region		VSA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0449	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Airc	raft C	ontro		Level	3	Hard landi	ng
A/C Mod	el 1		SF 25C	Falke		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Minor	Pha	ase	Landi	ng		PIC Age	56
heavy lar minor da establish allowed t over but	dertaking a curre nding. The port o mage. The Instru ed on a stable 'er he aircraft to sta he was caught by efensive to ensu	utrigger v ctor note ngine off' Il onto th y surprise	wheel sn ed that tl approad le ground e. Worklo	apped off a ne pilot unc ch, the pilot d. The Instr oad during l	nd rel ler che unde uctor andin	ooun eck la r che notec g is hi	ded inte cked cu ck flare d in hine igh and	o the w urrency d slight dsight t the ins	ving tr v. Whi tly too that h struct	ailing edge le the moto b high and u e should ha or must be	causing r glider was inexpectedly ve taken on the



Accident and Incident Summaries

of taking over quickly where necessary. However, this is easier said than done and pilots under check can surprise even the most experienced instructor. If an instructor has any doubt as to the safety of the approach, they should take-over.

Date	29-Nov-2014	Regior	n	NSWGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0464
Level 1	Operational		Level	2 Grour	nd Ope	eratio	ons	Level	3	Taxiing col collision	llision/near
A/C Mod	el 1	5		A/C Model 2							
Injury	Nil	Dam	Damage Minor			ise	se Ground Ops			PIC Age	67
contacte	wing the glider to d a metal pole ca r attention to ob	ausing mi	nor da	mage. When	groun	d har	ndling g	liders,	mem	bers need to	•

Date	30-Nov-2014	Region		GQ		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0442
Level 1	Operational		Level 2		Airfrar	ne		Level	3	Landing gear/Indic	ation
A/C Mod	el 1		Glasfluge	el 304C		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dama	Damage Minor			Phase Landing				PIC Age	16
touch-do	aft was landed w wn. The pilot ex rcarriage mecha	periencec	l difficult	y lowering	the ur	nderc	arriage	and su			-

Date	30-Nov-2014	Regior	า		NSWGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0441
Level 1	Operational		Leve	el 2	ļ	Airfrar	ne		Level	3	Landing	
			Piper PA25-235 A/C Model 2								ation	
A/C Mod	el 1	Piper PA25-235 A/C Model 2										
Injury	Nil	Damage Minor Phase Landing PIC Age 65								65		
As the to	w plane crossed	an intersecting runway just prior to becoming airborne, the pilot noticed a jolt							ed a jolt.			
Upon rel	easing from tow	at 1700ft	t 1700ft, the glider pilot advised the tow pilot that the tow plane's port									
undercar	riage leg was ha	nging down. The tow pilot completed two orbits of the aerodrome to assess his										
	nd elected to la											-
	ocking the opera				•			-		•••	-	
	pulled the mixtu											
-	low but a safety	-					-			-		
	e commenced a		-					-				
	d the aircraft. Su			-							-	
		d during take-off due to fatigue. In this case a crack developed that went undetected										
	ture occurred. Fa	-			• •							
the only	available defence	e is bette	r dete	ectio	n inspectio	ons du	ring	mainte	nance i	nclud	ing the use	of NDT.





Date	30-Nov-2014	Regior	ı	VSA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0443
Level 1	Operational	l Level 2 Aircraft Control						Level	3	Wheels up	anding
A/C Mod	lel 1 Pik 20B A/C Model 2										
Injury	njury Nil Damage Nil Phase Landing PIC Age 56							56			
down. Uj landed w	forgot to retract oon returning fro vith the wheel up ng the undercarr	om the ta b. This inc	sk and wh ident high	nen joining nlights the	the ci impor	rcuit, tance	the pil of cor	ot retra	acted	the underc	arriage and

Date	30-Nov-2014	Region	1	WAGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0451
Level 1	Operational	Level 2 Terrain Collisions Level 3					3	Collision w	vith terrain		
A/C Mod	del 1 H-36 Dimona A/C Model 2										
Injury	/ Nil Damage Substantial Phase Landing Pl							PIC Age	60		
runway a Pilots sho	nding in a gusty o and collided with buld be aware th amage occurring	a runway at engine	/ cone m -on land	arker, resul ings in mot	ting ir or glid	n a pr lers h	opeller	strike	and s	ubstantial d	amage.

Date	30-Nov-2014	Region	WAGA	SOAR Report Nbr	S-0469
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Accident and Incident Summaries

Level 1	Operational	Le	evel 2		Airfrar	ne		Level	3	Objects fa aircraft	ling from
A/C Mod	el 1		005		A/C	Model	2		anciait		
Injury	Nil	Damage							PIC Age	39	
the balla cover car ballast be	re-flight inspecti st box cover was ne off and was h ox to be taped a and should be re	dirty and co ost during th nd checked b	oming l e fligh oefore	oose. The t. The DG1 each flight	pilot s .000S t	ecure light	ed the l manua	ballast Il requi	cover res th	with the old e cover of t	d tape. The he tail

Date	2-Dec-2014	Region		GQ		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0448
Level 1	Operational	Lev	/el 2	Airc	raft Co	ontro	Ē	Level	3	Wheels up	landing
A/C Mod	el 1	SZD-48-1	Jantai	r Standard	2	A/C	Model	2			
Injury											
cross-cou The pilot dictated undercar lever to t made wi heavily o damage. unsatisfa as he wa edge airt	aft landed in a ro untry flight the p then forgot abo an outlanding wa riage was retrac the placard, the f th sufficient clea n the fuselage. T The pilot noted ctory surface con s not in recent po prakes. Causal fac crcarriage was re	ilot elected to ut the underc as necessary a ted as part of act that the u rance over po he paddock s that he spent ndition from a ractice using ctors include	arriag and th the p inderco wer li urface time the ain conve high v	the under ge and emb ne pilot sel- ore-landing carriage wa ines but th e was roug selecting a r. The pilot ntional air vorkload, c	rcarria parked ected checl as retu e pilo her th an app also brake pomitti	age do d on a what k and racted t faile nan an propri advise s bec ng to	own un a cross- : was th , despit d went ed to ar nticipat ate pac ed that ause he comple	til the f countr nought te the p unnoti rrest th ced and ddock b he mar e usuall ete a po	first c y fligh to be pilot p ced. 1 e rate l the a put dia y have ly flev pst-re	limb was en nt. Eventuall a suitable p periodically o The final app e of descent aircraft suffe d not pick th e misused th w an aircraft	countered. y conditions addock. The checking the proach was and landed ered minor he he airbrakes with trailing

Date	3-Dec-2014	Region		GQ		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0447
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Airc	raft Co	ontro	j.	Level	3	Hard landi	ng
A/C Mod	el 1		Astir CS	Jeans		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Damag	ge	Nil Ph		se	e Launch			PIC Age	71

The aircraft was subjected to pilot induced oscillations during the pilot's first take-off in a single-seat glider. The pilot released from tow at about 300ft AGL and positioned for landing. During a downwind final approach the glider pilot did not maintain adequate airspeed and landed heavily. The wind direction had been variable and the pilot was launched into a 7 to 10 knot crosswind. The tow pilot had to use full control deflections to maintain directional control. As the combination became airborne it flew through a thermal and the glider commenced a series of oscillations in pitch, probably due to inappropriate and course control inputs by the pilot. When the glider pilot released he performed a 'tear drop' manoeuvre to land back on the runway but failed to maintain adequate speed control and landed heavily but without damage or injury. Gliding operations were suspended until the wind stabilised. This incident highlights the importance of conducting 'conversion flights' in benign conditions. Causal factors include inexperience on type and a high workload caused by adverse weather conditions and mishandling of the controls.

Date	4-Dec-2014	Region		GQ	SOAR Repo	ort Nbr	S-0479
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Aircraft Co	ontrol	Level 3	Wheels up landing
A/C Mod	el 1		Discus 2B		A/C Mode	2	



Accident and Incident Summaries

InjuryNilDamageMinorPhaseLandingPIC Age73This experienced pilot released from aerotow in a ballasted glider but did not contact lift. The pilot made a
late decision to land and joined circuit at low height. In his haste to dump the water ballast, the pilot forgot
to lower the undercarriage and landed with the wheel retracted. Landing mishaps commonly occur to pilots
who lack the discipline to break off the flight at an early stage, and who become overloaded when close to
the ground. Workload management can be eased by proper flight management which includes attending to
pre-landing tasks, like lowering the undercarriage, early rather than later in the circuit. Refer also OSB 01/14
'Circuit and Landing Advice'.

Date	6-Dec-2014	Region		WAGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0453
Level 1	Operational	Level 2 Crew and Cabin Safety Level 3 Flight crew incapacitation							V		
A/C Mod	el 1	DG-500 Elan Orion A/C Model 2									
Injury	Nil	Damage Nil Phase In-Flight PIC Age 60								60	
Just prior	to setting off or	a 200km cross country task at 5,000ft and after about 30 minutes of flight, the								light, the	
comman	d pilot flying not	ted movement of the control column to the right was restricted. The command									
pilot, flyi	ng from the rear	ear seat, asked the co-pilot if his leg was obstructing the controls but received no									
response	. The command	d pilot then noticed both rudder pedals were immovable and asked the co-pilot to									
take his f	eet off the peda	ls. The co-	-pilot wa	s unrespon	isive d	espit	e the co	omman	nd pilo	ot speaking	in raised
tones and	d tapping the ba	ck of his h	ead. Aft	er approxin	nately	30 se	econds	the co-	-pilot	regained co	nsciousness
and rema	ained clear of the	e controls	while ar	n emergenc	y desc	ent v	was con	ducted	l. On [.]	the ground i	the co-pilot
advised t	hat he felt 'airsio	k' but hac	d no reco	ollection of	losing	cons	ciousn	ess nor	the c	ommand pi	lot's
attempts	to arouse him.	The comm	nand pilo	t noted that	at it wa	as on	ly by ci	cumsta	ance	that the co-	pilot was
flying wit	h him and not in	the club	s single-	seater. This	is the	secc	ond tim	e the co	o-pilo	t has lost co	onsciousness
in flight -	on 11 January 2	014 while	flying a	single-seat	er he i	recov	vered co	onsciou	isness	at very low	level and
the even	t was attributed	to dehydr	ration. T	ne co-pilot'	s med	ical p	ractitic	ner dia	ignos	ed vasovaga	l syncope
and he is	It was attributed to dehydration. The co-pilot's medical practitioner diagnosed vasovagal syncope s not flying pending medical clearance.										

Date	6-Dec-2014	Regior	۱	VSA		SOAR	Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0450
Level 1	Operational	Level 2	Terra	ain Co	llisions		Level	3	Collision w	ith terrain	
A/C Mod	Model 1 J			5 CM	A/C Model 2						
Injury										PIC Age	60
After lan	er landing the glider pilot taxied clear of th			[:] the runwa	y to m	ake roo	om fo	r a foll	owing	g aircraft on	approach.
During th	e course of taxy	ing, the p	ort wing	tip struck a	a raise	d runwa	ay lig	ht. Altł	nough	ı runway ligl	nts are
designed to be frangible, the glider's wing was substantially damaged. Pilots need to exercise care when						re when					
taxying to avoid known obstacles.											









Date	6-Dec-2014	Regior	1 I	NSWGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-0461	
Level 1	Technical		Level 2		Syster	ns		Level	3	Other Systems Issues	
A/C Mod	el 1	ASW 28			A/C Model 2						
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Nil	Pha	hase Launch				PIC Age	28
successfu Investiga	AGL during an ae ully completed a tion revealed a s re locking mecha	modified pring had	circuit an d failed in	d landed o the tow p	on an a	altern	ative r	unway	with	the rope sti	l attached.

Date	7-Dec-2014	Region		GQ	SOAR Repo	ort Nbr	S-0460
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Airfran	ne	Level 3	Doors/Canopies
A/C Mod	/C Model 1		ASW 1	L9B	A/C Model	2	



InjuryNilDamageMinorPhaseLandingPIC Age20Following a competition flight the glider landed in strong wind conditions associated with a storm front.While moving the glider off the strip the wind blew the unlocked canopy open. The canopy was torn off
causing minor damage to the fuselage but the canopy did not break. This incident highlights the importance
of always locking the canopy before leaving it unattended.

Date	8-Dec-2014	Region	Region VSA			SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0505
Level 1	Operational		2 Runway Eve			S	Level	3	Runway incursion		
A/C Mod	el 1	Shemp-Hirth Arcus M			A/C Model 2		2	Bee	chcraft Trav	el Air	
Injury	Injury Nil Dar		ge	je Nil		ase Launo		Launch		PIC Age	42

The powered sailplane pilot had just given a radio call that she was lining up on the operational runway when a Beechcraft Travel Air entered and backtracked without making radio calls. The sailplane pilot applied braking and brought the glider to a halt. The pilot in the Beechcraft did not make any radio calls on CTAF and did not adapt to the situation but continued to back track and then take-off. It is essential that pilots be alert and look for other traffic and exchange traffic information when operating at or on a non-towered airport. This is of particular importance since other aircraft may not have communication capability or, in some cases, pilots may not communicate their presence or intentions when operating into or out of such airports. To achieve the greatest degree of safety, it is essential that all radio-equipped aircraft transmit/receive on the common traffic advisory frequency. Pilots are expected to taxi an airplane safely whether moving to or from a runway or otherwise moving about the airport, and it is important to remain extremely cautious and maintain situational awareness. For example, prior to brake release for taxi, minimise cockpit tasks, observe "sterile flight deck" procedures, and always practice a "heads up, eyes out" mode while taxying.

Date	9-Dec-2014	Regior	۱	NSWGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0454		
Level 1	Operational		Leve	el 2	Airfrar	ne		Level 3		Objects falling from		
	Madal 1									aircraft		
A/C Mod	el 1		DG	G-1000S		A/C Model 2						
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Nil	Nil Pha			e In-Flight			68	
-	InjuryNilDamageNilPhaseIn-FlightPIC Age68During flight the trim ballast cover was lost but the ballast blocks did not fall out. The DG1000S flight manual requires the cover of the tail ballast box to be taped and checked before each flight. The Trim Box cover for											
				-					-			
	this particular aircraft was difficult to fit and pilots were reusing tape when dressing the perimeter of the Trim Box cover as per the flight manual. Pilots were also using a thinner tape than that specified. The Club											
	troduced furthe	-				-		-				
	upplied tool to g	-					0			-		

Date	11-Dec-2014	Regior	า	WAGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0470	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Airc	raft C	ontro		Level	3	Wheels up landing	
A/C Mod	el 1		ASW	/ 24		A/C	Model	2			
Injury Nil Damage Minor Phase Landing PIC Age S								59			
successfu his landin his pre-la during hi Landing	cross-country fligures ully retrieved. Or and in order to cound anding checks an s circuit he was s mishaps usually o e lowering the ur	the retunduct an duct an d the airc opreoccoccur due	rn flight Air Expe craft was upied wi to poor	to the home rience flight landed with th the plane workload n	e airfio . The n the o ning h nanag	eld th pilot under is AEI emer	ie pilot quickly rcarriag F that h nt, so it	receive descer ge retra e forgo is impo	ed a randed l nded l ncted. not to l nortant	adio reques out failed to The pilot no ower the ur t to get som	t to expedite complete oted that dercarriage. e of the



Date	12-Dec-2014	Regior	า	NSWGA		SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-0462	
Level 1	Consequential	Events	Level	2 L	ow Cir	cuit		Level	3	Low Circui	t
A/C Mod	el 1	ASW 28				A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	age	Nil	l Phase Outlanding					PIC Age	23	
paddock 100ft AG over flow high wor	aft was on a mai prior to aerodro L the pilot execu n. The aircraft la kload and optim	me, he do ted a 180 anded wit ism bias.	etermir) degree :h a 30 Cross-c	ed that he v turn down knot tail win ountry pilot	vould (wind (d unde s must	not m 60 kn er a S rema	nake the ots ASI WER lir ain aler	e aeroc) to lan ne. Pote t to the	Irome d in tl ential e risks	e. At a heigh he paddock causal facto of undersh	t of about he had just ors include ooting and
	should not persist with marginal final glides. At low levels in windy conditions, the likelihood of encountering heavy sink and turbulence is high.										

Date	13-Dec-2014	Region	1	VSA	/SA SOAR Report Nbr			S-	0455		
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	2 Terra	Terrain Collisions Level 3		3	Collision w	vith terrain		
A/C Mod	el 1	Standard Cirrus				A/C Model 2					
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	e Minor Phase Landing			PIC Age	46			
While ou	While outlanding in a canola stubble paddock the port side of the glider's fuselage aft of the main wheel										
made glancing contact with a small rock. The aircraft suffered superficial damage to the paintwork.											

Date	13-Dec-2014	Regior	1 I	VSA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0458
Level 1	Operational		Level 2		Fligh	t		Level	3	Other Flight Prep/Nav	
				Prepara	tion/N	laviga	ation			Issues	
A/C Model 1 ASW 20 A/C Model 2						2					
						Outla	nding		PIC Age	77	
During a cross-country flight the pilot successfully completed an outlanding. An attempt to contact the							act the				
Gliding Club immediately after landing was unsuccessful as the pilot was out of range of mobile coverage.											
The pilot	moved to an are	a where	coverage	was availa	ble ar	nd, de	espite e	ight su	bsequ	uent attemp	ts to contact
the club	over the next fou	ır hours,	he could	still not rais	se any	one a	at the c	lub. Th	e pilo	ot eventually	/ phoned the
local poli	ce and asked the	m to adv	ise the cl	ub that he	had sa	afely	landed	so as t	o prev	vent search	and rescue
procedur	es being implem	ented. It	appears	the club tel	epho	ne wa	as not b	oeing m	onito	red and the	pilot had an
outdated	contact list. This	s incident	: highlight	ts the impo	rtanc	e of C	lubs ha	aving a	n activ	ve SAR Wate	ch
mechanis	mechanism in place and for pilots to organise and brief their own person responsible for initiating SAR action										
(refer als	o to MOSP 2, pa	agraph 8	8.1.18 - Se	earch and R	escue	(SAR	R) Actio	n). A cı	urrent	list of seve	ral contact
telephone numbers would also have assisted.											

Date	14-Dec-2014	Regior	۱	SAGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0457
Level 1	Technical		Level 2 Systems		Level 3		Avionics/F	light			
									instrumen	ts	
A/C Mod	el 1		-21Mi	A/C Mode			2				
Injury	Injury Nil		age	Nil	Phase In-Flig			ght		PIC Age	65
of Airwor rear ASI The evalu	r was being flow thiness. During t was not function uation flight was cted from the in	the take- ing. The o complete	off the s commar ed and i	second pilot nd pilot note nspection af	in the d that ter lar	rear : the f nding	seat ad ront As reveale	vised t SI appe ed the a	he co ared 1 ASI pl	mmand pilc to be 'under umbing was	ot that the -reading'. 5



Accident and Incident Summaries

disconnected the ASI plumbing to conduct a manometer test and failed to reconnect it. This oversight was not picked-up during a secondary inspection. The experienced command pilot acknowledged that he failed to conduct an instrument check as part of the Daily Inspection. This incident highlight the importance of diligently carrying out the required Independent Inspection following maintenance and, undertaking a check of the functioning of instruments during the Daily Inspection.

Date	14-Dec-2014	Regior	۱	VSA		SOAR Report Nbr			S-	0456	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Run	iway E	vay Events Leve		Level	3	Runway ex	cursion
A/C Mod	A/C Model 1		Janus			A/C Model 2					
Injury	Nil	Nil Damage Nil		Pha	Phase Landing				PIC Age	66	
-	e landing roll on d wing caught in	-			•		-			-	

Date	14-Dec-2014	Regior	1 I	SAGA		SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-0473	
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Airc	raft Co	ontro	<u> </u>	Level	3	Hard landing	
A/C Mod	el 1		ASW 2	0CL		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Minor	Pha	ise	Landi	ng		PIC Age	53
After returning from a cross-country flight, this experienced pilot configured the aircraft for I						raft for land	ding and				
employed full 'landing' flap. During final approach the pilot commenced the round-out too high. Despite fully											
closing th	ne airbrakes, the	aircraft's	speed de	cayed resu	ulting i	in a h	eavy la	nding.	The s	tarboard wi	ing contacted
the grou	nd and suffered i	ninor da	mage. The	e CFI advise	ed the	pilot	was fly	ing the	e final	approach a	at a speed
that was	too slow for the	conditio	ns. The hig	gh round-c	out and	d sub	sequen	t loss c	of spe	ed placed th	ne aircraft in
the back	of the polar curv	e with a	high rate	of descent	and lo	oss of	fsome	aileron	cont	rol, which c	aused the
wing to drop and come into contact with the ground. Rounding out too high is usually because the pilot is											
unaware	of the glider's he	eight and	any chan	ge in it. In	this in	cider	nt fatigu	ue may	have	been a fact	or affecting
the pilot's judgement.											

Date	20-Dec-2014 Region GQ					SOA	R Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0459
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Airc	raft Co	ntro	I	Level	3	Hard landi	ng
A/C Mod	el 1		LAK 1	.7A		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dama	age Su	ubstantial	Phas	se	Outla	nding		PIC Age	75
The pilot, who was competing in the NSW State Gliding Championships, had taped over both of his water								his water			
ballast wing-tank vents so that water would not leak while one wing was on the ground on the grid. Just											
prior to launch the pilot forgot to remove one of the pieces of tape. During the course of the cross-country											
flight the pilot got low and an outlanding became inevitable. The pilot opened the water ballast dump valve											
but only	one wing emptie	ed. During	g the cour	se of landi	ng the	pilot	was ui	nable to	o mai	ntain wings	-level and
the wing	containing balla	st touche	d the gro	und at spe	ed caus	sing t	the airc	craft to	grou	nd loop and	suffer
substant	ial damage. This	accident	highlights	the impor	rtance o	of co	mpleti	ng a the	orou	gh pre-board	ding check
immedia	tely prior to fligh	ıt. While ı	nost fligh	t manuals	sugges	t kee	eping tł	ne wing	gs hor	izontal befo	ore take off
	uneven water di		•	•			•			•	
	this, use tape of a colour that contrast with the glider surface and ensure it is removed before flight.										
Asymmet	tric water ballas	t is poten	tially dan	gerous and	l could	lead	to inac	lverten	ıt spir	nning and di	fficulty
recoverir	ng from spin. In a	an asymm	etric win	g loading c	onditio	on, in	crease	d speed	d may	v be necessa	ry to
maintain	recovering from spin. In an asymmetric wing loading condition, increased speed may be necessary to maintain control.										



Date	21-Dec-2014	Region		SAGA	SOA	AR Repo	ort Nbr		S-	0466
Level 1	Operational	Le	vel 2	Terrain Co	ollisior	าร	Level 3		Collision v	vith terrain
A/C Mod	el 1		ASW 27		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Damage	Subs	stantial Ph	ase	Outla	nding		PIC Age	48
	was flying cross-	•	•		-	•		•	•	
-	ow 6,000ft and e	-		-			-			-
	ling and noted th		•				-		-	
	distracted when	-								
	the knee pocke		-			-		-		
	e downwind leg, In base leg the pi	-					-		-	-
•	avoid it. The init									
-	avoid some roc	-					-			
	ay. Despite braki		-			-				
	knots and rebou	• ·	•				-			•
metres fr	om the contour	bank. The air	craft su	ffered substa	ntial d	lamage	. The pil	ot no	oted afterw	ard that
while he	had been drinkir	ıg water duri	ng the fl	ight, the colo	ur of	his urin	e indica [.]	ted ł	ne was dehy	/drated and
	eaction times ma	-	-		-	-				
	ours to find a roa		-						-	
distraction, fatigue and dehydration. There are a number of lessons from this accident; 1. ensure clothing										
does not interfere with the controls; 2. put the undercarriage down before entering circuit to avoid										
unnecessary distraction when close to the ground; 3. make sure you drink plenty of fluid containing electrolytes during flight; and 4. ensure you have adequate water and food after outlanding in case you have										
-		and 4. ensur	e you ha	ive adequate	wate	r and fo	od atter	out	ianding in c	ase you nave
a long wa	IIK.									

Date	23-Dec-2014	Regior	Region SAGA SOAR Repo			ort Nbr		S-0463			
Level 1	Operational		Level 2 Ground Ope			erations Level 3			3	Taxiing collision/near collision	
A/C Mod	del 1 Stemme S10-VT A/C Model 2										
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Minor	Pha	ise	Landi	ng		PIC Age	65
approach lifted the aircraft, r high wor	'power on' landi n. The pilot turne port wing and t resulting in the a kload, turning on due to misidenti	ed off the he starbo ircraft pit nto the ta	runway a ard wing ching for xiway at	a little earli tip contact ward and t too high a	er and ed the the pro	l at a grou ppelle	higher Ind. The er striki	speed e pilot ng the	than brake grour	normal. A gu d heavily to nd. Causal fa	ust of wind slow the actors include

Date	27-Dec-2014	Regior	1	SAGA		SOAR Report Nbr		S-0476		
Level 1	Consequential	Events	Level 2	Forced	/ Prec	autionary	Level 3		Forced/Precautionary	
					landir	Ig			Landing	
A/C Mod	el 1		Cherc	kee II		A/C Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dam	age	Nil	Pha	se Landi	ng		PIC Age	60
While loo	al flying the low	experien	ce pilot	flew too far	from	the airfield f	or the	condi	tions and o	utlanded
while ret	eturning to the airfield. The pilot, who was not cross-country endorsed and was flying a low									
performa	performance aircraft, flew through heavy sink and successfully completed a safe paddock landing with no									
damage or injury.										



Date	28-Dec-2014	Regior	า	SAGA SOAR Report Nbr			S-	0474		
Level 1	Operational		Leve	el 2	2 Runway Events		Level 3		Runway in	cursion
A/C Mod	el 1	Ģ	irob G	G 103	Twin II A/C Model 2					
Injury	Nil	Dam	age		Nil	Pha	Phase Landing		PIC Age	39
While lar	While landing on an inactive runway, the low experience pilot misjudged the stopping distance and the									
glider crossed the active runway, fortunately without incident.										

Date	28-Dec-2014	Regior	1 I	VSA		SOAR Report Nbr		S-	0490		
Level 1	Operational		Level 2	Airc	raft Control Level 3		3	Wheels up	landing		
A/C Mod	el 1		DG-30) Elan		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Minor	Pha	ise	Outla	nding		PIC Age	48
While fly	While flying back to the home airfield after a long cross-country flight, conditions became soft and the pilot						nd the pilot				
	o conduct an out	-	•						-		
	nt height to com	-			-		-				-
	aft landing with t								-	•	
	uninjured. Fatigue may have been a causal factor. This accident highlights the importance of pilots making										
the decision to break off the flight at sufficient height to configure the aircraft for landing and to complete a											
precautionary search of the outlanding paddock.											

Date	29-Dec-2014	Regior	egion VSA			SOAR Report Nbr				S-0465	
Level 1	Operational		Leve	Level 2 Miscella		aneous Level 3		3	Rope break/Weak lin		
										failure	
A/C Mod	el 1		A	SK-21		A/C	Model	2			
Injury	Nil	Dam	age	Nil	Pha	ase	Launc	h		PIC Age	65
Near the	top of a winch la	aunch, th	e swiv	el attaching tl	ne dro	gue c	hute b	roke. Tl	he cal	ble was rele	ased from
the glider	r and, due to ver	y strong	strong winds, the drogue chute drifted downwind over 1000 metres falling into a					falling into a			
suburban street. Fortunately there was no damage to property or injury to persons. The drogue was											
returned	returned to the club by a local resident.										

Date	31-Dec-2014	Regior	ı	VSA		SOAR Report Nbr		S-	0467		
Level 1	Operational		Level 2		Airfrar	ne		Level	3	Doors/Can	opies
A/C Mod	el 1		DG-1	G-100 A/C Model 2			2				
Injury	Nil	Dama	age	Minor	Pha	se L	aunc	h		PIC Age	64
During th	e aerotow take-	off run th	ne canopy	opened. 1	he pil	ot relea	ased f	rom to	w an	d landed str	aight ahead.
This expe	rienced pilot wa	s distract	ed by a cl	lub memb	er, wh	o was s	howi	ng som	ie visi	tors the glic	ler, and
forgot to	lock the canopy	prior to l	prior to launch. This incident highlights the consequences of distracting a pilot who					g a pilot who			
is prepar	ing for launch. La	aunch. Launch point discipline and hygiene is vital; distractions must be avoided and									
onlookers kept out of the way.											



		-	
Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	DefinitionAn aircraft collides with another aircraft either airborne
Airspace	Aircraft Separation	Collision	or on the runway strip, or a vehicle or person on the runway strip.
Airspace	Aircraft Separation	Issues	Airspace - Aircraft separation occurrences not specifically covered elsewhere.
Airspace	Aircraft Separation	Near collision	An aircraft comes into such close proximity with another aircraft either airborne or on the runway strip, or a vehicle or person on the runway strip, where immediate evasive action was required or should have been taken. (a) En-route (b) Thermalling (c) Circuit
Airspace	Airspace Infringement	Airspace Infringement	Where there is an unauthorised entry of an aircraft into airspace for which a clearance is required.
Airspace	Other	Other Airspace Events	Airspace occurrences not specifically covered elsewhere.
Consequential Events	Ditching	Ditching	When an aircraft is forced to land on water.
Consequential Events	Diversion / Return	Diversion / Return	When an aircraft does not continue to its intended destination, but either returns to the departure aerodrome or lands at an alternative aerodrome.
Consequential Events	Emergency / Precautionary descent	Emergency / Precautionary descent	Emergency descent - Circumstances that require the flight crew to initiate an immediate high rate descent to ensure the continued safety of the aircraft and its occupants.
Consequential Events	Emergency evacuation	Emergency evacuation	When crew and/or passengers vacate an aircraft in situations other than normal and usually under the direction of the operational crew.
Consequential Events	Forced / Precautionary landing	Forced / Precautionary landing	Forced landing – Circumstances under which an aircraft can no longer sustain normal flight and must land regardless of the terrain. <u>Precautionary landing</u> - A landing made as a precaution when, in the judgement of flight crew, a hazard exists with continued flight.
Consequential Events	Low Circuit	Low Circuit	Any occasion where a pilot flies a Low Circuit that was potentially hazardous.
Consequential Events	Other	Other Consequential Events	Consequential events not specifically covered elsewhere.
Environment	Weather	Icing	Any icing issue that affects the performance of an aircraft.
Environment	Weather	Lightning strike	The aircraft is struck by lightning.
Environment	Weather	Other Weather Events	Weather occurrences not specifically covered elsewhere.
Environment	Weather	Turbulence/Windshear/Microburst	Aircraft performance and/or characteristics are affected by turbulence, windshear or a microburst.
Environment	Weather	Unforecast weather	Operations affected by weather conditions that were not forecast or not considered by the flight crew.
Environment	Wildlife	Animal strike	A collision between an aircraft and an animal.
Environment	Wildlife	Birdstrike Other Wildlife Events	A collision between an aircraft and a bird. Wildlife related occurrences not specifically covered
Environment Operational	Wildlife Aircraft Control	Airframe overspeed	 elsewhere. The airspeed limit has been exceeded for the current aircraft configuration as published in the aircraft manual.
Operational	Aircraft Control	Control issues	The flight crew encounter minor aircraft control difficulties while airborne or on the ground.
Operational	Aircraft Control	Hard landing	Damage occurs during the landing.
Operational	Aircraft Control	Incorrect configuration	An aircraft system is incorrectly set for the current and/or intended phase of flight.
Operational	Aircraft Control	In-flight break-up	The aircraft sustained an airborne structural failure or damage to the airframe, to the extent that continued flight is no longer possible.
Operational	Aircraft Control	Loss of control	When control of the aircraft is lost or there are significant difficulties controlling the aircraft either airborne or on the ground.
Operational	Aircraft Control	Other Control Issues	Aircraft control occurrences not specifically covered elsewhere.
Operational	Aircraft Control	Pilot Induced Oscillations	Any PIO occurrence occassioning damage.
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Operational	Aircraft Control	Stall warnings	Any cockpit warning or alert that indicates the aircraft is approaching an aerodynamic stall.An aircraft contacts the intended landing area with the

			The incorrect loading of an aircraft that has the potential to adversely affect any of the following: a) the aircraft's weight;
Operational	Aircraft Loading	Loading related	 b) the aircraft's balance; c) the aircraft's structural integrity; d) the aircraft's performance; e) the aircraft's flight characteristics.
Operational	Aircraft Loading	Other Loading Issues	Aircraft loading occurrences not specifically covered elsewhere.
Operational	Airframe	Doors/Canopies	When a door or canopy, or its component parts, has failed or exhibited damage.
Operational	Airframe	Furnishings & fittings	An internal aircraft furnishing or fitting, including its component parts, has failed or exhibited damage.
Operational	Airframe	Fuselage/Wings/Empennage	Damage to the fuselage, wings, or empennage not caused through collision or ground contact.
Operational	Airframe	Landing gear/Indication	When the landing gear or its component parts (including indications), has failed or exhibited damage.
Operational	Airframe	Objects falling from aircraft	Objects inadvertently falling from or detaching from an aircraft.
Operational	Airframe	Other Airframe Issues	Technical - Airframe occurrences not specifically covered elsewhere.
Operational	Airframe	Windows	A window or a component part has failed or exhibited damage.
Operational	Communications	Other Communications Issues	Communications occurrences not specifically covered elsewhere.
Operational	Communications	Transponder related	The incorrect setting of a code and/or usage of transponder equipment.
Operational	Crew and Cabin Safety	Cabin injuries	A cabin crew member or passenger has suffered an illness or injury.
Operational	Crew and Cabin Safety	Flight crew incapacitation	A Flight Crew member is restricted to nil or limited duties as a result of illness or injury.
Operational	Crew and Cabin Safety	Inter-crew communications	Relates specifically to a loss, or breakdown, of communication between flight crew or associated ground staff.
Operational	Crew and Cabin Safety	Other Crew and Cabin Safety Issues	Cabin safety occurrences not specifically covered elsewhere.
Operational	Crew and Cabin Safety	Passenger related	Where the actions of a passenger adversely or potentially affects the safety of the aircraft.
Operational	Crew and Cabin Safety	Unrestrained objects	When objects are not appropriately restrained for the aircraft operation or phase of flight.
Operational	Fire Fumes and Smoke	Fire	Any fire that has been detected and confirmed in relation to an aircraft operation.
Operational	Fire Fumes and Smoke	Fumes	When abnormal fumes or smells are reported on board the aircraft.
Operational	Fire Fumes and Smoke	Smoke	When smoke is reported to be emanating from: a) inside the aircraft; or b) an external component of the aircraft.
			Errors or omissions during the planning and/or pre-flight phase that affect or may affect aircraft safety in relation
			to:
Operational	Flight Preparation/Navigation	Aircraft preparation	a) the aircraft's weight;b) the aircraft's balance;
			 c) the aircraft's structural integrity; d) the aircraft's performance; e) the aircraft's flight characteristics.
Operational	Flight Preparation/Navigation	Lost / Unsure of position	When flight crew are uncertain of the aircraft's position and/or request assistance from an external source.
Operational	Flight Preparation/Navigation	Other Flight Preparation/Navigation Issues	Navigation - Flight planning occurrences not specifically covered elsewhere.
Operational	Flight Preparation/Navigation	VFR into IMC	An aircraft operating under the Visual Flight Rules enters Instrument Meteorological Conditions.
Operational	Fuel Related	Contamination	When the presence of a foreign substance is found in fuel.
Operational	Fuel Related	Exhaustion	When the aircraft has become completely devoid of useable fuel.
Operational	Fuel Related	Leaking or Venting	Relates specifically to the unplanned loss of fuel from a fuel tank or fuel system.
Operational	Fuel Related	Low fuel	The aircraft's supply of fuel becoming so low (whether or not the result of a technical issue) that the safety of the aircraft is compromised.
Operational	Fuel Related	Other Fuel Related Issues	Fuel related occurrences not specifically covered elsewhere.

Operational	Fuel Related	Starvation	When the fuel supply to the engine(s) is interrupted, but there is still usable fuel on board the aircraft.
Operational	Ground Operations	Foreign Object Damage/Debris	Any loose objects on an aerodrome have caused, or have the potential to cause, damage to an aircraft.
Operational	Ground Operations	Ground handling	Any ground handling and aircraft servicing that caused, or has the potential to cause injury or damage to a stationary aircraft.
Operational	Ground Operations	Jet blast/Prop/Rotor wash	Any air disturbance from a ground-running aircraft propeller, rotor or jet engine that has caused, or has the potential to cause, injury or damage to property.
Operational	Ground Operations	Other Ground Ops Issues	Ground operation occurrences not specifically covered elsewhere.
Operational	Ground Operations	Taxiing collision/near collision	An aircraft collides, or has a near collision, with another aircraft, terrain, person or object on the ground or on water during taxi.
Operational	Miscellaneous	Missing aircraft	The aircraft is reported as missing. Miscellaneous occurrences not specifically covered
Operational	Miscellaneous	Other Miscellaneous	elsewhere in this manual.
Operational	Miscellaneous	Rope break/Weak link failure	Towplane separation incident necessitating a modified circuit.
Operational	Miscellaneous	Rope/Rings airframe strike	Airframe struck by launch cable or rings. Includes entanglemt with rope.
Operational	Miscellaneous	Warning devices	Situations in which an aural or visual aircraft warning device activates to alert the flight crew to a situation requiring immediate or prompt corrective action.
Operational	Miscellaneous	Winch Performance Issue	Any incident caused by poor winch performance, such as power failure, or mechanical reasosn.
Operational	Runway Events	Depart/App/Land wrong runway	 An aircraft that: a) takes off b) lands, c) attempts to land from final approach d) operates in the circuit at, to or from an area other than that authorised or intended for landing or departure
Operational	Runway Events	Other Runway Events	Runway event occurrences not specifically covered elsewhere.
Operational	Runway Events	Runway excursion	An aircraft that veers off the side of the runway or overruns the runway threshold.
Operational	Runway Events	Runway incursion	The incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft.
Operational	Runway Events	Runway undershoot	Any aircraft attempting a landing and touches down prior to the threshold.
Operational	Terrain Collisions	Collision with terrain	Any collision between an airborne aircraft and the ground, water or an object, where the flight crew were aware of the terrain prior to the collision.
Operational	Terrain Collisions	Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)	When a serviceable aircraft, under flight crew control, is inadvertently flown into terrain, obstacles or water without either sufficient or timely awareness by the flight crew to prevent the collision.
Operational	Terrain Collisions	Ground strike	When part of the aircraft drags on, or strikes, the ground or water.
Operational	Terrain Collisions	Wirestrike	When an aircraft strikes a wire, such as a powerline, telephone wire, or guy wire, during normal operations.
Technical	Powerplant/Propulsion	Abnormal Engine Indications	A visual or cockpit warning that indicates an engine is malfunctioning or operating outside normal parameters.
Technical	Powerplant/Propulsion	Engine failure or malfunction	An engine malfunction that results in a total engine failure, a loss of engine power or is rough running.
Technical	Powerplant/Propulsion	Other Powerplant/Propulsion Issues	Powerplant / Propulsion occurrences not specifically covered elsewhere.
Technical	Powerplant/Propulsion	Propeller malfunction	The failure or malfunction of an aircraft propeller or its associated components.
Technical	Powerplant/Propulsion	Transmission & Gearboxes	The failure or malfunction of an aircraft transmission/gearbox and/or its associated components.

Technical	Systems	Avionics/Flight instruments	The partial or complete loss of normal functioning of the avionics system or its components.
Technical	Systems	Electrical	The partial or complete loss of normal functioning of the aircraft electrical system.
Technical	Systems	Flight controls	The partial or complete loss of normal functioning of a primary or secondary flight control system.
Technical	Systems	Fuel	The partial or complete loss of normal functioning of the fuel system.
Technical	Systems	Hydraulic	The partial or complete loss of the hydraulic system.
Technical	Systems	Other Systems Issues	Technical - Systems occurrences not specifically covered elsewhere.